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GIAPTER 1
INfRODUCTION
The Problem of the 1hird Use of the Law
According to the Lutheran Confessions there are three uses of the law; this

is plainly stated by the Formula of Concord (Ep. VI, 1; SD VI, 1). In catechesis these

are usually referred to as curb, mirror, and guide.1 The first serves to maintain
outward order and decency in society and is exercised by all lawful authority,
especially the family, government, and schools; this is called the political or civil

use of the law [usus politicus seu civilis]. The second and principal use is intended
to bring people to a knowledge of their sin; this is the theological use [usus

theologicus}. The dogmatidans of the orthodox period divided this use into the
usus elmchticus, by which people are convicted of sin, and the usus paedagogicus,
by which they are then led to Ouist (Gal. 3: 24). This was done to make it clear

that the law itself does not lead to Quist but does so only when Quist takes it in
hand. The third use [usus tertius] applies specifically to Cluistians, giving them a
definite rule and norm according to which they should pattern and regulate their
lives [usus didadicus seu nonnaticus]. However, beyond that, opinions differ as to
how it is to be used; some, for instance, maintain that it is meant for the regener-

ate, lnsofar as they have been born anew; others say that it is for the regenerate,
insofar as they are still sinners. Nevertheless, there are two things that supporters of the third use agree on: (1) that it ls a specifically positive, didactic use and
(2) that it is intended only for Ouistians. The Fonnula certainly teaches that the

law plays a role in the life of the Ouistian. Precisely what that ls, and whether

1

2
the third use as such is necessary, will be discussed in chapter three. For the
purpoees of clarity, we will define the 'traditional• understanding of the third
u.ae of the law as that view (consolidated in Lutheran orthodoxy) according to

which the law plays a positive, normative, didactic, ar'1. necessary role in the life
of the truly regenerate Ouistian qua saint. 'This is the tertius usus legis in renatis.
Whether this is the correct interpretation of the Formula uf Concord remains to be
seen. Furthermore, this traditional view has often been asserted against the
liberal position, which denies that the law plays any positive, didactic role in the
life of the Cluistian. Conservatives have clung to it tenaciously, using it as a
bulwark against the high tide of moral relativism.

1he problem of the third use of the law is part of the larger problem of the
proper dun:tnction between law and gospel, which is not only one of the great
hallmarkl of Lutheranism but, at the same time, a major watershed between it
1nd the rellt of Ouistendom,2 The controversy over its use, which started shortly
after Luther'• death, wu heightened by the fact that Luther himself consistently
taught only a twofold use. The pressure of the First Antinomian Controversy
between 1537 and 1540, already during hia lifetime, forced Luther to be more
precise in hil statements ebout the law, and to correct some of the more serious
miaunderstandinga that aeem to have uiaen u

A result

of his sometimes pr<>-

vocative and unguarded remarkl ebout the Cluistian's freedom from the law. In
the Antlnomi'1n Di,putationsl Luther sets out very precisely his understanding of
law and gospel, puticularly ln connection with conversion and regeneration.
·The problema connected with the third uae of the law, while not altogether
ab8ent here, are more the focua of the Second Antinomian Controversy leading
up to the Formu"' of Concord. In fact Article VI, on the third use of the law, grew
out of thla controversy, which had at its center the question of whether reborn

3

Christians need the law; one party said Yes, the other, No. Both claimed to be the
legitimate interpreters of Luther. The problem of the third use of the law, while
it has been a major source of division within Lutheranism itself, has also led to
significant differences between Lutherans and Reformed, as has the problem of
law and gospel generally.
A survey of the literature will show that most modem Luther scholars
hold that Luther himself did not teach a third (positive) use, but that the idea was
first introduced into Lutheranism by Melanchthon, and later given special prominence by the theologians of the orthodox period. The question of the third use is
thought by some to be one of the greatest differences between the Reformation
and later Lutheranism. Because of Melanchthon's defection from the Cllu.rch of
the Augsburg Confession, his later writings, and those of his followers, were
regarded as suspect by the strict (Gnesio) Lutherans, for it is precisely in these
writings that the teaching of the third use of the law is clearly articulated. How-

ever, the decisive controversy over the usus tertius occurred mainly between the
opposing factions of the Gnesio-Lutherans.
The fact that the proponents of the third use of the law were not able to
point immediately to passages in Luther where the tertius usus is explicitly
taup,ht, as in Melanchthon, did not automatically close the debate. What they
had to do was show that the doctrinal formulations of Melanchthon agreed in
substance with Luther's intentions. Oearly, the question of whether or not
Luther taught a third use cannot be resolved simply by demonstrating that he
spoke only of two uses of the law. In other words, the numbt?r of uses is not in
itself decisive. First, we need to arrive at a comprehensive view of Luther's
understanding of the law before we can determine whether his teaching implies a
third use, or whether a third use is compatible with his theology. Although the

4
Fonnulil of Concord teaches a third use of the law, the differences of interpretation

allow scholars both pro and con to claim its support for their position. Our task

will be to determine if there is any difference in accent between Luther's understanding of the role of the law in the Cluistian life, based on his great Galiltians

Commentary, and Article VI of the Fonnula of Concord, on the tertius usus.
The Boundaries of Research
1be question of whether Luther taught a third use of the law is far too

broad for a thesis. We will th~refore confine ourselves, in the main, to his great

Galatians Commentary of 1531 / 1535, where he explicates in considerable detail the
doctrine of justification and the proper distinction between law and gospel.4
Even though the nature of the letter is such that Paul speaks there more about
justification than about sanctification, Luther still writes enough about the role of
the law in the Oui.stian life to warrant using this as our primary source. There
are two main reasons for this choice: first, apart from the Antinomian Disputations
(which would seem to us to be more appropriate for a dissertation than a thesis
topic), Luther's Galatians Commentary is the best source for an extended treatment
of law and gospel in relation to both justification and sanctification; secondly, it is
justifiably famous, is often alluded to in the Confessions, and represents Luther's
mature theology. This in many ways makes it an ideal document because, even
though it does not consciously address the problems involved in the discussion
about the third use of the law, the debate over the tertius usus cannot be isolated
from wider questions, such as thoee of the relation between law and gospel, between justification and sanctification, and between faith and good works, all of
which are dealt with at some length in Luther's Commentary.

5
We have decided against a separate study of Luther's earlier 1519 Galatians

Commenta,yS because his theology at that stage still contained many Augustinian
ideas which he later laid aside as he reshaped his theology around the central
core of justification by faith, and the extemality of God's redemptive work pro

nobis per Christum, mediated through the word. On the other hand, there is also
much in the 1519 Commentary that is thoroughly evangelical, yet it can in no way
compare with the profoundness and lucidity of his later Commentary.
Method of Approach
Our first task will be to survey the positions of the major protagonists in

the modem debate, which peaked around the 1950s. This survey is not intended
to be exhaustive. We can only consider a handful of theologians who have made
a signif icarit contribution to the discussion. All are responding, in one way or
another, to Karl Barth's wartime attack on the Lutheran distinction between law
and gospel, and its associated doctrine of the two kingdoms. In all of them, the
problem of the third use is inextricably coMected with the larger problem of the
relation between law and gospel.
Following our survey of the literature and a brief summary of some of the
main questions raised, we will tum to a detailed investigation of Luther's great

Galatians Commentary and attempt to focus especially on those issues already
shown to be important by our survey. Although we cannot include a special
chapter on antinomianism, we will append an excursus that highlights the chief
issues in, and differences between, the First and Second Antinomian Controversies. This in tum will help sharpen our focus as we compare Luther and the
Confessions, and alert us to some of the struggles that stand between the time of
Luther and the Formula of Concord. After the excursus, we will examine the
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Lutheran Confessions, especially Article VI of the Formula of Concord, to see if
there is any inconsistency or difference in emphasis compared with Luther's

Commentary. In that chapter we will enter into discussion with some modem
authors in an attempt to define our own position as precisely as possible. As we
probe the problems of the terlius usus, we will also try to answer the question of
whether there is an evangelical use of the law. 'The final chapter will be the conclusions.
Background
As we have already indicated, scholars generally agree that the doctrine of
the threefold use of the law (triplex usus legis] was first introduced on Lutheran
soil by Melanchthon in the 1535 edition of his Loci Communes. There he posits

that, in addition to its civil and theological functions, the law also has a didactic
use, which instructs the regenerate in the works that please God and that have
been commanded by him (CR 21, 405-6). He reaffirms his position in the 1543
edition of his Loci: "Therefore, even though we are free from the Law, that is,
from damnation, because we are righteous by faith, for the sake of the Son of
God, yet because it pertains to obedience, the Law remains; that is, the divine
ordinance remains that those who have been justified are to be obedient to God.•6
The difference between Luther and Melanchthon on the doctrine of the
law was one of the factors that contributed to the bitter, internecine struggle,
which embroiled the followers of the two reformers after the death of Luther, and
which was only finally settled by the Formula of Concord in 1577. It rejected
Melanchthon's doctrine of the law and upheld Luther's view of evangelical freedom, by trying to steer a middle course between the unevangelical alternatives of
antinomianism and legalism.

7
It has been noted that Melanchthon's later view of the law, while rejected

by Luther and the Confessions, received strong support from the Swis.9 Reformer,
John Calvin. This is particularly clear from his Institutes of the Christian Religion
(1536) where Calvin defends the view that the gospel and the law have much in
common with each other.7 Ironically, Calvin uses the language of Luther's great

Galatians Commentary to praise the usus didacticus as the principal use of the law,
while Luther himself, in that same Commentary, emphasues that the principal use
is the usus thtologicus.8
These difference between the two great reformers in their approach to the
law sets the stage for the debate in our own century, which is basically a continuation of the argument between Lutherans and Calvinists that goes back to the
Reformation.9 To properly appreciate the moJem debate, it is important to
reAli1.e that the Refonnation has bequeathed to us two divergent views of the
law. At the risk of oversimplifying, we could say that for Lutheranism, the chief
use of the law is basically negative and regulative--ita main functions being to
accuae people of sin, and to restrain the wicked-while for Calvinism, the chief
use of the law is positive and normative--ita main function being to guide and
instruct OuistiAN ln how to lead a God-pleasing life.10

In our century the debate over law and gospel in general, as well as the
third UBe of the law in particular, was given fresh impetus by the publication of
Karl Barth's famous e88ay Evangelium und Gtsetz in 1935.11 Already the order of
the words, goepel and law, is highly significant. Barth does not accept the
-Lutheran diAlectic of law and goepel but rather teaches that law and gospel are
merely two different ways of describing the one and the same act of God. Therefore, law and goepel are not two intrinsically different words but merely two
ways that God uaes to say the same thing. Barth's famous sentence says it all:
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'The Law is nothing else than the necessary form of the Gospel, whose content is
grace.' 12 Given his emphasis on the majesty of God, and the almost unbridgeable gulf that he sees existing between God and mankind, it is not surprising that
he says: 'The very fact that God even speaks to us, that itself, in any event, is
sheer grace,"13
Survey of the Main Positions
WemerElert
The first and most powerful Lutheran voice to be raised against Barth on

this issue was that of Werner Elert. He rejected Barth's coordination of law and
gospel and the positive didactic role that he assigns the law in the Ouistian life.
Instead, Elert propo8ed a radical dialectic which leaves no room for a third use of
the law as tr~ditionally understood.14 He argues that if Melanchthon's axiom 'lex

... semper accusal conscientias et perlernfacit (Ap. 167 § 38) is applied consistently,
one can only conclude that the law cannot serve as a guide to life for the vita

christuma. For Elert the law is never simply an en~my to the sinner or a friend to
the saint. He categorically denies that the law is ever purely informatory, and
tcjects the view that the Confessions teach otherwise. •Not for a moment does
the Formula of Concord forget the fundamental Pauline-Lutheran understanding
of the law, which follows already from the text of the Decalogue, namely, that it
is always a law of retribution, and that even when instructing the regenerate it

can never be anything else.•15 Elert does not deny that the law is valid for tt-c
Ouistian, but not insofar as he or she is born anew. Rather, it continues to
address its threats and punishments to the Cluistian as sinner, for even the
Ouistian can never fully shed the flesh. However, he refuses to have anything to
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do with an innocuous third use of the law that has been stripped of its threats
and that now serves merely the positive function of guide to the conscience.
Elert agrees that the Confessions do talk of the law playing a role in the
life of the regenerate, but he argues that the term 'regenerate• is used there in the
wide sense of a Omstian as saint and sinner, not in the narrow sense of a person
who has been reborn through justification. He makes his position clear when he
says:
The Fonnula of Omrord thus certainly teaches that the regenerate also
need the law, and instruction through the law, •ut doceat certa opera.• ·sut the
law of God prescribes good works for believers in such a way that, like a
minor, it shows them at the same time (simul} that in this life our good works
are imperfect and impure• [SD VI, 21].16 In other words, there is no law for
the earthly life of the regenerate that serves purely as information, either for
the old Adam in them or even insofar as they actually do the •good works• of
the law. •Arguere autem peccata est proprium officium 1tgis• [SD VI, 14}. The
person who hears God's law also experiences the usus arguens (or, as the later
dogmatidans called it, the llsus elenchticus). Also Melanchthon in the Apology had said, • Lex semper accusal.• The usus didacticus of the later dogmaticians,
in the sense of mere information, is a pure abstraction which, if elevated as a
practical norm, could only ever lure them into the pestilentissima secu ritas of
the Phansees.17
According to Elert, the problem with the third use is that it has the effect
of reducing the law-gospel tension by giving the law preeminence over the
gospel, thereby opening the door to moralism. Seen from that vantage point, the
divine will begins and ends with the law. Although Quist remains the
redeemer, the purpose of salvation is now to enable people to fulfill the divine
command for themselves, which they would otherwise be incapable of doing.
The gospel then becomes subservient to, and a means of fulfilling, the law.
According to this scheme of things, the only difference between the way the law
functions for a believer and an unbeliever is that the believer is redeemed from
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the curse of the law. For the Ouistian, the law then becomes primarily a rule for
life.18
Such a position is unacceptable to Elert because it weakens the antithesis
between law and gospel, which is fµndamental to Lutheran theology. Instead of
keeping them apart in dialectical tension, a third use that teaches only a positive
function of the law for the regenerate ends up bringing law and gospel closer
together. Elert traces this error back to Melanchthon who, although he agreed
with Luther in teaching that the praecipuus usus was the theological use, in which
the law reveals and condemns sin, nevertheless diverged from him by even+ually
developing •a third use in which the law is no longer judgment but exclusively a
response attainable through obedience' (Ibid., 394).19 For Elert, a third use of the
law unde~tood in this sense, where the gospel finally serves the law, is basically
Barthian, for Barth holds that the law is in the gospel, and that the gospel is
simply a clearer rrumifestation of the law .20
Paul Althaus
There are two problems that Althaus finds with Bert's denial of the third
use of the law.21 First, it overlooks the fact that there are already imperatives
implied by the gospel itself, and secondly, it fails to deal adequately with the
ethical directives of the New Testament letters. It is precisely here, according to
Althaus, that Barth's position has an element of truth, even though his gospel-law
sequence is dogmatically untenable. These are the problems that Althaus
addresses in his book, Gebot und Gesetz. His thesis is as follows:
U the lex is clearly un~erstood and defined as the polar-opposite of the
gospel, then we should no longer really speak of a tertius usus ltgis, much less
accept the formula, •gospel and law.• What is legitimate in these formulations, from the standpoint of the gospel, must be expressed another way. This
is what I attempt to do by distinguishing between 'command' [Gebot] and
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"law" {Gesetz/: that is, between God's will for us, and the special form of that
will as law. We can only do justice to what is really at stake in this discussion if we replace the two-part formula, •1aw and gospel,• with the three-part
formula, "command, law, and gospel. 1 22

Althaus finds some justification for the theological distinction between
"law• and 'command' already in the terminology of the New Testament, particularly in the Johannine corpus.23 Even though Paul does not make this distinction, he claims that it is implicit in his statements. The same Paul who proclaims
Christ as the end of the law (Rom. 10: 4) also teaches that Christians no longer
live under the law, nor do they live without law, but they live in the law, namely,
the law of Quist (1 Cor. 9: 21), and fulfill the law through love (Rom. 13: 10; Gal.
5: 14). Althaus does not see nomos as identical to the eternal, unchangeable will
of God for human beings, but as •one limited and temporary form of this eternal

will--a form that in Jesus Christ has been superseded and abolished.• 24 The term
he uses for God's eternal will (following Johannine usage) is "divine command."
This command {Gebot} is based on God's eternal love; it is the reverse side of the
offer {Angebot] with which the eternal love of God encounters mankind. "God's
offer is at the same time a summons, an appeal, and a command to let him be
what he wants to be--my God. •25 Before the Fall, God's command meant life and
joy. His demand: "you shall,' was really permission: "you may.•26 We still find
an echo of this in some of the Old Testament psalms which praise God's Torah as
a source of joy and delight (Pss. 1: 1, 2; 119: 1, 35, 47, 70, 97). However, after the
fall, the command became law. 'The law is the form that God's will for us must
take on account of sin. •27 The contents of the law is the same as that of the command, but the form of God's will as command is fundamentally different from its
form as law. The law does not have the unitary character of the command but, of
necessity, confronts us as a multitude of prohibitions. After the fall, God's eternal
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loving will must take the form of a verbum alienum. The law accuses and condemns, and all the more so when sinful human beings use it to justifying themselves before God. Consequently, the law is no longer a source of joy and delight
but of anxiety, sighs, fear, torment and also curse.28 Yet even •through and beyond the verbum alienum I hear the original verbum proprium . ... We therefore
never stand simply under the law; we also continue standing under the original
command of God's love. The will of God confronts us simultaneously as command and law.■ 29 But Ouist is the end of the law, the end of the relationship
between God and human beings governed by the law. In Cluist God now acts
contrary to the law by justifying the ungodly. Throu&n the gospel the law once
again becomes command. Althaus comments:
~e command, as it exists in the realm of the gospel, is different however
from the original command in one important respect: It is addressed to those
who, though living under the gospel, have not ceased to be sinners, and still
have the old Adam. Therefore, the command is no longer supralapsari:mhence it must have one feature in common with the law: it must necessarily
express the positive will of God also in the negative form of prohibitions.30
Althaus's basic criticism of Barth is the latter's failure to distinguish properly between law and command, on the one hand, and primal grace and gospel,
on the other. •1n the beginning is the grace of the primal state, not the gospel;
and this primal grace does not give rise to the law, but the divine commandGod's loving call, his wooing claim upon our hearts:31 Since the command becomes law after the fall, what follows the gospel is not law (a la Barth), but command. The Ouistian is freed from the law, but not from the command. Furthermore, while gospel and law stand in strict disjunction and antithesis, there is no

contra between gospel and command. Rather, the gospel itself points toward the
command and enables its fulfillment.32 In fact for Althaus, •the command is an
element of the gospel itself: the challenge to accept the freedom that God offers,
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and to live in and from his love.•33 This command is an "imperative of grace'
(Elert) and, as such, is altogether different from the imperative of the law. Not
only does the command presuppose the gospel, the gospel itself implies the
command. To that extent, Althaus argues, the gospel necessarily confronts us in
the form of a command--a command which itself is gospel, empowering us to
live from God's love, and therefore in that love. He nails his colors to the mast
when he asserts: 1 The gospel is simultaneously and unalterably command; faith
is immediately and unavoidably action and stance.934 While this finally is noth-

ing but a rank confusion of law and gospel, it is his way of attempting to address

th- problem of cheap grace, where faith is divorced from works. It is also on
accoWlt of this danger that Althaus claims that the traditional formulas asserting
that faith effects works, or that works follow faith, are inadequate. "Faith lives in
works, in concrete behavior, and not without it or apart from it.935 Being and
action, indicative and imperative, are indissolubly connected. "Thus our Oui.stian life at all times stands under the double aspect of being and act, gift and task.
'Being' (the Ouistian life as the fruit of faith) is real only in terms of personal
'action."36 Here he appeals to the Confessions which teach that good words are
done by the Christian, just as a good tree produces good fruit, and that at the
same time good works must be done (CA VI).37
What implications does Althaus's theology have for a third use of the law?
Although he finds it theologically indefensible, he still wants to salvage the concept. He gives three reasons for rejecting the traditional idea of a tertius usus and

in each case offers an alternative. First, the notion of law in Lutheran theology is
so overwhelmingly that of the lex accusans, condemnatrix, justifkatrix, that he
thinks it best not to confuse the issue by speaking now of a positive function of

the law, Instead of talking about a third use of the law, Althaus would rather
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speak of •a function of the biblical «::ommands and directives in the Ouistian
life. ■ 38 Secondly, the term •taw• can easily convey the idea that being a Ouistian

means following a code of rules or instructions rather than being led by the
Spirit.39 The ethical admonitions of Scripture are not intended to be understood
legalistically as prescriptions, but as helps toward our own persmal discernment
of what the Lord requires ot' us in the present situation. Thirdly, the concept
'law• suggests that it is only the imperatives of Scripture that provide directives
for the Ouistian, whereas infact Jesus and the apostles also see their lives, as
well as their teaching, as being examples to the church (1 Cor. 11: 1; Phil. 3: 17),
not to mention the "great cloud of witnesses (Heb. 12: 1). Therefore, even though
Althaus rejects the terminology of the tertius usus ltgis, he does not deny that the
OU'istian still needs the guidance and direction of God's will, which he calls the
divine command. For it is precisely through 'the moral directives and realities in
Scripture and in Ouistianity" that the Spirit leads us to know God's will.40
Gerhard Ebeling
Ebeling's assessment of the law in Luther in essence agrees with Elert's
position but has corrected some of Elert's imprecisions.41 The strength of Ebeling's work lies in his detailed study of the Antinomian Disputations. Since however this is not our primary area of research, we will refrain from reporting the
details of his findings. His general conclusions should be sufficient. We begin by
noting that Ebeling agrees with Elert that Luther always speaks only of a duplex

usus ltgis, and accepts his proof that the only passage in Luther's works that
would support a triplex usus must be rejected as a forgery intended to bring about
a harmony between Luther and Melanchthon. Ebeling tries to get at the problem
of the third use of the law by carefully investigating the origin and meaning of
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the term usus legis in Luther. He shows that the doctrine of the triplex usus legis
originates with Melanchthon who includes it for the first time in the 1535 edition
of his Loc.1--not the terminology as such, but the doctrine.42 While the term

triplex usus legis is not actually used by Melanchthon until the 1540s, Ebeling
observes that the idea of the tertius usus legis is present as early as 1528 in the

Instruction for Visitors and in the Apology of the Augsburg Confession.43 From this
he concludes that, apart from a few isolated instances, Melanchthon basically
teaches a triplex usus, even if he does not use the term until later.

1n tracking Luther's use of the term usus legis, Ebeling makes several helpf ul observations.44 First of all, Luther evinces no consistent use of the term. He

uses it most frequently in his 1531 / 1535 Galatians Commentary. On the other
hand, in~ 1519 Commentary, he develops his doctrine of the law without using
the term usus legis at all, while in the Antinamian Disputations the formula duplex

usus legis occurs only once (WA 391,441: 2-3).45
Ebeling asks a question that is crucial to a proper understanding of the

usus legis, Who is the subject of the uti? God, as the author of the law? or the
human beings addressed by the law? For him the answer must be God, since,
from the standpoint of justification sola gratia sola fide, the only legitimate use of
the law is the paedagogus in Ozristum. If human beings were the subject of the uti,
then the law itself would be necessary for justification.46 Furthermore, while a
proper use of the law will distinguish between the usus politicus and the usus

theologicus, in preaching the law the two must be held firmly together, for the law
must be understood by all who hear it in both its political and theological modes.
Only the believer however can use the law in the usus politicus without becoming

guilty of abusing it by using it as a means of self-justification.41
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According to Ebeling, Luther teaches that the law must be preached to
both believers and unbelievers, but in different ways. He stresses that the law
has to be preached to believers not in quantum iusti but in quantum

peccatores.

Here he agrees with Elert. It is not the Ouistian as saint who needs to hear the
law, but the Ouistian as sinner. Therefore, for Ebeling it is not so much a matter
of distinguishing between the second and a third use as making a distinction
within the second use itself. He writes:

In denying that Luther taught a tertius usus legis in Melanchthon's sense, we
are always apt to overlook the fact that Luther does indeed ~erentiate
between the effects that the law in the usus theologicus has on the unbeliever
{impiusJ and on the believer (pius}, and again, between the ways in which it
has to be preached to the one and to the other. Here the distinction between
law and gospel enaoaches on the doctrine of the usus legis.48
Ebeling defends the view that the

usus legis takes on homiletical and

pastoral relevance, so that it could even be said that the preacher becomes the
subject of the uti lege in rightly dividing the word of God. In support of this he
appeals to Luther who says that even though Ouistians are still to be taught the
law, after justification the law loses its sting. Before justification the law terrifies
all who encounter it, but afterward the reason for teaching it to the believers is
not to accuse or condemn, but to encourage them to do what is good. Therefore,
the law is to be softened for them and taught instead of exhortation.~9

Ragnar Bring
Bring, like most Scandinavian and Finnish scholars, also rejects the third
UBe

of the law as traditionally understood.so On, the other hand, as we will see

later, he has no difficulty in accepting the doctrine of Article VI of the Fonnula of

Concord. In order to understand this apparent contradiction, we need to begin
where he does, not with examining specific Luther texts, but with a d.i.scussion of
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tiuch concepts as 'converted" and 'regenerate: These terms, he argues, which are
espedally relevant to the debate about the third use of the law, come to take on a
different meaning in the period of pietism than in Luther, a meaning which Bring
claims ultimately goes back to Melanchthon. Pietism discards Luther's distinction between the old and the new self, and instead identifies the new self with the
converted person in c.oncmo. ln that case, the third use is regarded as a special,
positive, non-accusatory use of the law, applicable only to believers. However, in
Luther's view, because Ouistians are still sinners, they continue to stand under
the law in the form of both the political and the theological use. When the "inner
man" is identified with the 'outer man,' as in pietism, there is no recognition of
the ongoing struggle between flesh and spirit, or the constant Anfechtung resulting from the temptation to either securitas or desperatio. For Luther, on the other
hand, the regenerate person is old and new at the same time, and experiences the
constant alternation of law and gospel. Pietism loses sight of the biblical truth
that God himself dwells within believers and sanctifies them through the means
of grace. Rather, sanctification becomes something that believers have, and
realize more and more, through obedience to the commandments. According to

this scheme of things, the gospel becomes a new law for the converted, which in
tum regulates their Uves.51
Bring believes that the Fonnula paints a different picture. It states that the
law is necessary on account of the old self, not that it is a norm for the life of the
new self. This for him is a thoroughly Lutheran distinction. However, the real
question that the Fonnula addresses is whether the law must be taught to the
regenerate or not. Here he believes that PC VI is very cleverly formulated so
1

that from the outset, it can formally affinn the third use of the law, while at the

same time setting aside the meaning of the third use that was really introduced
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by Melanchthon: 52 Bring argues that the Fonnula neutralizes the danger of
Melanchthon's doctrine of the third use by (1) streS&ng the difference between
the old and the new self; (2) making the new, and not the old self, the decisive
subject in sanctification; and (3) referencing the law to the old self of the believer.
He points out that the attempt to equate the new self with the reborn Ouistian is
expressly rejected by the Fonnula (Ep. VI, 3), and he is equally certain that the
Fonnula also rejects the traditional understanding of the third use, which sees it

as a special use of the law for the reborn (Ep. VI, 6). Certainly, Luther constantly
holds up to believers the Ten Commandments. But these are not only norms for
Guisti.ans, but the will of God for all people. Nor are they simply fixed, eternal
norms, solely for the sake of society, but are applicable to believers as well. All
people,~ regenerate and unregenerate, need the same law, because all people
are united by the fact that in Adam they are sinners--the chief difference is that
Ouistians are forgiven sinners.SJ Of course, while both may fulfill the law outwardly, only believers can truly fulfill the law. But this does not mean that they
are motivated by the demands of the law, or by norms in the form of commands:

As long as the law presents external norms for people, and they follow them
out of compulsion and under their own steam, their action will not become
that of the new man but will remain their own work, something that springs
from their own willpower, and will not be the direct result of God's and
Ouist's indwelling in faith or, as we might say, the result of the Holy Sprit's
ruling over him. All this however does not at all exclude the fact that norms
and commands are really present for the Christian. 1be only thing that is
denied is that the guidelines [Richtschnur] for the new life amount to following specific norms and commands.54
We must always distinguish between the insight that the reborn person as sinner
is in constant need of the law with its demands and norms (both first and second use),

and, on the other hand, the realization that the Cluistian as saint lives entirely without
law, and yet in his or her •law-free• life actually fulfills the law, and is the only person
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who really does fulfill it, for the law can only be fulfilled properly by faith. The third use
of the law in the traditional sense (which Bring argues is not taught in the Fonnula),
thrives on the illicit mingling of these two points of view. As a result, a person is seen
neither as completely new nor as completely old, but rather as a mixture of both. For
Luther however there is never any mixture or change: the Clui.stian is completely new
and completely old at one and the same time, but not some thing in between. This twofoldness is characteristic of the Ouistian life this side of the grave: as saints, who belong

already to the new aeon, we live completely in love; as sinners, who still belong to the
old aeon, we are bound and driven by the law. Bring shows that this has important
implications for the question of law and gospe[ -The old and new self

are distinguished

in the same way as law and gospel. The gospel addresses the new self, the law the old.

Yet the old and new self form a concrete unity just as law and gospel. Although law and
gospel are polar-opposites and must be kept as far apart as possible in justification, Bring
stresses that they also cohere very closely in the Oiristian life. However, like Althaus, he

treads on dangerous ground when he insists that, in view of the ultimate unity of law
and gospel, the Formula of Concord emphasizes that the gospel must not only be understood in marked contra:,--t to the law but that, in the broad sense, it must also include the
law.
The position just outlined leads Bring to conclude that the gospel is not simply
God's gift or offer of forgiveness; rather, the gospel changes our whole outlook and
behavior. It does not allow us simply to accept the gift and still remain the self-seeking
peoplt:: that we are. He notes that in the letters of J\e New Testament, the strongest
admonitions are directly connected with the proclamation of the gospel (d. Rom. U: 13). In other words, gift and obligation go together. We leave Bring speak for himself:
As a new person there is no difference for him between the demands of the
gospel and its gift; the one includes the other. But there the •demands• are
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not like external demands or norms. However, this does not exclude the
fact that he knows that he is obliged to have the deepest responsibility and
to achieve the most that can be demanded of him.
But there this is no longer perceived as an outer demand which one
focuses on for the purposes of gaining something; it is not fear that binds the
person to the demand, not even the hope of reward. The law is 'law• in its
characteristic sense, precisely for the 'old' man, who is always interested
only in himself, and is ordered by the law to be interested in something other
than himself. TI1e tension which arises therefore when a person attempts, by
himself, to get beyond himself, is characteristic of the position under the
"law,• in contrast to the position under the "gospel." The law demands that a
person not only wills, but actually strives, for something other than what is
of benefit to· him. But the only inducements by which demands can reach a
human being are necessarily selfish, precisely because he himself is selfish.
This kind of law is completely expunged for the new man. When we speak
of demands in connection with the new man, we are not talking about external demands, but something that he must strive to carry out according to his
own innermost will, which, through faith, is Olrist's own will. The fact that
in this way the law belongs to the gospel means, however, that there is no
third use of the law. But the fact that we can say of the gospel that, in one
sense, it contains law, easily leads us to think in this direction; and a vague
feeling for the correctness of this thought may in part lie behind the conviction that the third use of the law is not only compatible with evangelical
theology but is in fact necessary for it.55
Th£:'"e are finally two reasons why Bring rejects the traditional Lutheran doctrine
of the third use of the law, because (1) the law must continue to be preached to the
regenerate Ouistian insofar as he or she remains a sinner; and (2) the gospel does not
mean unlimited, fleshly freedom but includes within itself an obligation, a specific law.
However, while he cannot accept the third use understood as a special law and norm
applicable only to Ouistians, he can still accept Article VI of the Fonnula of Concord
because, according to his reading, it insists that Ouistians need the law as much as
anyone else because they are still sinners. However, the peculiarity about Bring's
position, which puts it beyond the confessional boundary, is his understanding that it is
the gospel, inasmuch as it contains the law in the form of obligation, which creates and
effects what it already gives, and that this must happen of necessity.
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Lauri Haikola
Haikola, a Finnish scholar, also rejects the third use of the law as not being
genuinely Lutheran.56 His work has two special virtues: First, he believes that
the .'.:omplex question of the usus tertius legis could be illuminated considerably if
the problem were investigated in the light of certain contemporary sources
which, until now, have not been fully utilized. In his opinion, the Fonnula of
Concord, and in particular Article VI, would become clearer if we were to ex-

amine it from the vantage point of its main author, Martin Oi.emnitz (which we

will do in chapter 3). Secondly, Haikola compares Luther's teaching on the law
with that of post-Reformation Lutheranism. Even if it turns out that his reading
is somewhat tendentious--and it lies beyond the scope of this thesis to test that-he has at least raised some important questions which need to be answered.
Haikola notes that the starting point, historically, of the dispute over the
third use was the formula that had been drawn up by Lutherans at the Synod of
Eisenach in 1556 in connection with the Majoristic Controversy. At the center of
this was the thesis that the doctrine of the law teaches that good works are necessary for salvation, if viewed abstractly and ideally [bona opera sunt necessaria ad

salutem in doctrina legis abstractive et de ideaJ.57 It was hoped that the Philippists
and Gnesio-Lutherans would be able to unite under this definition 01 the relation
between law and gospel. Haikola points out that this formula presupposes a
view, widely held among Lutherans, that sees the law as an objective order, binding on both God and human beings. According to this view, which he says goes
back to Melanchthon, the law, in principle, is the original way of salvation. If
people could keep the law perfectly, tht!y would be •tegally• entitled to salvation.
According to this scheme of things, Christ did what human beings cannot do. He
fulfilled the law for them perfectly. Quist therefore abolis.Jted the law through
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hls vicarious obedience; but the abstract, theoretical possibility of salvation by

works still exists. And people already in the state of grace can help themselves
pt!rsevere in grace if they fulfill the law. Consequently, the claim is made that the
teaching of the third use, which rests on this presupposition, stems from a view
of the law which sees it as basically fulfillable.58
Haikola argues that Luther, unlike the orthodox theologians, teaches that
human beings cannot fulfill God's commands and so preserve their own salvation. The law was never given as a means of salvation. Not even Adam could
keep the law without the help of divine grace, much less sinful human beings
after the fall. Hence in Luther's view of the atonement, according to Haikola,
Christ does not simply fulfill the law as our substitute, hecau.se of our inherent

inability to keep it ourselves. Rather, Christ frees us from the curse and tyranny
of the law, indeed, frees us from the law in toto.
All Lutherans agreed that Christians, insofar as they are reborn believers,
are free from the compulsion of the law. They willingly and spontaneously do
what the law requires, without the need for its external threats and rewards.
(They agreed also that Christians, insofar as they are still sinners, need the law to

reveal sin and coerce the flesh.) On the other hand, they disagreed on whether
Christians, insofar as they are regenerate, are also free from the law as a norm. In
Haikola's opinion, the orthodox view, upheld by the Formula of Conrord, apparently had as its point of departure the idea that the law is as an objective, immutable order, which is given to us in the written law of holy Scripture. It asserts
.that Christians, although they are ruled by the Holy Spirit and by love, are in no
way free from obedience to this objective norm. The law norms the new obedience of believers, both inwardly and outwardly. Christians, even as saints, still
need the guidance of the written law; without it they w.>uld not know the will of
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God, and would soon fall prey to self-chosen works. Those, on the other hand,
who denied a third use of the law, thought that Ouistians, as saints, have the
right to contravene any law--written or unwritten-or change it, as love demands.
According to this view, the Cluistian, like Cluist, is lord of the law, and uses it
just as freely as all other things in creation. The Antinomians claimed that
believers were not normed by the law, but that they in fact normed the law.59
Hai.kola believes that the Antinomians captured the essence of Luther's
spiritual understanding of the law. One thinks, for instance, of his remark that
the Ouistian could make better decalogues than Moses, or that love masters all
laws. What then are we to make of the ethical directives of Scripture? For
Hai.kola, like Althaus, they are to be used as examples to help Ouistians decide
for themselves how love is to act in a given situation. He insists that the scriptural admonitions are merely concretions of the law, and are not intended to be
universally binding on a person's conscience. In other words, he views them
descriptively, not prescriptively. Ouistians are free from the whole law: in faith
they are free from the curse of the law, and in love they are free from all moral
norms. And yet love will go beyond the bounds of the law, for the sake of the
neighbor. The law's demand for faith and love is unconditional and unlimited.
Its contents however can never be fixed in a final form, for God's eternal will can
never find exhaustive expression even in the scriptural commands.60
Haikola nevertheless concedes that Luther ~oes at times also speak of the
need for the law to be taught after justification, but in an altogether different
fashion than before justification. The law is no longer to be presented as a threatening and accusing power, but as a friend and gentle yoke, that admonishes and
urges people to produce the fruits of faith. Haikola however rejects the idea that
Luther's approach corresponds to the orthodox distinction between the second

24
and third uses of the Im,.,. He le convinced that Luther is not talking here about

different uses of the ·w-., but simply about the different effects which the law in
theory will have on WLbelievers as compared with believers. We can never know
for certain how God is going to use his word of law, and how it is going to be
heard; all that we can do is to take into account the effect that the preacher
intends the law to have, and the use that God, Satan, and the human hearer may
make of it. 61 Haikola however remains adamant that the scriptural "admonition"
does not constitute a new use of the law in addition to the second use.62
Wilfried Joest
Joest's monograph on the problem of Luther and the third use of the law
first appeared in 1951, and is probably the most important and comprehensive
treatment fo appear this century.63 It has two parts: the first deals with law and
freedom in Luther and is more theological; the second examines how Luther
treats the parenesis of the New Testament and is naturally more exegetical. Our
summary will confine itself to the first part.64
Joest's starting point is Luther's radical, contradictory antithesis of law and
gospel in the sense that both cannot be the way of salvation at the same time:
"either Ouist stands and the law perishes, or the law stands and Cluist perishes•
f'N A 40 I, 114: 13-14). The law demands obedience to God's commandments, the

gospel offers Ouist and his fulfillment. The gospel does not mean that God no
longer demands obedience but that Ouist's obedience and his fulfillment of the
law is now offered to us as a gift. The law demands that we fulfill the law in

orde, to be saved;65 the gospel is that Ouist's fulfillment has been given to us and
effected in us bec.ause we are saved 1be gospel, as God's action, is the 'counterpart• of the law, which demands action by human beings. The relation betwe-o.n
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doing and ""eCeiving, fulfillment of the law and justification, is inverted. God's
,

will dues not change, insofar as its contents is love; rather, what changes is the
law as a Verhiiltnisordnung, as a claim which demands immediate fulfillment and
which threatens and punishes all who fail to obey it. The lex exactrix, accusans,

reos agens, which is the polar-opposite to the gospel, that law now comes to an
end in Ouist.66
Although the gospel is God's final word, Joest contends that Luther knows
that the law is still God's law--and that includes the 'legal' relationship that the
law establishes between God and human beings. It is a false reading of Luther to
conclude that he views all 'legal' religiosity as imperfect and inappropriate to the
true relationship with God. 'He is not fighting against a principle of legality in
general and for a principle of grace in general, but he is concerned with the fact
that law and gospel, both of them God's real word and true order, come into play
whole and unmixed.'67 The law comes first and is God's alien work; the gospel
comes last as his proper work. The condemnation of the law and God's wrath on
sin and disobedience is no human delusion. But God in his unfathomable mercy
(not bound to any principle) breaks through his own anger, and voluntarily
forfeits his own right to demand and to judge. This means the end of the law, not
that the law is not still in force, but 'now however' {nun aber/ (cf. Rom. 3: 21) he
deals with us in Ouist in a way altogether different from the way in which he
deals with us in the law.
This does not happen as a principle and in a general way, but here and only
here in this contingent, concrete, heilsgeschichtlich place, in Jesus Olri.st. God
is not a God who does not demand and repay at all; but here where Jesus
Ouist stands, here and ~ow where the preaching of the gospel ~ me, he
no longer wishes to demand and repay, but simply to give everything.
When Luther fights against the mingling of law and gospel, he fights for ~
pure understanding of this hie et nunc, this 'nun aber,' with which God
reverses his way with human beings, in a particular place, at a particular
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kairos, in this one person, Jesus Ouist. Here, where this has happened and
still happens through the proclamation of the gospel in the life of the individual Ouistian, the law must no longer be preached. What God does in
Ouist must not be boWld up with reservations and conditions, and thus
made into some Wlcertain, half-measure. It must be recognized and
preached in its pure opposition to the order of the law .68

It is on this basis that Joest seriously questions the validity of a third use of
the law, because it is just as tertius usus that it is linked with the heilsgeschichtlich

kairos of the gospel, and issued in the name of Jesus Gui.st, yet it wants to be law
precisely where Gui.st stands. The question must therefore be asked, Does not
the law here reach beyond its heilsgeschichtlich limits? Is not the gospel now furnished with conditions and reservations which obscures the pure reversal of
God's way of acting?
Joest claims that Luther also knows of an encounter between the Ouistian
and the law, where the law acts in harmony with the gospel. Not that the gospel
gives the sinner permission to make a truce with the world of the flesh, or to surrender to sin without a struggle. Rather, for Luther, the gospel belongs to the
irruption of God's world into this aeon. A battle between the two worlds has
begun: on the one hand, the Ouistian as sinner stands on the side of the "world,"

but, on the other, the Oui.stian as saint stands on the side of the coming kingdom. 1bis kingdom, in which the believer is united with Ouist through baptism
and faith, has a thrust in the direction of reality. Faith-precisely that faith which
already anticipates life in heaven--becomes incarnate like Ouist. It w.mts to
make everything like itsell, beginru ... , with its own flesh. Believers are now
shown quite concretely the works that they are to do--and they are shown this by
the very same law that previously showed them their sins, and that still does,
insofar as they are simul peccatores. The contents of the law, as the expression of
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God's unchangeable will, is and will remain the same, for time and for eternity.
But there has now been a complete reversal in the order of relationship:
For sinners, and also for Cluistians as sinners, the law is always lex implenda:
you must do this to be saved. But that same law encounters faith as lex impleta: Ouist has done this and he does it eternally. Now you may do it too,
because you arc in Ouist. 1he responsibility for succeeding and the burden
and danger of failing no longer lies with you. He has already struggled and
fulfilled everything, and now takes you with him into his fulfillment. You
no longer first have to gain the victory with your own obedience--he has
gained it, and now you may begin to measure the extent of his victory with
your actions. You no longer have to in order to ...; but you may because ....
You are completely sustained and sheltered in everything.69
This is the reversal of the order of relationship that Joest sees taking place

in faith, and which overcomes the antithesis between law and gospel. The law,
which previously made people responsible for their own salvation, has now been
overcome, and is not reestablished with this "third use." Therefore, whatever
name we give this "law• that now guides Ouistians in their life, it is not the law
that Luther knows a.s the antithesis of the gospel. Rather than the third use of the
law, Joest prefers the term "practical use of the gospel" {usus pnu:ticus evangelii}.
He claims to find support for this in Luther who often (but not always) avoids
the term lex precisely in those contexts where he is talking about the Ouistian
and the law ,70 This law, which still comes to Ouistians externally in the word, is
no longer law in the strict sense (as in the second use) but la impleta. Since it
presupposes salvation and no longer threatens believers with judgment, they
joyfully and spontaneously embrace it in the freedom of faith and willingly
conform their lives to it.
Joest posits that, at any given moment, Cluistians encounter God's command in two ways: as sinners, and yet as those who are called to Christ. As
sinners, they encounter the command (Gebot] as a destroying law (Gesetz]: you
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ought, but you cannot. However, as those called to Ouist and who believe this
call, Christians experience this same command as evangelical encouragement
[Zuspruch}: Christ can--you will. Joest denies that Ouistians ever encounter the

command as a tertium between law and gospel, such as: Ouist certainly has--but
now you must too. Nor should the command ever be understood moralistically,
as if our salvation depended on our own performance and achievement. Joest
makes his position clear: • The command as spoken to the sinner is law in all its
sharpness; the command as spoken to faith in Ouist, as parenesis, is paraclesis,
encouragement, gospel in the fullest extent. •71
We have seen that Joest does not reject the idea that the law, or better,
command, plays a role in the life of the Ouistian qua saint. Before faith, law and
gospel are diametrically opposed, and the law functions primarily as the usus

elenchticus. After faith, Joest maintains, the law no longer accuses but guides the
Ouistian, so that inf act the gospel and the law become one, and the command is
changed from law into a use of the gospel [usus evangelii}. However, this developing Wlity ('becoming-one') of law and gospel in the Ouistian life is a contingent reality, not an ontological reality ('being-one') in prindple.72
Jocst agrees with Paul Althaus's proposal that we should use the term
•command• to refer to the law in the life of the Ouistian, in order to distinguish
between the way the law acts before and after faith. For the command is no
longer law in the strict sense of a law that requires fulfillment /lex implenda}, but
rather it flows from the law that has been fulfilled /lex impleta}. The 'you must in
order to ... • of the first (before faith), should not be grouped together with the
"you may because .. _. of the second (after faith), as a different sub-species under
the one Oberbegriff, 'lex: Given this distinction between a usus legalis of the law,
and a usus evangelicus of the command, Joest argues that neither Luther nor the
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Bible disallow the view that every aspect of the Ouistian life is regulated by
God's command.
Conclusions

ln the light of this survey of the various positions taken in regard to the
third use of the law, we conclude the chapter by noting some of the common
U,emes that we found recurring in arguments against the traditional understanding of the third use. We have seen that the basic problem addressed by
almost all scholars except Elert, is how to explain, theologically, the different role
played by the law in sanctification compared with justification. It was felt that,
while the law prior to faith ls primarily accusatory, after faith it cooperates with
the gospel in bringing about the fruit offaith (good works).

Out survey has raised important questions: Does the function of the law
after justification differ from that before? Does the law change or is it now heard
with different ears? Is Elert correct in arguing that the law only accuses? Is there
warrant for Joest's position that for the Ouistian, the law as command, parenesis,
is allied so closely with the gospel that it would be better to describe it as the

practical use of the gospel rather than the third use of the law? How do we speak
about the tertius usus legis without jeopardizing Ouistian freedom? If the law
plays a normative and didactic role in the Ouistian life, teaching us what works
are good and pleasing to God, can it ever be only positive, or is it also bound to
be negative and accusatory? Do we need the law insofar as we are saints, or is it

only because we are still sinners? Finally, in spite of the fact that FC VI texhes a
third use, ls it possible to be faithful to the doctrinal content of the Formulll while
rejecting a special, positive, didactic use of the law exclusively for the regenerate?
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8According to Calvin, Institutes, Bk. 2, ch. 7, sect. U, the law plays a dual
role in the life of believers; it teaches as well as exhorts:
Here ls the best instrument for them to learn more thoroughly each day the
nature of the Lord's will to which they aspire, and to confirm them in the
understanding of it .... Again, because we need not only teaching but also
exhortation, the servant of God will also avail himself of this benefit of the
law: by frequent meditation upon it to be aroused to obedience, be strengthened in it, and be drawn back from the slippery path of transgression.
Luther, in his great Gallltians Commentary, also teaches a twofold use of the law,
namely, the civil use and the theological or spiritual use. However, the emphasis
is entirely different. After talking about the civil use, he writes, WA 40 I, 480: 12-

481: 4:
The other use of the law is the theological or spiritual use, which serves to
increase transgression. This is the primary purpose of the law of Moses,
that through it sin might grow and be multiplied, especially in the conscience. Paul discusses this magnificently in Romans 7. Therefore, the true
function and the chief and proper use of the law is to reveal to people their
sin, blindness, misery, wickedness, ignorance, hate and contempt for God,
death, hell, judgment, and the well-deserved wrath of God.

'lf or a critical analysls of the problem of law and gospel in Luther, Melanchthon, Calvin, Barth, Tillich, Elert, and Althaus, see Albrecht Peters, Gesetz
,md Et1"ngelium, vol. 2 of Handbuch Systmiatischtr Theologie, ed. Carl Heinz RatliChow (Giltenloh: Gutersloher Verlagshaus Mohn, 1981), Eugene F. Klug, writing on the third use of the law (FC VI) in A Contemporary wok at the Formula of
Qmrord (St. Louis: Concordia Publlahing House, 1978), 200-203, offers some
cunory comments on the positions of Elert, Althaus, and Ebeling.

lOfor an authoritative treatment of the law in the Reformed tradition, see
Otto Weber, Foumllillon• of Dogmatic,, trans. Darrell L. Guder, vol. 2 (Grand
Rapids, MichigAn: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1983), 380-407.
Weber can hudly be taken Berioualy when he warns Lutherans against the error
of viewing the life ci the believer ln Reformed theology as basically law-oriented
(394), August Pieper, 'The Difference Between the Reformed and the Lutheran
Interprvtation of the So-called Third Use of the Law,' Wisc.onsin Lutheran Qu1irttrly trl (Spring 1990): 108-122 [trans. Richard W. Strobel from 'Ober den Unterachied der reformierten und lutheriachen Auffassung vom sogenannten dritten
Brauch des Geaetzee,' Thtologilcht Quartallchrift 13 (April 1916)], notes that in
Reformed ethics, 'the norm for faith And the will, which is carried along by faith,
in individual situAtions always la the divine will as something still standing over it,
dtmmding the particular action. The 'you must' has not yet been overcome, but
rather sharpentd' (115). He further notes that 'just because faith has been kindled,
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for that reason the law is necessary, which urges one on to action: Finally, he
highlights the difference between the Reformed and Lutheran ethos on the basis
of their difference of approach to the apostolic text about the law of freedom
(James 1: 25): "the Reformed emphasizes the word law as real law, while the
Lutheran emphasizes the word fmdom as freedom from the law in the true sense
of the word, so that the law of freedom signifies the norm that is present in the
believer hlmscU- (116).
11Karl Barth, 'Evangelium und Gesetz,' in Theolcgische Existenz heute, no.
32 (Munich: Ouistian Kaiser Verlag, 193.?). The same essay reappeared in
'l11tOlcgische Existmz heute, 3d ed., neue Folge, no. SO (Munich: Ouistian Kaiser
Verlag, 1961), and was reprinted in C,esetz und Evangelium: Beitrage zur (;egenwdrtigen theologischen Diskussion, ed. Ernst Kinder and Klaus Haendler, vol. 142 of
Wege der Forschung (Darmstadt: WlssenschafUkhe Buchgesellschaft, 1986), 1-29.
References to Barth's essay are from this reprinted edition. The book edited by
Kinder and Haendler brings together in a single volume some of the most significant essays this century on the topic of law and gospel. The editors regret that
they could not include any articles by G. Ebeling, W. Joest, and H. Thielicke.
12Barth, Evangelium, 9.
13Jbid., 2.
14Wemer Elert, 'Gesetz und Evangelium, • in Zwischen Gnade und Ungnade:
Abwandlungeu des Themas (;esetz und Evangelium (Munich: Evangelischer Presserverband for Bavaria, 1948), 132-69. Edward H. Schroeder, the translator of the
English edition, Law and Gospel, Facet Books, Social Ethics Series (Philadelphia:
Fortress Press, 1967), provides a helpful note on p. 1: 'Elert's term, realdilllektischer
Gtgensatz, expresses the core of his position. It designates a dialectical opposition
in the contents (n:s} of law and gospel, not just in terminology (wrlxJJ. The
antithesis is between substances and not merely forms.• For a critique of Elert,
St.'C Leo Langemeyer, Gesetz und Evangelium: Das Grundanliegtn der Theologie
Werner Eltrts (Paderbom: Verlag Bonifacius-Druckerei, 1970).
15E1ert, Gesetz, 164.
16For some inexplicable reasol\ the English translation in The Book of
Concord: TI1t Confessions of the Evangeliad Lul11tran Church, trans. and ed. Theodore
G. Tappert (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1959), 567, leaves out zugleich {simul}, the
very word that Elert ltalidus because of its importance for his argument.
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17Wemer Elert, Das christliche Ethos: Grundlinien der lutherischen Ethik, 2d &
exp. edition, ed. Ernst Kinder (Hamburg: Furche-Verlag, 1961), 392-93.
18Etert, Ethos, 395.
19Etert, Ethos, 394. He argues, Gesetz, 161-3, that the only place in Luther
where the three uses of the law are expressly listed is a forgery. The passage, at
the end of the Die zweite Disputation gegen die Antinomer (WA 39 I, 485: 16-24), was
allegedly copied almost word for word from the 15l5 edition of Melanchthon's
l.oci. The offending sentence reads: 'The law is to be retained in order that the
saints (sancti} may know the works which God requires and in which they can
exercise obedience toward him.' It seems that this could easily have been said by
Luther, provided that we understand 'saints' in the sense of Ouistians qu11 saints
and siMers and not just qua saints. However, even this would not satisfy Elert
since his exclusively negative view of the law compels him to even reject the idea
that O\ristians need the law to teach them the good works commanded by God.
2Qaarth, Evangelium, 9-10.
21Toe following summary is based on Paul Althaus, Gebot und Gesetz:
Zum Tiiema "Gesetz und Evangelium, • in Beilriige zur 1-'iirdtrung christlicher
Thtologie, vol. 46, ed. Paul Althaus and Joachim Jeremias (Gutersloh: C. Bertelsmann Verlag, 1952).

22Jbid., 7-8.
23Althaus, Gebot, 10, notes that in the Gospel of John 'law' always refers
to the law of Moses. In his letters John hardly ever uses the term nomos; the mark
of the O\ristian life is rather keeping the commandments of God or of Ouist.
24Ibid., 11.
25Ibid.
26Jbid., 13.
27Jbid., 12.
28we merely note in passing that this traditional Lutheran assertion,
based on Luther's reading of Paul, is now being called into question by NT
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scholars who doubt whether Paul himself properly understood the attitude of
first century Palestinian Judaism toward the law. This is a very complex problem
and has already produced a massive literature, indicating both the significance of
the problem and the widely divergent views among exegetes. For a helpful survey and assessment of the situation, see John M. G. Barclay, •Paul and the Law:
Observations on Some Recent Debates' Thtmellos 12 (September 1986): 5-15.

29 Althaus, Ge bot, 20.
30Jbid., 24.

31Ibid., 25.
32Althaus cites Ap. IV, 348: ·we are justified for this very purpose, that,
being righteous, we might begin to do good works and obey God's law• (d. also
Rom. 8: 4). What Paul and the Confessions call •1aw, • Althaus calls 'command."
33Althaus, Gebot, 29.
34fbid., 27.

35lbid., 28.
36Ibid., 34.
37·fhe relation between faith and action, indicative and lmperative--which
really embraces the relation between justification and good works--la important
for a discussion about the third uae of the law. While Althaus la right in seeing
faith and works cloeely connected, he falls to understand the proper relation
between them. It la our conviction that when the Confessions say that faith
should produce good works, they are simply stressing the fact that good works
are not optional for the Ouiatian but are commanded by God (Ap. IV; FC SD, IV,
14, 16). However, they also know that Cluiatians, inaofar as they are saints, do
these same good works cheerfully and spontaneously, without any compulsion.
This is what Althaus overlooks when he lnalats that works never automatically
follow faith but are always called into existence by the divine command implied
already in the goepel's offer. Yet the Ouiatian life stands not only under the
imperative of the law (command) but also, and first of all, under the indicative of
the gospel. However, Althaus is unwilling to recognize this indicative (good
works tire the fruit of faith) as a true indicative. For him it is descriptive of the
•;,rhtrenl necessity with which the gospel, grasped by faith, presses toward deeds
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of love. Thi& necessity however does not take effect automatically, but only by
means of personal decisions and human actions• (Althaus, Gcbot, 35). All of this
means that, for Althaus finAlly, the Cluistian life is obedience [corresponding to
tho Sull-NotWt'ndigktit)-•and even when he qualifies it as {rte obedience, it is that,
not by virtue offaith or the indicative of the gospel, but the necessity of the
indkati ve I Stit1!rNotuie11digktit J.
38Jbid., J7.
39Hana Philipp Meyer, 'Normen chriBtlichen l-landelnB? Zum Problem
des tcrtiua w,ua legis, • in Widtrspn,ch, Dialog und Einigung: Studk,i zu r Korikordhmformel der lutheriachen Reformation, ed. Wenul Lohff and Lewis W. Spitz
(Stuttgart~ CAlwer Verlag, 1971), propo.a an ethic of diadpleship /NachfvlgeJ as
an alternative to the teaching of the lertiu• usua ltgi,. Tho law (first, and esp. 8(.>c•
ond Wie) drives the •otd 11\AJ\ to death from which the 1new man• is resurrected.
However, Meyer Argues that when we confess our aln and our inability to fulfill
the law, thi11 is not done 1bstractly; we die to ourHelve1 only ln the concrete act of
attempting to fuUill the law and re1U1.ing its impouibility. Through the seUdestruction of ourwlvea u penona we me with O\riBt infaith, for whose sake
ow failed Attempts to fulflll the law are or become 'fruits of the Spirit.• for
Meyer an evangelical ctthic la not one that directly promotes and builds up the
Christian life but rather one that lhatlers and dnlroy• one'• ptrso,ud life; an ethic of
dylng for othen After th~ ex11mplct of Cluiat. Only when the old has been destrorcd can falth bo born and strengthened. For thia ethic there la no ltrtiu• usua
ltgia (&ee pp. 2..19--W). While we agree with Meyer thlt the third uae of the law
cannot oo the basil for evangelical ethla, we do not accept that ita bula CW\ be
located ln diadple&hip, for there wv can never 011C1pe the judgment of the law.
Rather, tho only buia for Christian ethia, which self-evidently mWlt oo p01itivu,
is tho g0tt~I of the forgtwneu of 11tns
1

40tbld,, 39. Althaua alao dlJIC\IIIIOI the role of the law in the Cluutian life
in Die Thtt>logit Martin Lulhtrs (GOtenloh: GOtenloher Verlagwua Gerd Mohn,
1962), 232-38. Hil attidam there of the third uae in Luther la leu atrlngent. Even
though he know• thot Luther never uae1 the term u such, he concedcl that in
a1ubltance it alao occun in Luther (238).
41Gerlw'd Ebeling,• Zw IAhre vom triplex uaua lugia ln der reformatoriachon Theologte,' ln Wort und Cl,mbt, 3d ed. (TOblngen: J.C. B. Mohr [Paul
Siebed.), 1960), S0.68. The following 1wnnwy of Ebeling'• poeition la drawn
from this CWWIY,
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42CR 21, 405-6. It la in the new &ection, Dt usu legis, added to the 15l5
udition of Uw l.vci, where Mttlonchthon speaks of the prim11::~ secumlum and
ttrtium ufficium ltgi1.
43Eooling, Triplex, 58. See Ap. IV, § 22·24 for the ldea of the later primus
usu• kgi,, wherv Gal. 3: 24 And 1 Tlm. 1: 9 ue also quoted; also Ap. IV,§ 187-91.
Pueiag~ reflt.'Cting the 1«u,,du1 usu, do not need to be cited.

.Unw history of the uaage of this term lJi more complex than one at first
thinki. Ebeling, Triplex, M, lhow1 thAt Melanchthon originally took the term
,tupln u1us kgia over from Luther, but then adapted it into the schema of the
trip la """ to 1uit hia own theology.
ill\Ebellng, Triplex, 58. The verbal phrue ltgt uti occura twice: WA 2, 500:
12· 1' And 527: 17• 19. Both p11Mge1 reflect an'""' lhtologtcu,, leading Ebeling to
conclude that thia la the only logitimate u1u1 legi,. Where Luther speaks merely
of the dilclpllne of the law, lt ii alway• ln clow connection with the u,u, thtok,gi,-ua: WA 2. 527: 16-32. FinAlly, Ebeling 1ugpltl that Luther'• remark in WA
2, "66: 19-26 and 498: 10.13 could point to the ldoa ol a l1rtlu, u,u, ltgi,, but in an
4ltogethdr diffurvnt IIOl'lllt than that lntend&td by Melanchthon.
4i>WA 39 J, 447: J..6-48: 1. In hil diacwllion of the thoologic&l interpretation
of Ow '""' ltgi• doctrine, Ebeling purpowly confine• himaeU to the Anttnomum
l>i1put11ticm, alnc#, at tho time ol writing, ho wu working on I detAlled study of
UwlO docunwnbi; however, nothing tull yot 1ppoARtd.
47Ebollng, Triplex, 66.
4'8fbld., 67-68.

49\-vA 391,414: M'/5: 6: 'Lox oat lam valdo mltig1t1 per luatillcattonom ...
Anto luattflc1tlonom ntgn1t lox et wrrot omno1, quoe tanglt. Sid non ale docenda
Qlt lox plla, ut argu,t, damnet. 11d ut hortetur ad bonum. , , , ltaquu lex W1, molli•
endA ollt ot quul vxhortadonla loco doconda,'

5<>nu1 1wnnwy ll b111d on ~gnar Bring, 'C..tz W\d Evangvllum W\d
dur dritto Gobrauch dot GeNtze• ln dor lutherllchen Theologkt, • ln Zur Thtologit
Lulhtra: Au, dtr Arw'f dtr Luthtr-Agrlcola Gn,ll,chtft in finnland, Schriften der
Luthor-Agrlcola Golllllchaft ln Plnnland 4 (Helalnkl: Akateemlnen Klrjakauppa,
194.1).
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51Bring, Gesetz, 70-81.
52Jbid., 84.
5..'lBring, Ibid., 90, n. 7, notes that it is only after the Fonnula declares that
the Holy Spirit must first renew our heart before we can keep the law, that it goes
on to say: •num he employs the law to instruct the regenerate out of it and to
show and indicate to them in the Ten Commandments what the acceptable will
of God is (Rom. 12: 2) ...• (FC SD VI, 12). Brings observes that this could be
taken aa a dear statement of the third use of the law following regeneration, but
that is not the case. He argues that there is nothing here to distinguish the law
from what Luther calls the fint (or second) use; therefore, it is same law, the
same will of God, applicable to all people, regenerate and unregenerate alike.
However, Bring is wrong when he asserts that, because the old Adam (the flesh)
still dings to Ouistians, they are no different from the unconverted, and hence
have no bula for claiming a special (third) use of the law that is different from
the law needed for the unregenerate. Sin in believers la peca,tum n!gnatum, not
peccalum rtgnans. Hence they are simul iusti et pecaitores.
54tbld., CX>-91.
55lbld., 9'5-96.

Slrtne argument is eet out ln Lauri Haikola, Usus Legis, in Schriften dtr
l.ullitr-Agrla>la-C,ntlllc:ha~, A 20 (Helsinkl: n.p., 1981). For his specific rejection of
the third use of the law, see p. 8'.

57Hatkola, U11ua, 13.
58Jbld., 91.
59Jbtd., 145-6.

60ttAlkola claims that Luther denied that the Ouistian ls subject to any
moral 1blolute1. The orthodox theologians, on the other hand, began with an
·entirely di{ferent premlae: the l1w u an ob)ective legal order, the la aeterna, valid
And 1CC011lble to all, not the impo,,il,ilita ltgi,, which Luther purportedly taught.
Given the orthodox understanding of the law, it la argued that life and salvation
mean I ltate of unequivocal harmony, emplrically verifiable, which comes as a
reward for keeping the law. Halkola however approaches Luther from an existentialist aumdpoint, and rejeda the orthodox interpretation with its idea of a
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continuing state of grace and an uninterrupted growth in holiness. He argues
that this would have been impossible for Luther, who knew only of a state of
grace that is being constantly renewed. Ouistians always stand under both law
and gospel: the law accuses and condemns, the gospel acquits and frees. With
every experience of Anfechtung, Ouistians despair of their own righteousness
and flee to Gui.st in faith. Because of this constant transitus, the life offaith under
grace is thoroughly contingent. Haikola claims that the orthodox position, on the
other hand, teaches that, with the help of a partially restored free will, Ouistians
can intentionally avoid sins, and in that way hinder the inner Anfechtung created
by the law. Such a view assumes that the law, when it functions according to its
third use, does not rule Ouistians inwardly (in the conscience), whereas, in its
second use, it rules the whole person, body and soul. Consequently, Anfechtung
is viewed negatively: it disturbs the tranquillity of the Ouistian life lived in
harmony with the law. For that reason, faith, life, and salvation can only begin
after the Anfechtung of the law. On the other hand, it is Haikola's contention that
the attacks of Anfechtung are a common experience of faith, and a means which
God uses to keep killing the old nature, and driving the Cluistian again and
again to Ouist. Whether Haikola is correct in his assessment of the orthodox
position we cannot say; howe• c!r, as we will see in the next chapter, Luther
would never say that faith, life, and salvation begin only after the Anfechtung of
the law. The very source of Anfechtung is the attempt on the part of the law to
reenter the conscience of believers, and to accuse them of sin, even though Ouist
has expelled the law and alone rules in the conscience through the gospel.
61Regarding the subject of the uti lege, Haikola, Usus, 129-32, maintains
that while preachers must distinguish between law and gospel, and not preach
the one as the other, they themselves cannot determine how people will hear the
law, for the real subject of the usus legis is God (Ouist, faith, the Spirit). Here he
is in agreement with Ebeling. For Haikola th~ real distinction between the different uses of the law, as between law and gospel itself, depends on the hearers
themselves. The distinction made by the preacher is only of theoretical interest; it
happens only in the word. The word of the preacher can never anticipate the use
as such. The decisive distinction between the uses of the law, just as between law
and gospel, depends on the use of the word by the hearer. At first this might
seem as if Haikola is saying that law and gospel is left to a human decision.
However, he rectifies that when he says:
If we really want to understand how Luther distinguishes between the
different uses we must first take into account how the preacher clarifies in
words the effect that he intends the law to have in theory, and secondly, at
the same time, what use the different subjects-God (Quist, the Holy Spirit),
Satan, and the human hearer-make of the law (Ibid., 133).

•
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Ulrich Asendorf, Die Theologie Martin Luthers nach seinen Predigten (Gottingen:
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1988), 337, n. 70, cites this p~ge with approval and
thinks that Haikola is right in emphasizing the relational use of the law in Luther.
62fuid., 141.

63Wilfried Joest, Gesetz und Freiheit: Das Problem des tertius usus legis bei
Luther und die neutestamentliche Parainese, 4th ed. (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck &
Ruprecht, 1968).
641rus summary will draw heavily on Joest's own conclusions on pp. U933. His existentialist interpretation is followed very closely by Gerhard 0. Forde
in his treatment of justification and sanctification (Eleventh Loe., "Ouistian Life•)
in Carl Braaten and Robert Jenson, eds., Christian Dogmatics, vol. 2 (Philadelphia:
Fortress Press, 1984), 425-44.
65-ibe question remains, Did God ever intend the law to be used as a
means of salvation, or is this an abuse of the law on the part of sinful human
beings? 1bis is a question that was taken up by the later antinomians, beginning
with Andreas Poach. He argued that even if human beings could fulfill the
whole law, they would still not merit salvation, for anything that humans do can
never be anything more than a delritum, for which God owes them nothing. See
Joest, Gesetz, 50. As we saw earlier, the question of whether good works are
necessary for salvation (which was at the center of the Majoristic Controversy)
presupposes the further question of whether one could be saved, theoretically, by
keeping the law.
66Joest, Gesetz, 20.

67Ibid., 130.
68Ibid, 130-31.

69n,id., 132.
70Joest, Gesetz., 132, admits that one of the exceptions to this is the formula
conscimtia in evangelio--corpus in lege, where •corpus• does not stand for the
Ouistian as sinner, but for the sphere of his or her concrete actions as a believer.
When we discuss this axiom in the next chapter, we will see that Joest interprets
it in a way that defeats the very intention Luther had in ~ because he does
not distinguish properly between law and gospel.
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7lfbid., 133.
72Joest, [bid., 236, n. 95, notes that what he proposes is not the same as
Barth's idea of the unity of gospel and law. God's real word, according to Joest,
is not just the unity of gospel and command in the sense of a usus practicus
evangelii, such as we have in the life of the Oui.stian, but first and foremost, the
opposition of gospel and command, where the command now is no gospel at all,
but sheer law in the sense of lex implenda sub necessitate salutis. Although Joest
rejects Barth's idea of the unity of gospel and law, he still speaks of a unity
himself. But this is not an ontological unity, in principle, but a unity that comes
to fruition when, in a given concrete instance, the law as lex implenda is overcome
by Ouist, and turned into the lex imp/eta or the usus practicus evangelii of NT
parenesis. In other words, this side of the paradoxical boundary, prior to the
coming of Ouist to an individual--when the command is changed from law into
the usus evangelii--there is no unity between law and gospel, but only antithesis.
Beyond that boundary however Joest contends that we can speak of a contingent
unity or an Einswerden of gospel and law (not a prinzipielles Eins-sein), where the
lex iam impleta, not the lex implenda, becomes the Zuspruch des ~horchen-durfens
(fbid., 198). It is in this context that Luther, according to Joest, knows of a
command--now actually in, with, and under the gospel--which gives concrete
direction [Weisung}, and an obedience of faith, that is united with the freedom of
faith (fbid., 195). The problem that we have with Joest's interpretation is that,
instead of distinguishing between law and gospel, he fuses them together in the
life of the Ouistian. Admittedly, unlike the situation before faith, where law and
gospel are solely antithetical, after faith there is a real closeness and even
harmony between them in the believer's heart. However, because of the constant
attempt of the law to regain entry into the conscience from which it was expelled
by Ouist, the Ouistian will often experience great anguish and temptation. It is
precisely here where law and gospel have to be carefully distinguished, and yet
th.is will be impossible to do if, as Joest claims, the command for the Ouistian-which we insist is still law-is now actually in, with, and under the gospel.

CHAPTER 2
THE LAW AND THE CHRISTIAN LIFE IN
LUTHER'S GREAT GALATIANS COMMENTARY
Introduction
Our main task in this chapter will be to examine Luther's Galatians

Commentary of 1531 / 1535 to see how he understands the role ·of the law in
the OU'lstian life. The methodology that we employ ln this chapter is strictly
doctrinal rather than exegetical, although ultimately these two cannot be
separated .. In other words, we will not simply examine those passages in the

Commentary where Luther expounds texts that are of a parenetic nature and
which occur mainly in the last two chapters of Galatians. Rather, we intend
to approach Luther's Commentary holistically and to mine it for whatever
data it yields on the question of the role of the law in the Ouistian life. The
reason why this approach is preferable is because Luther does not confine his
remarks on this topic to merely thoae passages where he comments on texts
in which Paul either urges good works or issues ethical injunctions. Instead,
many of the statements that he makes in relation to our topic are to be found
sprinkled throughout the Comment11ry.
Given the nature of Paul's letter to the Galatians, we can expect that
much of what Luther says about the law ls going to be more applicable to
justification than to sanctification. Nevertheless, Luther says enough about
the function of the law in the Christian life to warrant using this Comment-
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not only reveals sin, it also provokes and magnifies it so that people are made
to see how sinful they really are (Rom. 7: 13) (I, 487: 24-29). Paradoxically, the
law ends up making people worse, not better (I, 400: 15-18). The law has different effects on different people, but only God can determine what the effect
will be. Some become so afraid that they tremble at the rustling of a leaf (Lev.
26: 36) (1, '157: 19-27); others become hypocritical, and still others are driven to
the brink of despair and will remain there unless or until they believe the
promise that God loves them in spite of that other word which declares his
wrath (I, 490: 21-24).3 However, the human heart is so perverse that when the
conacience is afflicted, instead of grasping God's proffered grace and mercy, it
has recourse to even more laws (I, 489: 17-21)--and laws by nature just keep
multiplying until they grow to infinity (I, 616: 24-31). The promises of the law
however are always conditional and therefore can never grant the conscience
the certainty that it seeks, because no one can ever keep the law perfectly.
Luther insists that any attempt to use the law as a means of selfjustification ls an abuse of the law,4 for obeying the law can never lead to
righteousness either before or after justification (I, 219: 22-33).5 The problem
is not the law but human sin, which tries to make of it something it was

never intended to be. The law itself is holy, good, and necessary, if used
"properly• (1 Tim. 1: 8, where the RSV translates •tawfully').6 However, it is
impossible for human beings to fulfill the law (I, 256: 30) because of sin (II, 81:
29-31), and even if it were theoretically possible, it would still be a misuse, for
the simple reason that God never intended the law to be used as a means of
becoming righteous in his sight (I, 620: 33-621: 12).7 The fact that God commands something does not automatically imply that we can do it (I, 606: 1718).8 Paradoxically, to try to keep the law (in an attempt to merit justification)
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is to act entirely contrary to it, for all who rely on the works of the law are

under a curse (I, 397: 25-32).9 The Law cannot be fulfilled without the Holy
Spirit, and the Holy Spirit cannot be received without Christ (II, 168: 15-16).
The doers or keepers of the law then are believers who, having received the
Holy Spirit, fulfill the law through faith by loving God and their neighoor (I,
407: 29-30). 10 Here Luther follows Paul's distinction between the works of the
law and the fruit of the Spirit (or works of the gospel): the works of the law
are the works exacted by the law and are done by all who live under the law,
but the fruit of the Spirit are works done by believers through the power of
the Holy Spirit. This distinction is really the same as that between the two
kinds of righteousness which Luther discusses in his opening •Argument":
the righteousness of the law and the righteousness of faith. The former is
active and applies to the "old man" who is born of flesh and blood, the latter
is passive and applies to the "new man• in Christ (I, 40-52).
Although the law cannot effect justification, Luther says that it serves
[prodest} justification by impelling us to the promise of grace and making it

sweet and desirable (I, 489: 27-29).11 It is a servant of, and a preparation for,
grace (I, 488: 14).12 It drives the troubled conscience to thirst and yearn for
Otrist. Yet after the law has done its work, only the Holy Spirit can tell the
heart that it is not God's will that it merely be terrified and killed but that it
should look to Christ, who is the end of the law (I, 556: 20-557: 14). Hence, the
chief purpose of the law is not death but life.13 "God wounds in order to heal;
he kills in order to make alive' (Deut. 32: 39) (I, 534: 17). When the law compels people to despair of themselves and drives them to Quist, then through
the gospel it serves the cause of justification (I, 490: 21-23). The law, though
inferior to the gospel, works with the gospel.14 Therefore, although the law
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reveals and increases sin, it is still not against the promises of God--if used
properly--but is, in fact, for them (I, 508: 29-30).
We began by saying that law and gospel are diametrically opposed, and
that remains true. However, we have now seen that that is not the whole
story: law and gospel abo work together and are closely connected in the heart
and life of believers (I, 520: 25-27). Indeed, it is precisely this fact that gives rise
to the terrible anguish and temptation {Anfechtung] characteristic of the
Ouistian life, which can only be overcome by faith. Therefore, while law and
gospel work together to bring about salvation and are closely connected in the
life of the Ouistian, when it comes to justification they can never be separ-

ated far enough (1,490: 32-35). Understanding precisely this interplay and distinction be~een law and gospel will be of the utmost importance in helping
us navigate our way around the dangerous reefs in the controversy over the
third use of the law.
The Law and the Otristian Life
We have already seen in a preliminary way that the law prepares the
sinner for justification but cannot itself effect justification. Only the Holy
Spirit working through the gospel can change a person's standing in God's
sight from that of sinner to righteous. But is justification merely a formal,
legal pronouncement whereby God acquits sinners of the law's accusations, or
is it also a change that he produces in believers themselves? 1his is a complex question, addressed ah;o by the Confessions, because it basically involves
two different views of justification. One sees justification as progressive and
transformative: God changes people into what he wants them to become, so
that they gradually become less and less sinful and more and more holy. This
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is the classical Augustinian view which Luther initially embraced but later
gradually distanced himself from, the more he understood the antithesis
between law and gospel. In confessional Lutheran theology, this view was
properly understood as sanctification and, as such, carefully distinguished
from justification. The other view sees justification primarily as a declaration

of grace and forgiveness on God's part whereby he imputes to sinners an
"alien• righteousness (in the sense that it is God's and not their own) on
account of Gui~ through faith. Here, if there is any change at all, it is a
change in God himself. In mercy he decides not to hold our sins against us
but to reckon us as righteous, for Otrist's sake, through faith. This is the
classical Lutheran view which is set out in the Confessions and which is
typical of the later Luther. Both views are theocentric and both teach that
justification is by grace alone. The difference between them is that the former
sees justification as something that God does inside of us while the latter
locates it outside of us in Olrist's death and resurrection.ts However, the
view that Luther holds in his 1531 Commentary is that justification is not
only an imputation of righteousness but also marks the beginning of a real
change in the life of the Ouistian.16 In other words, justification, while
logically prior to sanctification and independent of it, never occurs with it. 17
The following passage from Luther shows there is no justification without
renewal:
First, he [Christ) justifies us by our knowledge of him; then he creates a
clean heart, produces new motives, gives us the certainty by which we
believe that for his sake we are pleasing to the Father, and grants the sure
judgment by which we approve the things of which we were formerly
ignorant and utterly contemptuous (I, 579: 14-17).
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Justification and sanctification (renewal) are both God's doing, the one extra

nos, the other in nobis. The question that now needs to be ask~d is, How does
sanctification occur? Is it already complete at the moment of justification or
is it a process that continues throughout the believer's life?
Sanctification: Totus or Partim?
In his Large C-atechism Luther confesses that the sanctification or holi-

ness of believers is nothing else than the Holy Spirit's application to them of
the treasures of salvation, meaning justification (LC II, 38).

~

begins in

baptism and daily increases through the means of grace until holiness is
finally perfected with the destruction of the flesh and the resurrection of the
body (LC II, 57, 58). Thus, on the one hand, Luther can say that the Holy Spirit
has "sanctified and preserved me in true faith" (SC II, 6), while on the other,
that we are "only halfway pure and holy" because of the flesh (LC II, 57).
The foregoing statements agree entirely with what Luther says in his
1531 /1535 Galatians C.Ommentary. On the one hand, he emphasizes that the

righteousness imputed to us in justification is full and complete because it is
Christ's righteousness and Ouist cannot be divided. Luther calls him "our
chief, complete, and perfect righteousness" (II, 90: 22-23). On the other hand,
Luther also knows that, insofar as we still have to struggle with the flesh, we
ll'e only partly righteous because we are still partly sinners [partim peccatores,

partim iusti sumus] (II, 86: 14-15).18 Christians therefore are not yet perfect
but at every moment of their life remain both saints and sinners [simul iusti
et

peccatores] (I, 368: 2u: cf. II, 24: 20). Sin is a continuing reality: "remnants

[reliquiae] of sin still remain in us' (I, 313: 13 passim) since faith does not
immediately transform us into new people (I, 313: 1~15). At the same ti.me,
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however, Luther also knows that something real happens as a result of
justification: we become new people, our actions are no longer driven by the
flesh but are now under the guidance of the Spirit.1 9 Although we are partly
flesh and partly spirit, we are encouraged by the knowledge that in the sanctified life it is the Spirit who rules; the flesh is subordinate (II, 93: 19-21).
These two ways of speaking correspond to justification and sanctification. From the standpoint of justification, we are fully righteous [totus},
while from the angle of sanctification, we are only partly holy {partim}. Both
are God's actions; one is by means of the imputation of righteousness and the
non-imputation of sin, the other is by means of the gift of the Holy Spirit who
creates in us a clean heart and new moti vations--a process that will only be
complete in the resurrection, when sin is destroyed once and for all and our
new self can live before God in pure righteousness and holiness, without the
opposition and encumbrance of the flesh. These two views coexist in Luther
quite comfortably because they are complementary. They simply witness to
the fact that although Luther stresses that justification is by faith alone, he
also knows that justification never exlSts without renewal and that in this life
renewal is only partial.20
There is one place where Luther seems to hold a view of progressive
justification. On the basis of Paul's statement, 1 Through the Spirit, by faith,

we wait for the hope of righteousness' (Gal. 5: 5), he says that we have indeed
begun to be justified by faith, by which we have also received the first fruits of

-the Spirit. Thus, the mortification of our flesh has begun, which is another
way of describing sanctification from the standpoint of the justified person.21
But we are not yet perfectly righteous. Our full and complete justification still
remains to be seen, and as such is an object of hope.22 In other words, •our
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righteousness does not yet exist in fact fin re} but it still exists in hope [in spe}"
(II, 24: 19-22).23 Thus, Luther can say, insofar as we are both flesh and spirit,
that our righteousness is only inchoate and partial. Therefore, believers are
not yet demonstrably holy but are in the process of becoming that, and will
only be perfectly holy after the resurrection of the body.24 This transformation is a gradual process because the Spirit does not immediately extinguish
the vices of the old nature, •but throughout life he purges the sin that inheres• (I, 312: 23-26). On the other hand, Luther knows that, from the vantage point of justification, we are already perfectly righteous, in spite of the fact
that we are also sinners. This finally is the only thing that matters, for the
sole basis of our confidence, coram Deo, is Olrist's perfect righteousness and
holiness, and nothing in ourselves.
We have seen that, while Luther can use quantitative language to
describe sanctification when he talks of Ouistians as people who are still
struggling with the flesh, his fundamental conviction is that through faith in
the promise Ouistians receive God's righteousness in all its fullness, by
imputation.25 There is never any hint in Luther that this is somehow only
partial and must be brought to completion through sanctification. We are
already righteous in God's eyes, for Ouist's sake, through the word and water
of baptism, and yet throughout life we struggle against sin through the power

of the Spirit and surrender ourselves to God so that he can make us the holy
people that we already are through faith. The same axiom applies here as
with justification: righteous deeds do not make a righteous person (Aristotle)
but a righteous person does righteous deeds.
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'fhe Aesh-Spirit Struggle
As long as we live in this world as Ouistians we are engaged in a

continual battle with the flesh.26 The classical Pauline description of this
struggle comes in Galatians 5: 16-26, the very same chapter in which Paul
pleads with his readers to remain free in Quist and not to allow themselves
to become enslaved again to the law (5: 1) or to use their freedom as an excuse
to serve themselves (5: 13). Therefore, when he admonishes the Galatians to
be guided by the Spirit and to resist the flesh (5: 16), he is doing nothing more

than calling them to serve one another in love, which is the essence of the
law (5: 14). However, is Paul not contradicting himself here? First he declares
Ouistians free, then in the very next breath he appeals to them to stand firm
and not to submit again to the yoke of slavery, or to walk by the Spirit and not
to gratify the desires of the flesh. Or, perhaps more to the point, does this not
sound like a perfect example of the third use of the law? Luther is emphatic
that Paul in these verses is not abandoning justification and returning to the
law when he demands of his readers a holy life. All he is doing is appealing
to them, as people who have been freed from slavery to the law, to freely
fulfill the law through love. This is no contradiction. It is not the law that
has changed, but it is they who have changed. As those who are no longer
slaves to the law but led by the Spirit, they can now see the law as God's good
gift. But if they surrender their freedom and become slaves of the law again,
they will no longer see it as God's good and gracious will which they are eager
to do freely and spontaneously, but instead it will become for them a condemning voice and a coercive power. The burden of Paul's appeal is that
believers in Christ should not let their lives be determined by the flesh but by
the Spirit. He reminds them that the works of the flesh are totally inconsis-
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tent with their new life in Ouist, which is the fruit of the Spirit. As saints
born of the Spirit, Ouistiaus delight in this admonition (which is still law)
because it is the very thing their new nature wants to do. Is the admonition
given to Christians qua saints, or is it given to them qua sinners; is it given to
them as saints, for the sake of the new nature, or insofar as, or even because,
they still have the old Adam? Luther does not answer these questions in so
many words. In fact they are not even his questions. He simply states that
Otristians need'the law, although he does say that it is only b1!<:ause as we
remain sinners that we need the law to discipline the flesh so that the Spirit
can do his work in us (II, 78: 35-88: 13).27 When Luther calls the injunctions
of the New Testament--such as the command to love one another, to bear
one anoth~r•s burdens, and to forgive one another's trespasses--a •rule for the
saints• (II, 83: 16), he is not implying that Otristians qua saints need a rule but
is simply using the term •samts• there in the broad sense of Ouistians rather

than in the narrow sense of those who are holy and sinless through faith.
Luther makes it very plain that while faith is eager to follow the path of love,
it is often thwarted by the flesh so that it needs the law to keep subduing the
flesh to enable it walk the way of the Spirit and not to gratify the sinful desires

of the old nature.28 We will continue this discussion when we address the
problem of the place of admonition in the Otristian life.
Because we are still sinners and live in a fallen world, we not only
have to fight a constant battle against the old fleshly nature but we are also
embroiled in spiritual combat, which involves fighting against the devil and
the powers of darkness as well as battling errors and heresies in the church.
At times Satan and his forces ally themselves with the flesh and mount a
combined assault against God's saints. However, we do not, nor can we, fight
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this battle alone. Just as Quist and the Spirit both intercede for us (Rom. 8:
27, Heb. 7: 25), so too both fight for us and with us. In fact finally it is not our
battle but God's, for which he gives us his own armor (Eph. 6: 10-17). With
faith, hope, and the sword of the Spirit--indeed, with the full armor of God-we fight against the flesh, and using these instruments as nails, we fasten the

flesh to the cross, "so that against its will it is forced to submit to the Spirit"

(II, 122: 20-22).29 One weapon which Luther himself highly prizes is the word.

In the anguish of temptation that arises from the conflict between flesh and
spirit, clinging to God's word is of paramount importance. Luther recalls that
as soon as he took hold of some of the words of Scripture as a holy anchor, he
found secwity and his trials subsided. Without the word he would have succumbed (II, 99: 12-28). He knows however that in the final analysis our confidence before God rests not in our ability to win the struggle against the devil
and the flesh but in Olrist's victory over Satan and all the spiritual powers
ranged against us."30 But we can only rejoice in Olrist's victory, especially in
the time of temptation, when we know how to distinguish between law and
gospel. However, that is most difficult to do precisely when the conscience is
being tried and tempted. Yet it is just then that it is most imperative to make
that distinction because, as Luther insists, the law must not be permitted to
terrorize the conscience (I, 141: 17-18). For that very reason, Ouistians need
be taught how to claim the victory that is theirs in Ouist, in the midst of

terror and despair (II, 109: 11-18); at the same time however they also need to
be warned how easy it is, in the name of Christian freedom, to fall back again

under the law and become slaves of the flesh. We can conclude from this
that Christians need exhortations to remain faithful and to persevere in the
face of temptation just as they need the gospel which renews their flagging
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spirits and comforts them with its message of forgiveness. However, not only
do Christians need the admonition of the law, inasmuch as they are still
siMers, but they also need to be instructed in how to distinguish between law
and gospel, especially in times of temptation, so that the law does not enter
the conscience and rob them of the certainty and freedom they have in Christ.
Freedom and the Law
Perhaps the single most important thing that Luther would say about
the Ouistian life is that it is freedom from the law--preeminently from its
curse and condemnation but also from a guilty conscience. In Gui.st the law
as a whole has been abrogated (I, 672: 28).31 We are free, our sins are forgiven,
and therefore we can no longer be condemned by the law, provided we
remain in Christ. The law, of course, still hurls its threats and accusations at
us but when we grasp OU'ist by faith--or, better, when he grasps us--he expels
the law with all its terrors and threats.32 It no longer has the right to accuse
us, for we do spontaneously what the law requires, if not by means of
perfectly holy works, then at least through the forgiveness of sins and f aith.33
However, that does not mean that Oui.stians are entirely free from all laws.
Although the gospel does not subject us to the civil laws of Moses, neither
does it exempt us from obedience to all political laws; on the contrary, in our
bodily life we are subject to the laws of the state in which we live and are
bound to comply with temporal authority (I, 673: 17-20).34
Here then we meet an important distinction that Luther makes between the new self and the old self, and again, between the conscience and the
body. lnsof ar as Ouistians are God's new creation born of the Spirit, they are
free from the law, but insofar as they are still sinners encumbered by the flesh,
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they are subject to the law in their bodily life.35 To put it positively, the law
applies to Ouistians precisely because they are sinners and only because they
are sinners. As God's elect and holy people, not only do Ouistians not need
the law but they are beyond the reach of the law, for, since they are pure and
holy by faith in Cllrist, the law can no longer accuse them. But as for what
Cllristians do in the body--their relationships to other people, their duties and
responsibilities--here they are still governed by the law. In a word, the law is
to rule the body but not the conscience (I, 213: 28-214: 24).36 But since the law
knows no bounds and will still attempt to condemn even the saints, Luther
insists that the law must be expelled from the conscience and not be allowed
to rob Ouistians of the comfort of the gospel (I, 205: 8-9 passim).37 To say that
the law m~t not be permitted to rule the conscience is the same as saying
that the law· must be excluded from the article of justification. For law and
gospel, though different, are also closely connected in the heart and life of the
believer, and yet law and gospel must be separated as far as possible in the
conscience whenever it causes the Otristian to doubt the certainty of God's
word of forgiveness. The law's chief office is to accuse and terrify the conscience. Here Luther agrees with Melanchthon's dictum (I, 257: 29; d. Ap. IV,
285). Yet even though Ouistians confess that they are sinners, the law dare
not accuse them of what is truly sin in their lives, for through Ouist the law
has now been deprived of its legal hold on them (II, 97: 29-34). Therefore,
when justification is at stake, Luther speaks most contemptuously of the law,
for in times of temptation or conflict it can do nothing to comfort or encourage the conscience but only frightens it and deprives it of its confidence in the
gospel (I, 557: 15-558: 23).38 The conscience should know nothing about the
law but look only to Ouist (I, 545: 21-22).39 Since the law implies works, to
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exclude the law from the conscience in the article of justification is the same
as excluding works. Justification is by faith alone, without the works of the
law. This is the great theme of Galatians which Luther echoes in his Com-

mentary again and again.
At the same time, however, Luther also knows that God commands
good works and that therefore they are necessary and must be taught. Oearly,
there is no contradiction here if the correct order is observed: first faith, then
works. Good works are always the fruit of faith and never its presupposition,
just as a good tree produces ·good fruit and not vice versa (1, 287: 17-23). In

other words, Ouistians do not become righteous by doing righteous deeds
but, having

bee1t

justified by faith, they do righteous deeds (I, 402: 24-25).40

Luther insists that f a;~h spontaneously produces good works in the same way
as a good tree bears good fruit. It can do nothing else.41 Faith does not need
the coercion of the luw to do good works but freely and willingly does the
very things that the law requires.42 Therefore, Ouistians are commanded to
do good works, insofar as they are still sinners, for the old Adam, which still
lives on in them, must be forced to do God's will using all the threats that the
law can muster. While Luther constantly stresses that faith alone justifies
without works, he says just as emphatically that faith is never alone, that is, it
is never idle or without love but always issues in good works (I, 427: 11-14).43

Both topics, faith and works, must be carefully taught and emphasized but in
such a way that they both remain within their limits (II, 78: 20-21). The classical Pauline formulation, •faith active through love• (Gal. 5: 6), rightly puts
the prius on faith.44 First faith, then love, but there can be no genuine faith
without love. That is the burden of James's argument: faith without love is
dead. True faith toward God is faith that loves and helps the neighbor with-
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out qualification (cf. James 1: 27). Hence, Luther can say that the only thing
that makes a person a Ou-istian is faith and love (II, 38: 26-31). However,
unlike the Scholastics, who always spoke of faith formed by love, Luther
stresses that faith is the worker and love the instrument; it is faith that is
effective, not love (II, 36: 8-14).45 He can even say that genuine good works
commanded by God (as opposed to the self-chosen works that were typical of
monastic piety) must be urged as much as faith (11, 68: 16-19). The reason that
good works must be preached is not just to bludgeon the flesh and force it to
act, but to make plain to Ouistians what God wants them to do. A'3 church

history has shown, the flesh can be astonishingly inventive when it comes to
acts of piety, but more often than not they are self-serving works which may
be done to the glory of God, but not for the benefit of the neighbor. That is

why Luther does not just stress the need for works, for not just any works are
pleasing to God, but specifically those that he has •commanded in the law," by
which he means the Decalogue.46 The freedom of the gospel is never to be
equated with license (I, 528: 24-34). It is never the freedom to do what I choose
but the freedom to do what God wants. Although Luther does not formulate
it in so many words, it is freedom from bondage to serve the neighbor in
love. Ouistian freedom will always be exploited by the devil who is intent
on bringing us back into bondage to the flesh (hence, back under the law).
1ne way to resist that is again and again to heed the scriptural exhortations to
serve God in one's calling and to help the neighbor in whatever way we can

(II, 61: 13-6-1: 12; I, 51: 21-31).
Even though Luther is in no doubt that good works must be preached
to Ouistians in order to goad the flesh into action, he is also concerned that at
no time is the conscience to be threatened by the law. He knows the dilemma
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posed by evangelical freedom: if you teach faith, the fleshly-minded neglect
good works, but if you urge works, faith and the comfort of the conscience is
put at risk (II, 94: 21-22).47 Hence, he warns that, although good works must
be wged, preachers dare not hide the freedom of the gospel, nor may they

compel obedience, but only admonish people to do what is right and leave
the rest to God {II, 63: 13-21). Luther also knows that good works can even be
an occasion for sin: "The devil is such a clever trickster that he can make great
sins out of my righteousness and good works.• In this sense he can say that,
because my sins are so grave, "my righteousness does me no good but rather
puts me at a disadvantage before God• (I, 88: 26-29).48 Yet our fear of Satan's
machinations must not be allowed to hinder us from doing good works, for
our confidence lies in the fact that everything that we do in faith is pleasing to
God, not for its own sake, but because it is forgiven, for Ouist's sake. In the
final analysis, the only thing that will rescue us from the dilemma posed by
evangelical freedom is the correct distinction between law and gospel. Luther
points the way in the famous passage about the two ways of viewing Ouist.
Scripture presents Ouist in two ways: as gift [donum} and as example
{exemplum}. Quist as exemplar (mirror) allows us to contemplate how

much we are still lacking, lest we become smug (II, 42: 19-28). However, he is
adamant that he will not tolerate Ouist being presented to him as exemplar
except when he is joyful. •1n a time of tribulation I will not listen to, nor will
I allow, [any Ouist] except the gift-Ouist [Christum donum}, who died for my
sirJ and bestowed on me his righteousness, and who accomplished and filled
up what is lacking in my life" (II, 42: 29-31). In other words, whether Christ is
presented as example or gift is nothing more than the simple application of
law and gospel. To the smug, Omst must be portrayed as example, but to
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those already burdened by their sin, Ouist must be presented as gift. Similarly, putting on Cluist can be understood in two ways: one, according to the
law, where we imitate the example and virtues of Ouist as we would any
saint; the other, according to the gospel, where we put on Christ himself: his
righreousness, holiness, power, salvation, life and Spirit. The latter is not a
matter of imitation but of a new birth and a new creation (I, 539: 34-540: 19).
This happens in baptism: there we put on Christ and his garment of righteousness. •Hence baptism is a very powerful and effective thing, for when
we put on Ouist, the garment of our righteousness and salvation, then we
also put on Christ, the garment of imitation• (I, 541: 33-35).49 We have seen
then that not only doctrine (e.g. Christ's death) but also parenesis (e.g. the
exhortation to put off the old self and put on the new) may be preached and
heard as either law or gospel. Precisely how this will be heard is beyond the
control of the preacher, but whether it is to be preached as law or gospel will
all depend on whether the words are intended to demand and accuse (reveal
sin) or to give and forgive (reveal Ouist as savior).
We have already stressed that Luther is emphatic that the law was
given to terrify and kill the stubborn and to exercise--indeed, drown--the •old
man• (vetus homo} (I, 44: 15-16), whereas the •new man• (novus homo} ls
not under law but under grace (I, 44: 24-45: 22). But the law is not meant to
last forever. Its terminus is Ouist. Thus, Luther echoes Paul in asserting that
Quist is the end of the law--not just its fulfillment but its end (Rom. 10: 4).

When Ouist comes, the time of the law is finished and the time of grace
begins. However, Luther does not understand this merely in a historical
sense with reference to Ouist's first coming at the time appointed by the
Father (Gal. 4: 4). He also understands it spiritually in the sense that •the
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same Christ who once came in time comes to us in the Spirit every day and
every hour." The reason he continues coming to us through his means of
grace is because we are not yet perfectly pure but are still infected with sin.SO
Every time Christ comes in grace and mercy to a penitent sinner, he more and
more abolishes the law and establishes his reign of grace.St Thus, although
the alternation of law and gospel continues in the life of believers inasmuch
as they are both sinners and saints, the more they grow in God's grace, that is,
the more they allow him to be the gracious, forgiving God that he wants to be,
the more they will be immune to the threats and accusations of the law.
Ouistians in concreto are both saints and sinners and therefore live under
God's total word of law and gospel: the law still judges them insofar as they
remain sinners, but the gospel absolves as they accept that judgment and
strengthens them for their battle against the flesh and the powers of evil.
The Place of Admonitions
The point has already been made several times that the chief function
of the law in Luther's view is the negative one of exposing and convicting sin
as well as coercing the old Adam to do the works commanded by God which
Christians, according to their new nature, do--or, at least, want to do--cheerfully and spontaneously, without any compulsion from the law. However,
while this is the law's chief role, it is not its only role. The law also instructs
Christians ln the good works that are pleasing to God and which he •prepared
beforehand, that we should walk in them• (Eph. 2: 10). It is this didactic
function of the law that we must now address.
We begin this section with a few definitions. So far we have not
defined law except to say that, when Luther speaks about it, he more often
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than not sees it in antithesis to the gospel. However, it would be more correct
to see the accusing function of the law as one of the post-fall expressions of
God's eternal, unchangeable will. The law that accuses is essentially the
Decalogue, interpreted spiritually, as in the Sermon on the Mount. lbis is
also the same law as that which is written on the heart, as we will see in the
next chapter. However, the question now arises, How are we to understand
the admonitions (parenesis) of the New Testament? Are they anything more
than the explication and application of the Ten Commandments, which can
be summed up in the command to love God and the neighbor, or are there
also parenetic statements which go beyond the Commandments? Luther of

course nowhere defines for us how he understands the term admonition in
his Commentary, but it is probably safe to say that he equates it with the

preaching of good works, which is ultimately a preaching of the law. That of
course immediately raises the question of how a law that accuses us of sin can
be used positively as a basis for instruction. Does the law itself change after

justification or is it the Ouistian, who now hears it differently? Can we ~peak
of so-called •evangelical imperatives,• or of a gospel use of the law? These
are some question that we need to keep in mind as we consider how Luther
understands the place of admonition or instruction in the OU'istian life. For
the time being, it is enough to say that when we talk about the admonitions
of the New Testament, we are talking about the appeal to do the good works
commanded by God. While these ethical appeals or instructions will often
go beyond the Ten Commandments, nevertheless, they are often still related
to the Decalogue, and can be broadly summed up by the twofold command to
love God and the neighbor.
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The first thing that needs to be said is that there can be no doubt that
Luther uses the term law (lex] in coMecting with instructing believers, even
though Joest, as we have seen, claims that he often uses command {Gebot].
While this modem distinction between law in its primary role as revealing
and condemning sin, on the one hand, and law in the form of command after
justification as it warns, instructs, and encourages believers, on the other, has
some limited merit in formal theological discourse, it is a distinction foreign
to Luther. In our opinion--and that is all it c.an be--the fact that Luther often
uses 'command' in connection with parenesis does not automatically imply
that he sees the law undergo a theological change of function when applied to
believers. The law itself does not change but believers do.
Luther holds that when Paul admonishes Ouistians with the law and
urges them to mutual love, he is doing nothing more than exhor"JJ\g them to
walk by the Spirit and not to gratify the desires of the flesh (II, 82: 19-22). Love
is the fulfilling of the law, but genuine love is impossible without the Spirit

and ends only in hypocrisy (11, 168: 15-20). Since, however, the Holy Spirit can
be received only by faith, Luther can say that finally faith ls the fulfilling of

the law.52 So the real •dotng• of the law is believing.53 This is entirely in
keeping with Paul's words that whatever does not proceed from faith is sin
(Rom. 14: 23). Even more profoundly, Luther can say that our 'activity' is
simply to let G>d do his work in us (I, 610: 15-17) because it is ultimately the
Holy Spirit, working through the word, who himself produces in Ouistians
the fruit of faith and the works of love. And because believers have the Holy
Spirit, they will certainly not be idle but, like a healthy tree, bear good fruit.
The Spirit guides them in all aspects of their piety so that they love God, pray
and give thanks to him, as well as show love to all people (I, 26.5: 29-36).
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These remarks of Luther agree with what we have seen elsewhere. He
consistently emphasizes that Christians are impelled by the Spirit in all
aspects of their life. Likewise, he says that the law is not to be preached for the
sake of faith (the 'new man') but on account of the flesh (WA 39 I, 374: 1~
18).54 OU'istians do not need the Decalogue to tell them what to do; insofar as
they are born anew and have the Spirit they know that already. The point to
be made here is simply that the good works done by Ouistians are good only
because they are done freely in faith. Therefore, when the law compels the
flesh to do the works commanded by God, they are not pleasing to him as
such, even though they accord with his command, because they are not
accompanied by faith. Only the fruits of the Spirit are truly works of faith
because they are done freely and spontaneously without any compulsion. It
follows then that since as OuistiaN we are simultaneously saints and sinners, our good works are pleasing to God only because they are forgiven.
Ultimately, Christians obey the law not to earn righteousness, which they
have by faith alone, but for the peace of the world, out of gratitude to God,
and as a good example,
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that others may be invited to believe the gospel

(I, 570: 18-21).
Ouistian freedom is the freedom to do the good works that the Spirit

of God leads us to do, in opposition to the flesh. If Ouistians are to continue
walking in the way of the Spirit, they need to be nourished and strengthened
by word and sacrament, and to be constant in prayer,
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that, by the power of

the Spirit, they can nail the flesh to the cross. Precisely because they are led by
the Spirit, Christians are exhorted to be the righteous people that they already
are by faith; they are warned not to give into the flesh but to resist it through
the Spirit. Luther can say that, to the extent that they struggle against the
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flesh through the power of the Spirit, they are also outwardly righteous even
though it is not this righteousness that makes them acceptable to God (Il, 90:
26-32 ). Although sin is still a reality in their lives, Christians no longer sin
deliberately but unwillingly, out of weaklless and ignorance (I, 573: 21-22). For
Luther the crucial thing is not that we are aroused by the desires of the flesh
but that we do not capitulate to them. In fact, the more godly people are, the
more aware they will be of the intensity of this conflict between the flesh and
the Spirit, and the less they will see in their lives any evidence of "progress"
or growth in holiness (Il, 94: 11-15). Since the struggle against the flesh is the
sign of faith and of the Spirit's presence, we should not despair when we feel
the flesh entering into a new battle against the Spirit, or if we cannot immediately force the flesh to submit to the Spirit (II, 90: 33-35).55 The mere fact that
it grieves us that the flesh is so intractable and that, even as Christians, we are
so weak and vulnerable, is already a sign that we are being led by the Spirit.
On the other hand, the absence of genuine grief over sin(s), that is, impenitence, grieves the Holy Spirit, and is a sign that we are being led by the flesh.
Law, gospel and good works--each has its proper place in the Ouistian life.
The law prepares the heart for the gospel while good works, as the fruit of
faith, flow from a heart that has been renewed by the gospel.
It is dear that Luther regards the dominical commands in the four
gospels as a preaching of the law and not of the gospel. In fact he calls them
"expositions of the law and appendices to the gosper (I, 260: 13-14). While
this phrase seems to bear some resemblance to the modem phrase •gospel

imperatives" (or imperatives grounded in the gospel, used chiefly in connection with the letters of the New Testament), Luther is still adamant that
the commands in the gospel are law. However, the fact that he does not call
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them law, pure and simple, but expositions of the law appended to the gospel,
suggests that he does not see these commands as functioning in a purely
accusatory way but as guiding and instructing believers in those works that
are pleasing to God. On the other hand, when Luther says that the commands are appended to the gospel, the word "gospel" here may mean nothing
more than the literary gospel. Be that as it may, from what we have seen so
far, we have no basis for believing that Luther ever saw the admonitions of
the New Testament--either the dominical injunctions or apostolic parenesis-as purely positive directives for Guisti.ans which no longer accuse them of
sin. In our opinion, the most we can say is that there is evidence to suggest
that Luther approved a toning-down of the law when preached to Ouistians,
not because they no longer need the law as sinners, but in order not to risk
threatening their conscience and injuring their faith.56 Although the flesh
still needs to be disciplined and coerced, the situation is not exactly the same

as that prior to conversion. Before justification, the flesh ruled unhindered
[peccatum regnant]; after justification however the flesh is no longer ruler but

is now ruled by the Spirit (peccatum regnatum}, although it still tries to regain
its lost ascendancy. It is for this reason, no doubt, that Luther concedes that
the preaching of the law among Ouistians is to be milder because the flesh
has been overcome by the Spirit.57 On the other hand, if believers allow the
flesh to regain control, and consequently lose the Spirit by refusing the gift of
the gospel, they can no longer be regarded as a Cluistians.
While the gospel is meant for the conscience and ~s intended to
strengthen and confirm our faith, when Luther wants to describe the way in
which faith expresses itself in love, he turns to the law, more specifically the
Decalogue,58 which Jesus sums up with the command to love God and the
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neighbor.59 Luther says we must listen to the law and follow our vocation.
Here he connects the law with our vocation and stations in life. God's will as
expressed in the Decalogue in concrete form is to be lived out, first and foremost, within the framework of our vocation as well as within the specific
structures (family, school, government etc.) and relationships in which he
has called us to serve him.60 For whatever work we do in these spheres is •a
divine work because it is a divine calling and has God's mandate• (II, 152: 38153: 29). 61 We praise and serve God, not in the abstract, but concretely, by

serving our neighbor and faithfully doing the work we are called to do. This
again highlights the importance that Luther attaches to the works commanded by God rather than those of our own chosing, which, more often than not,
end up being an escape from our God-given responsibilities and the needs of
the neighbor. It is precisely as we live out our lives in the community of this
world and of the Ouistian congregation that our faith is given the chance to
become active in love.
Conclusions

In this chapter we have explored the role of the law in the Oui.stian
life and, in particular, the relation between the law and the freedom of the
gospel. Several points have become clear from our study of Luther's great

Galatians Commentary of 1531/1535. On the one hand, Ouistians, insofar as
they are already righteous and holy by faith, need no law, because they freely
and spontaneously do the works that God has commanded. AB people who
have been born anew by the Spirit, they know what God requires, even before
they are told, and delight in doing it to his praise and glory. The law for them
has been abrogated and driven out of their conscience where Ouist alone

66
dwells in faith. On the other hand, because Ouistians are still sinners and
burdened by the old Adam, they must have the law preached to them, both to
convict them of sin, drive them to Ouist, and to instruct them in the works
that are pleasing to God. Even though the old Adam remains an unwilling
partner, because the Ouistian is led by the Spirit and not the flesh, the law
forces the flesh to do God's will with all manner of threats, rewards, and
punishments. This twof oldness which characterizes the Christian life stems
directly from the fact that believers are simultaneously righ~eous and sinners,
and as such are enmeshe j in a battle between the flesh and the spirit-which
is ultimately a battle between the old Adam and the Holy Spirit. The final
outcome is already assured through Ouist's death and resurrection, but until
the death of the old Adam, begun in baptism, is completed on the last day, we
must continue to fight the flesh by letting the Spirit have his way with us. In
other words, we need to return daily to our baptism to drown the old Adam
through contrition and repentance so that the new self may daily rise up and
live before God in righteousness and purity forever (SC IV, 12).
This lifelong struggle between the flesh and the spirit/Sphit will often
give rise to terrible Anfechtung. The accusations of the law will repeatedly
threaten the conscience and try to rob it of the freedom of the gospel. Luther
never tired of saying that the law must be kept out of the contrite conscience
and relegated to the domain of the body. The law controls our bodily life and
relationships, our duties and responsibilities in our calling and stations in
life, but Quist alone dwells in our con.science with the comfort and certainty
of the gospel. However, in qrder not to lose the freedom of the gospel, we

need to be taught how to distinguish the law from the gospel so that, when
our conscience is harassed, we can turn a deaf ear to the law and take refuge
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believers of their sin and drive them to Ouist. While the law always accuses,
it does not only accuse; it also teaches Ou-istians the good works God that has
prepared (for) them to do (Eph. 2: 10). However, the appeal to do the good
works commanded by God is never regarded by Luther as anything other than
a preaching of the law. On the other hand, he knows that since our hearts
have been renewed by the gospel, we now receive these admonitions with
joy, for not only do they correspond with our own inmost desires but in faith
we see God's law as his good and gracious gift. It is for this reason that Luther
can extol the Ten Commandments in his Large Catechism and say that we
should •prize and value them above all other teachings as the greatest
treasure God has given us• (LC, I, 333).

NOTES

1"Therefore, the true office and chief and proper use of the law is to
reveal to people their sin, blindness, misery ... judgment and the welldeserved wrath of God" (I, 481: 13-16). For more on the proper use of the law,
see I, 485: 23-486: 16. All references are to WA 40 unless otherwise stated.
2Luther, commenting on Gal. 3: 19, says that the first use of the law as a
civic restraint is extremely necessary for preserving public peace and order,
and especially for ensuring the free cowse of the gospel. Compared with the
second use, which is primarily negative, the first use of the law has a positive
function in preserving external righteousness and justice and restraining evil
(I, 480: 22-25).

3When justification is at stake, "the law must be removed from sight
completely, ~ though it had never existed or would never exist but were a
mere nothing" (I, 490: 30-32).
4Toe law is chiefly abused when the self-righteous and hypocrites
imagine that they can use it to merit their own salvation. However, Luther
also mentions two other abuses: the law is abused by those who want to exempt OU'istians from it altogether, in the name of OU'istian liberty (a la the
Peasants' Revolt), which they confuse with carnal license. The other abuse is
perpetrated by those who do not understand that the terrors of conscience
produced by the law are meant to last only until Christ comes. In the latter
case the law leads to despair, while in the case of hypocrites it causes pride and
presumption (I, 528: 21-34).
5For Luther the fundamental sin is the private opinion all peJple have
that they are righteous by means of their own work. 1his fatal presumption,
endemic to all human beings, who are by nature "religious,• is "the head of
the serpent crushed by Christ" (I, 47/: 23-478: 13).
6When the law is used properly and not abused, it does not lead to
pride or despair but rather, like a stimulus, drives the hungry to Ouist in
order that he may fill them with his good gifts. Thus Luther says:
Therefore, the proper function of the law is to make us guilty, to humble
us, to kill us, to lead us down to hell, and to take everything away from
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us, but always with the purpose that we may be justified, exalted, made
alive, carried up to heaven, and acquire all things. Therefore, the law
does not merely kill, but it kills for the sake of life (I, 529: 10-1").
7Luther seems to vacillate on the question of whether the law was ever
given on the assumption tr-3l it could actually be kept. Is it the case that the
law could, and indeed shou!d, be kept but that sin makes this impossible? Or
does the very attempt to keep it alffady constitute an abuse c:J the law since it
fails to recognize the law's real purpa;e? Thus, on the one hand, Luther can
say that it 3s impossible for hWIW\ nature to keep the law; on the other, he
can also say that we should keep the law and be justified by keeping it, but sin
gets in the way (Debemnus quidem implert legtm et implectiont tius
iustificari, sed peCClltum obstatJ (ll, 79: 22-23). Perhaps it would be wise not to
press passages like the latter since, on balance, they are in the minority. More
of ten than not, Luther asserts that the law is imp08Sible to keep without the
promise (meaning Ouist and justification by faith) and the Holy Spirit, and
that God foresaw this long before the law (I,. 400: 15-26). Passages that suggew
that we should be able to keep the law but ,·annot probably owe mott.· to
Luther's rnetoric than his dialectic. It would be going too far, in our opinion,
to say that such passages allow us to conclude that Luther viewed the law,
even if only theoretically, as a potential WdY of salvatioo. We saw already in
the iast chapter that the question c:J the fulfillability c:J the law waa a point c:J
contention between the Gnesio-Lutherans and the Philippists in the controversies that arose after Luther's death.
8The Ouistian ethos has no place for the Kantian axiom: you must,
therefore you can. Luther writes:
If we loved God with all our heart etc., then. c:J coune, we would be
justified and would live on account c:J that obedience, according tv the
statement, •sy doing this a person will live.• But the gospel uya, •you
are not doing thii; therefore, you will not live on account ol it.• For the
statement, •you shall love the Lord,• requires perfect obedleftce .•. toward God (I, 606: lS.22).
This remark is interesting for two reasons: First, it provides us with another
passage in which Luther is at least prepared to grant the p<-.ibility that a
person could be justified by perfect obedience (see the previoua note for the
discussion). Seccmdly, his use c:J the word •gasper here ia unURW. Oearty,
when he states that the gospel says, •you are not doing this; therefore, you
will not live,• we can only aasume that he ia wling the term in the broad
sense of God's word and not, as is more usual. in the narrow let\8e ol the
promise of the forgiveness ol sw.
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9Luther distinguishes between a moral • doing• and a theological
•doing." True • doing• is a doing in faith, a theological doing. "Therefore,
every doer of the law and every moral saint who wants to be justified
through human will and reason is under a curse, because he comes before
God in the presumption of his own righteousness. In 'keeping' the law he
does not keep it• (I, 419: 13-16). In his comments on Gal. 3: 10 Luther notes
that Paul proves the affirmative statement, •All who rely on works of the law
are under a curse,• on the basis of a negative statement which he borrowed
from Moses, "Cursed be everyone who does not abide by all things, etc• (Deut.
27: 26). These two statements however appear to be in flat contradiction: Paul
says that those who do the works of the law are under a curse, but Moses says
that those who 'do not do the works of the law are under a curse. For Luther
these can only be reconciled through faith. The operative word is •do.• There
are two types of doers: true doers and hypocrites. The first are people of faith,
who trust that they are justified solely for Christ's sake; the second are peopl~
who rely on the works of the law for justification. The latter, however, desiring to be justified by the works of the law, act contrary to the law, for even the
law witnesses to the righteousness of faith. Only believers who have received
the Holy Spirit fulfill the law by loving God and their neighbor--if not in fact,
at least through forgiveness. Therefore, only believers are the real doers of
the law; the rest abuse the law by trying to justify themselves on the basis of
works, and are thus under a curse (I, 396: 26-409: 22). Hence, when Paul says
that those who do the things written in the law will live by them (Gal. 3: 12),
Luther takes this statement as hypothetical, since for him there are no such
people extra fidem (I, 430: 15-18).
10fherefore, it is impossible to keep the law without the gospel, the
Holy Spirit, and faith. Thus, Luther can say that the true doer of the law
receives the Holy Spirit through faith in Ouist, and then begins to love God
and to serve the neighbor. Hence, there is no "doing" in the theological sense
without faith. Faith first makes the doer into a tree so that his or her deeds
become the fruit. "To keep the law without faith therefore is to make apples
without a tree, out of wood or mud, which is not to make apples, but to make
mere fantasies. But once the tree has been planted ... then works follow. Fer
there must be a doer before deeds, not deeds before a doer• (I, 401: 30-402: 21).
11Toe true office and use of the law is as a •most useful servant,
impelling us to CJuist• (I, 489: 30-31). Luther insists that it is vital for people,
crushed by the law and on the brink of despair, to know how to use the law
correctly, which means in the service of the gospel. Thus he says:
Its function and use is not only to disclose the sin and wrath of God, but
also to drive us to Ouist. Only the Holy Spirit seeks this use of the law,
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and the gospel teaches it, because only the gospel says that God is present
with those who are contrite in heart. Therefore, if you have been crushed
by that hammer, do not use your contrition wrongly by burdening yourself with even more laws, but listen to Gui.st when he says, •come to me
.... • When the law drives you this way so that you despair of everything that is your own, and seek help and solace in Quist, then it is being
used correctly; and so, through the gospel, it serves the cause of justification {servit per Evangelium ad iustificationem}. This is the best and most
perfect use of the law (I, 490: 15-24).
12a. I, 598: 28-30: "Sin still clings to our flesh, continually disturbing
the conscience and hindering faith, so that we cannot perfectly see and desire
with joy that eternal wealth which God has given us through Gui.st: This
can be seen only in the light of the gospel, and yet the gospel cannot do its
work and plant the seed of faith unless the soil of the heart has been prepared
by the scarifying work of the law.
13Because of human pride and the presumption of righteousness,
people cannot live until the old nature is killed. •Although the law kills,
God still uses this effect of the law, this death, for a good cause, namely, life."
God decided to kill this pestilence (Luther also calls the old Adam a beast) by
means of the law, that people might be raised up again to hear this voice
beyond the law: "Do not fear. I did not give the law and kill you through it,
in order that you should remain in death, but that you should fear me and
live: A presumption of good works and of righteousness leaves no room for
the fear of God. Therefore, God must use the hammer of the law to crush
that proud beast, presumption. When people have been reduced to nothing
by the pounding of the law, they despair of their own powers or goodness and
"begin to thirst for mercy and the forgiveness of sins' (I, 517: 31-518: 24).
14Toe law is much inferior to the gospel because it was ordained
through an intermediary (angels), whereas the gospel was ordained through
the Lord himself (I, 494: 23-24).
15Toe difference between the views of early and late Luther with
regard to justification has been well documented in Uuras Saamivaara,
Luther Discovers the Gospel: New Light Upon Luther's Way from Medieval
Cat1wlicism to Evangelical Faith (St Louis: Concordia Publishing House,
1951), 9-18. The core difference between Augustine and late Luther is that for
Augustine, justification ii:1 the renewal or gradual transformation of the
believer into the image of God, while for Luther it is the forgiveness of sins
and the imputation of righteousness for Christ's sake. Both see salvation
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consisting of two gifts, forgiveness and renewal. Augustine understands
justification primarily as renewal, with the non-imputation of sins as its
supplement (basically the view adopted by Trent), whereas Luther sees
justification as both the non-imputation (or the forgiveness) of sins and the
imputation of Olrist's righteousness. According to Luther's view, renewal is
not a part of justification but its fruit. Furthermore, for Augustine, salvation
results from our fulfillment of the law made possible by the power of grace;
for Luther, on the other hand, the law can only be (or begin to be) fulfilled
after we have first been justified and received Ol.rist's perfect fulfillment in
faith. Therefore, each has a different view of the law: for Augustine, the law
drives people to Ouist to seek power to fulfill the law in love and obedience;
for Luther, the law drives people to Ouist to receive from him his own
perfect fulfillment of the law; their own fulfillment of the law in love will
follow as a fruit of faith. Adolf Koberle, Rechtfertigrmg und Heiligung: Eine
biblische, theologiegeschichte und systematische Untersuchung, 2d ed.
(Leipzig: Verlag von Dorffling & Franke, 1929), 122, n. 2, distinguishes three
different emphases in Luther's treatment of the relation between justification
and sanctification (nova vita), each corresponding to a particular stage of his
theological development. ln his early life, when he is still under the influence of Augustine, he uses effici and reputari interchangeably, so much so
that he even speaks of a magis et magis iustificari. Later, Luther begins to
emphasize more and more the externality of Olrist's work so that the
Christus in nobis is clearly subordinated to the Christus pro nobis. This is
what we find in his great Galatians Commentary. Finally, in the latter part of
his life, as a result of his experiences with the fanatics, he comes doser to the
view of Melanchthon by emphasizing the iustitia aliena more and more in
contrast to renewal. Koberle concludes however that Luther at all times,
though with differing emphases, held to •the close interconnection between
justification and sanctification, while clearly distinguishing between the two
theological concepts.•
16Tois, for instance, comes out in his description of the new life as
God's new creation wrought by the Holy Spirit. In connection with Gal. 6: 15
Luther comments:
This [renewal] is then followed by an outward change in the flesh, in the
parts of the body, and in the senses. For when the heart acquires new
light, a new judgment, and new motivation through the gospel, this also
brings about a renewal of the senses. The ears long to hear the word of
God ... These changes are, so to speak, not verbal but real. They produce
a new mind and will, new senses, and even new actions by the flesh so
that the eyes, the ears, the lips, and the tongue not only see, hear, and
speak differently than before, but also the mind itself approves and
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pursues things that are different. Before it went about blindly ... , imagining that God is a peddler who sells his grace to us in exchange for our
works and merits. Now that the light of the gospel has risen, it knows
that it acquires righteousness solely by faith in Quist. Therefore, it now
casts off its self-chosen works and performs instead the works of its calling
and the works of love, which God has commanded. It praises God and
proclaims him, and glories and exults solely in its confidence in mercy
through Christ. U it has to bear some sort of evil or danger, it accepts this
willingly and joyfully, although the flesh goes on grumbling. This is
what Paul calls a new creation (II, 178: 32-179: 23).
17Koberle, Rechtfertigung, 125-6. Henry P. Hamann, 'Sanctification--A
Symbolical, Exegetical, Dogmatical, and Homiletical Study,• Lutheran
Theological Journal 10 (December 1~6), 90, argues, contra Kasemann, that
while justification and sanctification cannot be separated chronologically,
they must be distinguished materially. Werner Elert, The Structure of
Lutheranism. Vol. 1: The Theology and Philosophy of Lutheranism
Especially in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, trans. Wulter A.
Hansen (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1962), 81-2, 153, stresses that
the divine righteousness received by faith (transcendental I) is reduced to a
mathematical point [punctum mathematicum] and, as such, is never something empirical that can be located somewhere in the conscience (psychic I).
18Toe partim ... partim way of speaking is typical of Luther's earlier
1519 Commentary. However, at that stage Luther was still not completely free
of Augustinian influence, and consequently we find places where he still
seems to be running justification and sanctification together. We find an
example of this in WA 2, 586: 9-19, where he says that the divine imputation
which justifies and the outpouring of the Spirit which sanctifies are one and
the same. When justification is understood progressively and transf ormatively, then partim ... partim mea.,s that the Oui.stian is partly justified and
partly a sinner. On the other hand, when Luther uses partim ... partim in
his 1531 Commentary, he applies it, not to justification, but to sanctification.
19Jt is clear that for Luther, God not only justifies people through the
proclamation of the word but also sanctifies them: ''Through my preaching
God has not only brought it about that you believed but also that you lived
holy lives, produced much fruit of faith, and suffered evil' (i, 352: 14-16). To
love one's neighbor with unfeigned love is for Luther certainly a powerful
deed of the Spirit (I, 352: 22-28).
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20Luther can speak about sin and righteousness in a partim ... partim
way when he considers sanctification from the standpoint of the Christian as
saint and sinner:
And so if we look a, the flesh, we are sinners; if we look at the Spirit, we
are righteous. So we are partly sinners and partly righteous {Atque ita
partim peccatores, partim iusti sumus}. Nevertheless, our righteousness
is more abundant than our sin, because the holiness and righteousness of
Christ, our propitiator, by far surpasses the sin of the entire world.
Consequently, the forgiveness of sins, which we have through him, is so
great, so abundant, and so infinite, that it easily swallows up every sin,
provided that we persevere in faith and hope toward him (II, 86: 13-19).
As we have already seen, when Luther uses the language of partim ... partim
he does not contradict his basic assertion that Ouistians are wholly righteous
and wholly sinful {totus . .. lotus]. Our sanctification, no less than our justification, is entirely God's doing. However, while our justification is complete, God continues to sanctify us throughout our life. Each is a hidden
reality and an article of faith. Thus, Luth~r can say that we are indeed partly
siMers and partly righteous. But never for a moment should we take that as
an alternative to his fundamental conviction that as Ot.ristians we are both
wholly righteous and wholly sinners at one and the same time.
21Luther regards the first fruits of the Spirit {primitias Spiritus} as the
leaven hidden in the lump; "the whole lump has not yet been leavened, but
it is beginning to be leavened.' He says that if we look at Christ, our leaven,
we see that we are completely pure and holy, but that if we look at ourselves
we see nothing but greed, lust, anger, pride, the terror of death, etc. 'To the
extent that these are present, Cll.rist is absent; or if he is present, he is present
weakly' {qualenus ista adsunt, eatenus abesl Christus, aul si adesl, infirme
adesl} (I, 537: 21-29). The passage about the leaven should not be interpreted
to mean that justification is incomplete and progressive. That would be
contrary to the whole thrust of the Commentary. Rather, it is a reference to
God's on-going work of sanctification, which we cannot see in ourselves but
which we believe, through the word and on account of the Holy Spirit whom
God has given us as a guarantee that what he has begun in us he will complete with the resurrection of the body and the life everlasting (I, 538: 23-26).
22Luther notes that there are two ways of interpreting Gal. 5: 5. One is
to understand it as saying, 'through the Spirit, by faith, we wait for the hope
of our righteousness, that is, the hoped-for righteousness {iuslicuim
speratam}, which is certainly to be revealed in due time.• The other way is to
take it as saying, 'through the Spirit, by faith, we wait for righteousness with
hope and longing; that is, we are justified, and still we are not yet justified,
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because our righte0Ub1less is still hanging in hope• (II, 23: 33-24: 15). He puts
them together in the following way:
Thus, in the midst of fears and of a consciousness of sin, my hope, based
on experience [d. LW 27: 21: •that is, my feeling of hope•] is so aroused
and strengthened by faith that it hopes that I am righteous. Then hopethat is, the thing hoped for--hopes that what it does not yet see will be
made perfect and will be revealed in due time (II, 24: 34-25: 18).
Luther approves both interpretations but thinks that the first affords greater
comfort to the troubled conscience because it regards righteousness as hope
based on experience {de affectu speranteJ. He continues:
For my righteousness is not yet perfect or conscious. Yet I do n>t despair
on that account, for faith shows me Otrist in whom I trust ... and
through hope I am encouraged over against my consciousness of sin,
since I conclude that perfect righteousness has been prepared for me in
heaven. Thus both things are true: I am righteous here with an incipient
righteousness; and in this hope I am strengthened against sin and look
for the consummation of perfect righteousness in heaven. These things
are correctly understood when they are put into practice• (II, 25: 19-26).
Luther knows that Ouistian hope is not just a hoping against hope, but a sure
confidence of the future, because it is anchored to Cltrist. Luther says elsewhere that believers have eternal righteousness laid up in heaven, •which
they look for in hope as an utterly certain possession• (II, 33: 29-31). Hope
waits to see visibly the righteousness that it already has through faith.
231n connection with Galatians 3: 6 Luther makes the point that righteousness does indeed begin through faith and that through it we have the
first fruits of the Spirit. •sut because faith is weak, it is not perfected without
divine imputation. ■ Therefore, faith begins righteousness, but imputation
perfects it until the day of Ouist. ■ (I, 364: 25-28). Although it is precisely faith
that receives the imputed righteousness, Luther's concern here is to take the
focus away from the subjective side of faith and to put it on the object of faith.
24•Toercfore, we are not said to be saints, formally, as a wall is said to
be white because of its inherent whiteness. Our inherent holiness is not
enough. Otrist therefore is our entire holiness; where this inherent holiness
is not enough, Cluist 1s• (I, 197: 25-198: 14). As we have said before, Luther
keeps both the whole and the partial aspects of righteousness and holiness
closely together. However, the basis and presupposition for the partial
(sanctification) is the whole .(justification).
25Luther also knows of other ways in which we receive the divine
righteousness. For instance, he can say that it is given to us by Christ in what
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Luther calls a happy exchange [feliciter commutans/, where Christ takes our
sins and gives us his righteousness (I, 443: 23-24). The term 'transfer' is also
used: 'Let us learn then in every temptation to transfer sin, death, the curse,
and all the evils that oppress us, from ourselves to Ouist, and, on the other
hand, to transfer righteousness, life, and blessing from him to us' (I, 454: 33455: 10).
26For Paul "flesh' characterizes people in their radical rebellion agautSt
God, and as such is always in conflict with the Spirit. Hence, the flesh is to be
put off again and again until finally, in the resurrection, it will be destroyed
along with sin. Luther however often uses "flesh' in a wider sense, so that it
not only refers to the old nature but to the body as well. In this sense he can
say that, when believers put off the flesh completely in the ref)lurrection, they
will have a flesh that is pure, without any passions or evil desires (II, 122: 2324 ). Here he is closer to Johannine usage. In fact Luther freely admits that he
understands flesh in Paul in the same way as Jesus uses it in John 3: 6: "That
which is born of the flesh is flesh.' Therefore, more often than not, Luther
does not simply identify the flesh with the old Adam, but sees it as referring
to human peings as a whole--body, soul, and spirit--in their sinful rebellion
against God (see I, 244: 14-28). This is clear from his comments on Gal. 5: 16:
"When I say that you should walk by the Spirit and should not obey the flesh,
or gratify its desires, I am not demanding that you strip off the flesh completely or kill it, but that you restrain it' (Il, 85: 26--28).
27 Again, Luther says that we continue to need the admonition and discipline of the law for the daily mortification of the flesh, the reason, and our
powers, and the renewal of our minds (2 Car. 4: 16) (I, 536: 23-537: 20).
28Luther comments on the perpetual struggle in believers between the
hearing of faith and the works of the law, and how difficult it is for us to get
rid of the opinio legis that we can make ourselves righteous by our own
efforts. The notion that one must do something to earn salvation is so deeply
ingrained that it can never be entirely eradicated. Of course, God grants the
will to listen to the word of faith and to do it. But our capacity to understand
is limited and our faith is weak, all of which creates such a struggle within us
that we cannot receive the gift when it is offered. Luther continues:
Just let your conscience keep murmuring, and let this •one must• keep
on recurring; endure it for a while and stand firm until you conquer this
"one must.' Thus, as faith gradually increases, that opinion about righteousness based on the law will decrease. But this cannot be done without
a great struggle' (I, 345: 33-346: 22).
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These passages show that the distinction between law and gospel is related
also to the triumph of faith over reason.
29•Faith and hope must remain, so that we may be justified by the
former and encouraged to persevere in adversity by the latter' (II, 85: 22-23).
Luther calls faith a theologian [Doctor] and a judge, which fights against errors
and heresies, and judges spirits and doctrine. On the other hand, he calls
hope a captain (dux belli], which fights against feelings such as despair, tribulation, and the cross. On top of that, faith and hope have different objects {II,
26: 16-25). Luther highlights the importance of hope in our struggle against
the enemies of faith, for we need hope to help us persevere. Although we are
justified by faith, we are encouraged by hope. However, in the face of cross
and conflict, faith and hope are both very weak and feeble; they 'seem to be a
'dimly burning wick' which a strong wind is about to blow out.' But for
those who fight against the consciousness of sin and of God's wrath by taking
hold of the promise of Ouist, faith 'will become like elemental fire, which
fills all heaven and swallows up all terrors and sins' (II, 33: 17-23).
30r.uther discusses this great duel (mirabile duellum} at various places
in his Commentary; see, for instance, I, 438: 32-440: 35.
31When Luther says that the entire law has been abrogate~ he means
the law of Moses, chiefly in its proper or spiritual sense. However, he does
not limit it to that, but includes the entire law, without distinguishing between the civil, the ceremonial, and the moral law (I, 671: 28-672: 17).
32n, 98: 11-14: There are two reasons that Luther gives for why
Olristians cannot be accused and condemned by the law: because (a) the rule
of the Spirit is so powerful and (b) Ouist, our righteousness, is beyond
reproach, and therefore cannot be accused by the law. Since Otristians are in
Olrist through baptism and faith, the law cannot accuse them either.
33-rhus, a Ouistian fulfills the law inwardly by faith, and outwardly by
works and by the forgiveness of sins {II, 121: 14-23).
34Luther calls this a second kind of abrogati.01' of the law. First, Omstians are freed spiritually from the law, meaning primarily the moral law; but
then, secondly, they are also freed outwardly from the political and ceremonial laws of Moses, for these were laws given to a specific people at a specific
time (I, 673: 14-674: 8). However, Luther recognizes the abiding merit of some
aspects of the Israelite law codes, and so he can say that it might even be a
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good thing if the emperor werr to use some of the civil laws of Moses. Luther
rejects the opinion of the sophists who take an extreme antinomian position
and claim that after Ouist the civil laws of Moses are fatal to us (I, 673: 22-24).
36Luther can even go further than this on occasion and say that OU'istians, to the extent that their conscience is trained by faith, are free from all
laws and subject to nothing, either internally or externally (I, 235: 26-30).
36 Although Luther expresses this in different ways, one of the most
common is the phrase, conscientia in evangelio--caro in lege. On this see
Wilfried Joest, Gesetz und Freiheit: Das Problem des tertius usus legis bei
Luther imd die neutestamentliche Parainese, 4th ed. (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1968), 101-109. Joest's interpretation of this phrase is tied
to his understanding of the need for the continuance of the law in the Christian life and contains different nuances. 1n essence, he does not separate
conscience from body as Luther does (conscience being the sphere of Ouist
and the gospel, the body being the domain of the law) but rather combines
them. He sees the caro in lege belonging together with the conscientia in
evangelio in the same way as love and faith belong together, the former
deriving from the latter. 1his is consistent with Joest's attempt to combine
law and gospel, after justification, into one, so that the inner and the outer,
the new and the old in the Ouistian, are one. The freedom of faith in Ouist
always stands at the center of action, and the binding of love to the neighbor
is the way of God's action with us. For Joest the caro in legt has three different meanings, loosely corresponding to the three uses of the law, but the
second and third each has two parts to it. Caro in lege means that: (1) Christians are reproved by the law on account of sin; (2) Ouistians are subject to
the external authority of the law, because (a) as sinners they need this
authority themselves and (b) as believers, for the sake of love, they do not
reject this authority, which is needed by the sinful world; (3) Christians are
given the law as a guide to enable their faith to become incarnate in good
deeds--and for these reasons: (a) to put off the fleshly nature through the
mortificatio carnis and (b) to allow the spiritual nature to become embodied
in love (p. 108). Our chief problem is with Joest's attempt to fuse faith and
love after justification. We do not question the fact that they belong closely
together, for faith is active in love (Gal. 5: 6). However, even after justification, faith and love must still be distinguished whenever the article of
justification is at stake. That is why Luther will not permit the law to enter
the conscience of the Ouistian but relegates it to the domain of the body, for
he knows that if it is permitted entry, the conscience would be robbed of the
certainty of knowing that Christ has fulfilled the law for us.
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37Torough a tropological use of Gen. 22: 5, Luther makes it clear that
Cllrist has delivered the conscience from the law so that it is free from slavery
(see I, 207: 24-208: 13). He continues:
Let the slaves remain in the valley with the donkey, and let Isaac alone
ascend the mountain with his father. That is, let the law have dominion
over the flesh and the old self; ... let the law prescribe what the flesh
should do and accomplish, and how it is to deal with other people. But
the law must not pollute the chamber in which Quist alone is to take his
rest and sleep; that is, it must not disturb the conscience, which should
live only with OU'ist, its bridegroom, in the realm of freedom and
sonship (I, 595: 27-34).
Luther mentions the limit of the law already in his opening •Argument• in
connection with a discussio~ about the two kinds of righteousness, the
righteousness of the law and the righteousness of faith. See I, 50: 24-51: 20.
38we can mock the law because it is captive, bound, and shorn of its
powers through Ouist and can no longer frighten us (I, 276: 24-278: 29). On
the other hand, apart from justification or the conscience, Luther can speak
very highly of the law, and even revere it as a god, "but in our conscience it is
truly a devil" (I, 558: 24-32).
39rhe conscience must also learn to recognize the devil when he
comes wearing the mask of OU'ist. "If OU'ist appears in the guise of a
wrathful judge or lawgiver who demands that we account for how we have
spent our lives, we should know for certain that this is not really Gui.st but
the devil" (II, 13: 13-15). Again, it is the devil's ploy to present Ouist our
savior as a lawgiver, judge, and condemner, for the devil never stops accusing our conscience (I, 90: 21-24).
40tuther notes that in the civic realm things are different. There, what
Aristotle says holds true: one becomes a doer by doing something, just as one
becomes a lutenist by often playing the lute. But in theology, one does not
become a doer by doing the works of the law; rather, the deeds follow the doer
(I, 402: 23-28).
41Here we thirjc of how Luther describes faith in his Preface to the
•o, it is a living, busy, active,
mighty thing, this faith. It is impossible for it not to be doing good works
ince~antly. It does not ask whether good works are to be done, but before the
question is asked, it has al.ready done them, and is constantly doing them•
(DB 7, 10: 9-12).

Epistle of St. Paul to the Romans, 1546 (1522):
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42Luther, in his fourth set of theses against the antinomians, also
makes it clear that after justification good works follow spontaneously
without the law, that is, joyfully and without coercion (WA 39 I, 354: 3-6).

43c1. I, 579: 14-15: "First, he [Ouist] justifies us by our knowledge of
him; then he creates a clean heart, produces new motives ... ." This passage
reminds us that for Luther justification and sanctification belong together and
that justification never occurs without renewal. On the other hand, when it
comes to the article of justification, Luther, as we have seen, confesses that we
are made righteous by faith alone; but then the life of new obedience always
follows faith as its fruit.
44CJ. II, 37: 26-30: "Paul is describing the whole of the Ouistian life in
thlS passage: inwardly it is faith toward God, and outwardly it is love or works
toward the neighbor." That is, we are Ouistians, inwardly, through faith,
coram Deo, for God does not need our works; outwardly, through love, coram
hominibus, for our fellow human beings do not benefit from our faith but
only from our love and works.
45Toe Ou-istian life consists of faith and works (love). Faith has two
sides; it can be viewed from the vantage point of justification or sanctification
as mirrored in the traditional distinction between fides quae and [ides qua.
According to Luther, when Paul speaks of its external function {de eius
externo officio}, he connects it with love and works. "Here he says that it is
the impulse and motivation of good works or of love toward one's neighbor." Clearly, when Luther speaks of the external side of faith, he is thinking
of sanctification, the vita christiana, not justification (II, 37: 30-38: 21).
461,345: 14-20: After a person has become a Christian by hearing the
gospel, he should give thanks to God and begin doing the good works that are
prescribed in the law. Luther continues:
Thus, the law and works follow the hearing with faith. Then he will be
able to walk securely in the light that is Ouist, and be certain about
choosing and doing works that are not hypocritical but truly good,
pleasing to God, and commanded by him, and certain about condemning
all the masks of self-chosen works.
This passage is instructive because it shows that, for Luther, good works
clearly come under the category of law, yet for Ouistians living under the
gospel, these good works prescribed by God in the law are the very things that
they delight in doing. The Spirit leads us to see the law in this new light, and
yet insofar as we remain sinners, we cannot escape its accusation. But even
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this no longer threatens our conscience, as long as we take refuge in Christ
and live in his forgiveness.
47Luther knows that this dilemma cannot be overcome by prescribing
definite rules, but all must struggle against the desires of flesh through the
power of the Spirit so that, if they cannot bridle them, they will at least not
gratify them (II, 94: 22-27).
48Tue editor of Luther's Works notes that •this passage and others like
it in Luther's rhetorical denunciation of works were to figure prominently in
the controversies over the necessity of works for salvation between George
Major {1502-74) and Nicholas Amsdorf (1483-1565)9 (LW 26, 36 n. 18).
49tuther opposes the fanatics and sectarians who claim that baptism is
"merely a token, that is, a small and empty sign." He stresses that in baptism
we have been snatched beyond the law into a new birth. Therefore, we are no
longer under the law, but we have been dre~d in a new garment, that is, in
Ouist and his righteousness (I, 541: 21-33).
50•Toerefore, he comes spiritually every day; day by day he completes
the time set by the Father more and more, and day by day he more and more
abrogates and abolishes the law• (I, 550: 17-29). In the final sentence of the
passage just cited: • Ideo quotidie venit spiritualiter et indies magis magisque
absolvit tempus praefinitum a pat re, abrogat et tollit legem • (I, 550: 28-29), we
take the phrase •indes magis magisque• as modifying both the absolvit and
the abrogat et tollit. This is consistent with what Luther says elsewhere, such
as the statement: "To the extent that I take hold of Quist by faith, to that
extent the law has been abrogated for me" (I, 538: 19-20).
511n the following citation Luther expands or. the difference between
the time of the law and the time of grace for the Cluistian:
To the extent that he is flesh, he is under the law; to the extent that he is
spirit, he is under the gospel. ... If you do not look at all beyond the flesh,
you will remain permanently under the time of the law .... An end to
the law must be fixed when it will cease. Therefore, the time of the law is
not forever; but it has an end, which is Christ. But the time of grace is
eternal ....
Luther then goes on to talk about the cOMection between fear and faith,
insofar as these correspond to the time of the law and the time of grace
respectively. The dynamic between them is very closely aldn to that of law
and gospel: just as the law without the gospel can lead to despair, so fear
without the gospel is not filial fear but servile fear:
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The fear of God is something holy and precious, but it should not be
eternal. It must always be present in a Ouistian, because sin is always
present in him, but it must not be alone, otherwise it is the fear of Cain,
Saul, and Judas, that is, a servile and despairing fear. By faith in the word
of grace therefore a Ouistian should conquer fear, turn his eyes away
from the time of the law, and gaze at Quist himself and at the faith to
come. Then fear becomes sweet and is mixed with nectar, so that it begins
not only to fear God, but also to love him (I, 526: 21-527: 18).
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this passage is Luther's understanding
of fear. He begins by saying that the fear of God is good but it should not last
forever. That seems to be a reference to fear under the law: it is good in that it
has a specific role to play in preparing people for faith, but, like the law itself,
it is not eternal; it lasts only until Ouist comes (Gal. 3: 24). Yet the way the
passage finishes is quite different: fear does not disappear when Ou-ist comes,
but it is changed from servile fear to the fear of the children of God. The dynamic involved here is instructive: faith in the word of promise overcomes
fear because it no longer sees the law in purely negative terms, but comes to
rejoice in it as God's good gift. Fear then mixed with the nectar of the gospel
not only fears God, says Luther, but even begiru to love him. This train of
thought would seem to lie also behind Luther's explanation of the Ten
Commandments with its famous refrain, 'we should fear and love God:
52•ooing" or "working' can be understood in three ways: naturally,
morally, and theologically. Luther insists that when used theologically, these
words acquire a new meaning. In fact, they are to be explained according to 'a
new and theological grammar' (a term Luther coins on the basis of Hebrews
11 with its constant refrain: 'by faith"). 'Thus, faith embodies and informs
the doing." Therefore, whenever Scripture speaks about doing and working
it is always predicated to faith. "In this way, whatever is attributed to faith is
later attributed also to works, but only on account of faith." Faith is the "doall' [Fae totum] in works (L 417: 18-19). "For works are not to be viewed
morally, but from the standpoint of theology and faith.• Luther's whole
purpose here is to admonish students of theology to distinguish between
moral "doing' and theological "doing.• (I, 417: 11-419: 21)
53rn connection with Gal. 3: 12 Luther stresses that Paul is not speaking

here about the believing doer of the law; he is speaking rather about the doer
·of the law, who does not have the forgiveness of sin but wants to be justified
solely on the basis of the keeping the law. That is, he is discussing the passage
theologically. Given his twofold understanding of the law, Luther does grant
that the statement, "whoever does these things shall live by them,• can also
be taken politically, but that is not Paul's purpose here (I, 429: 29-430: 15).
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54Paul Althaus, Die Theologie Martin Luthers (Gutersloh: Gutersloher
Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn, 1962), 234, agrees that the theological function of the
law in the Ouistian life is to reveal sin, and not to motivate or guide the new
life of the believer in Christ, yet he argues that Luther also knows that the
Ouistian life is not just about combating sin, but also doing good works as
commanded by the law. The law not only curbs and disciplines the Ouistian
as sinner, but the "commandments also serve the Olristian who has received
the Spirit, by helping him to a true understanding of 'good works' and summoning him to action" (236). He cites Luther, Die Promotionsdisputation
von Theodor Fabricius und Stanislaus Rapagelanaus (1544) as saying that
althoJ~ the law must no longer accuse, coerce or condemn believers [pii],
yet it is to be retained, that they might have a pattern [formal for doing good
works. The law instructs them in the good works that they are to do (WA 39
II, 274: 20-22). He claims that this passage guarantees the authenticity of WA
39 I, 485, 22 ["the law is to be retained so that the saints might know what sort
of works God requires, and in what things they can practice obedience to
God"], the very pas.5age which, as we saw in the last chapter, Elert rejects as a
forgery (236, n. 124).
55Rather then being surprised or frightened when he feels within
himself this conflict of the flesh against the Spirit, Luther fights back by telling
himself:
I am a sinner, and I am aware of my sin, for I have not yet put off the
flesh to which sin clings as long as I live. But I will yield to the Spirit
rather than the flesh. That is, I will take hold of Ouist by faith and hope,
and I will fortify myself with his word, and being thus fortified, I will not
gratify the desires of the flesh (II, 91: 2~30).
56Paul Althaus, 11ieologie, 23.5, cites several passages from the Antinomian Disputations in which Luther says that the law and its terrors are
greatly "moderated• on the grounds of justification (WA 39 I, 474: 8). Repentance is now "joyful and easy• [iucunda et facilis] (WA 39 I, 398: 15). Again,
"the law remains, but its onus or yoke is not placed around the necks of those
on whom Christ's yoke has been imposed, which is sweet and easy [sullve et
level (WA 39 I, 381: 9-10). The problem that we have with Althaus's view is
that he wants to see a change in the law itself after justification whereby it
becomes more gentle and helpful rather than only being accusatory. We, on
the other hand, think it better to say that the law remains law, but that after
justification Christians experience it differently because, now that they have
been born anew by the Spirit, they take delight in the law, not only because it
is the very thing that they themselves are eager to do, but also because the law
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disciplines and compels the old nature into doing it too. Ultimately, the law
would be unnecessary if Ouistians were perfectly pure and holy, for it is the
sinful flesh that constantly prevents them from doing the works of faith,
namely, praising God and serving the neighbor in love.
57we note in passing that Luther stresses that a sermon should be
more than an exhortation to good works; it should also be an appeal to
believers to maintain sound doctrine. Pure doctrine and genuine love are the
two vital components of the Christian life, but doctrine is to take precedence
nver love. Once we have lost sound doctrine we have also lost Christ, and if
we lose Christ, love will be of no use. In the sphere of life, with its sin and
error, where there is repentance there must also be forgiveness. But in doctrine there is no error to for.give. Therefore, there is no room to tolerate
errors of doctrine, but we can be lenient toward errors of life (II, 51: 28-60: 25).
58Toe Decalogue is both a prescription and a description of God's will,
and, to that extent, can be understood as both second and third use of the law.
lhis is also how Luther's explanation of the Ten Commandments should be
understood. In a strictly theological sense, the Catechism begins with the Ten
Commandments, and since they precede the Creed, they prepare the heart for
the gospel by accusing and convicting the conscience of sin. However, Luther
ends the Catec/Jism with the Table of Duties, which point us back again to the
Ten Commandments, which are now seen as a description of the good works
which God has commanded us to do. However, when Luther's explanation
of the Commandments is considered in catechcsis, it must be remembered
that even when they are taught as descriptions of the new obedience and the
good works that Ouistians are now eager to do, insofar as they have a new
heart and are led by tht: Spirit, yet they will continue to be heard as accusing
law by anyone whose heart remains impenitent. The difference between the
penitent and the impenitent is not that the former are any less sinful before
God than the latter, but that they agree with the judgment of the law, confess
Uleir sins, and take to heart God's gracious words of absolution.
59tuther thinks that people are mistaken when they imagine that th'?y
understand the command to love. This mandate, of course, is written on the
heart because people by nature instinctively know that we should treat others
in the same way as we want to be treated ourselves. Yet, it seems that they do
not really understand this command, for if they did they would show it in
their actions and prefer love to all other self-chosen works (Il, 71: 22-72: 12).
Yet Paul the Ouistian says that, while he knows what to do, he is powerless
to carry it out because the old sinful nature always tries to thwart the Spirit,
and to block it from fulfilling the very law that Paul calls holy, just and good.
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But that is a confession that can only be made by the Ouistian who now sees
God's law as a good and gracious gift (Rom. 7: 7-20).
60rhe connection between faith and vocation is developed especially
by Gustaf Wingren, The Otristian 's Calling: Luther on Vocation, trans. Carl
C. Rasmussen (Edinbwgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1958).

61•Thus a prince walks by the Spirit when he performs the duties of
his office diligently, rules his subjects well ... His flesh and the devil oppose
him [when he does this], and they urge him to start an unjust war ... Unless
he follows the ~pirit as his guide and obeys the word of God when it gives
him correct and faithful warning about his office, he will gratify the desires of
the flesh• (11, 87: 34-88: 13). Note the coupling here of following the guidance
of the Spirit and heeding the word of God.

EXCURSUS
THE ANTINOMIAN MOVEMENTS OF THE SIXTEENTH CENfURY
Our aim here is to provide a summary of some of the key issues that were
diSCU88Cd during the antinomian controversies which began already in Luther's
lifetime and which emerged again in the decade following his death. For this we
will depend largely on the overview presented by Joest.1 First of all, we need to
distinguish between two separate groups of antinomians who stood for different
issues. The earlier antinomians are better known and have as their chief representative John Agricola. He was the main target of Luther's disputations, polemical writings and sermons against antinomianism. The other group, the later
antinomians, represented by men like Poach, Otho, Michael, Neander, Musculus,
flourished in the decade following Luther's death and were mainly embroiled in
controversy with the Philipplsts and the Gnesio-Lutherans.
Agricola was chiefly concerned with the problem of conversion and not
that of the third use of the law. He taught that contrition does not result from the
preaching of the law but of the gospel. Consequently, he was alarmed by the
importance given to the preaching of the law by the Saxon Visitation Articles of

1527. When Melanchthon urged that the law be preached to counter the abuse of
evangelical freedom, he saw this as a decisive break with the original evangelical
position. Agricola's stance however was not always clear and consistent like that

of the later antinomians. At any rate, it seems that basically he wanted to reverse
the law-gospel sequence, not do away with the law altogether. He objected to the
Decalogue being taught in the church, and preferred to replace it with admon87
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itions from the concluding chapters of Paul's letters. He seemed to be in no
doubt that God's wrath against sin must be preached as well as the imperatives
of the law. Yet, on the other hand, he could say that the Decalogue belongs in the
town hall, not in the pulpit.
However, Agricola's real concern had to do with the inner dialectic of law
and gospel. For him the time of the law--Moses, the Decalogue, indeed the Old
Testament--was past, and now the time of the gospel had come. The inferior law
had been replaced by the superior gospel. He did not understand, as Luther did,
that the law prepares people for the gospel and drives them to Clmst. He could
not agree with Luther's statement that the law kills in order to make alive. His
conviction that repentance, faith, and renewal are awakened, not through the fear
of God's wrath but through the overwhelming power of God's love, resulted
from a failure to understand the relation between law and gospel.
The later antinomians, on the other hand, were certain that it is the law
that drives people to repentance, and so works toward the gospel. It is clear that
they taught the usus elenchJicus--partly in reaction to Agricola. However, they
opposed the usus tertius which was strongly emphasized by Melanchthon and the
Philippists, who taught that the law instructs the regenerate as well as reveals
their sin.
The starting point of the Second Antinomian Controversy was the dispute
between the Philippists and the Gnesio-Lutherans over the necessity of good
works. The followers of Melanchthon held unwaveringly to the sola fide, but they
taught that if good works do not result from justification the person is not saved.
Their opponents objected that this finally means that salvation is once again
made to depend on works instead of faith alone.
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At first the question of the law was not raised in the dispute over the

11ecessarium of good works. It only emerged with the formula produced by the
Eisenach synod of 1556 which was meant to strike a compromise between the
Gnesio-Lutherans and the Philippists. It stated that works can be spoken of as
being necessary for salvation "in doctrina legis abstractive et de idea.• What this
means in effect is that it is theoretically possible to be saved by keeping the law
and doing good works, on the aMumption that the structure of the relationship
between God and humans is based on the law (Gesetzordnung]. However, since
fallen humankind cannot keep the law, justification by works or the necessarium
of works is nothing more than a theoretical possibility (abstractive et de idea].
Nevertheless, the formula still raised the question: Is the fundamental relationship between God and humans stamped by the necessarium, by demand, achievement and reward--that is, by the law--or is it stamped by the gospel?
The idea that the Gesetzordnung is primarily a way of salvation came under
strong criticism by Andreas Poach, the first of the later antinomians. He argued
that, even if human beings could fulfill the law, that would still not mean that
they would have earned salvation. &.:lCause of sin, there is nothing that we can
do that is not a debitum, for God owes us nothing. The gospel cannot be introduced into a legal framework of demand and reward and made the exception, for
the gospel by its very nature is superior to the law. Poach concluded that the
regenerate should and will do the will of God, but not in response to some
external demand, but as a direct consequence of their own new nature.
Anton Otho went further and denied the tertius usus legis altogether. For
him the law belongs in two places: in the pulpit to reveal sin and in civic life to
preserve order. He rejected totally the idea that the law admonishes and guides
Cltristians qua believers, and instead asserted that they spontaneously do those
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things that are pleasing to God because through faith their will is now completely
at one with the divine.
Michael Neander adopted a similar position but he distinguished between

Christians qua believers and Ouistians qu11 sinners. Ouistians are both one and
the other at the same time, yet theologically the iusti must be sharply distinguished from the pecc.atores. As sinners Ouistians live under the law in the sense
of the usus elenchticus, and thus again and again before the gospel; as believers
they live under grace and thus no longer under the law.
Andreas Musculus followed a similar line of thinking. He agreed with
Otho that there is no longer any antithesis between God and believers because it
is God alone who is at work in them. Thus, there is no place for the law in the
Ouistian life except where the usus elenchticus is needed to drive people back to
the gospel when they fall away from grace.
One of the chief opponents of the later antinomians was Mortin. He
re}tx1ed Poach's idea that a right relationship to God is baBed on the gospel and
not the law and that the law came later and is thus secondary. Marlin argued
J

that, since O\rist fulfilled the law for us, in the final analysis, God's first and last
will is that we obey him and that his law is fulfilled. He claimed that the cross
joins law and gospel together on the same level. Therefore, the gospel does not
break through and abolish the law, but establishes and confirms it. He also
criticized the antinomitns for what he saw as a mystical or schwilnnerisch
tendency to reject the word as a means of grace infavor of inner experience and
an immediate union of the divine and human wills,2
In their struggle ag~ the third use of the law, the antinomians from
Poach to Musculus wanted to defend Luther's law-gospel dialectic in all its
tension (as they understood it) against the leveling, tempering, pedagogical
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tendencies of the Melanchthonian school of theology. It is precisely here of
course that the question arises: Did they understand Luther in the first place or
did they simply read him idiosyncratically in order to support their own position
which they could easily justify as being authentically "Lutheran"? Joest rejects
Seehawer's opinion that the antinomian position can be understood as an
extension of medieval theology and claims instead that every stage of its
development can be found in Luther. This however comes as no surprise to us
since Luther himself was trained in the Augustinian theology of the Middle Ages
and only gradually gave it up as he came to see that it was incompatible with his
new understanding of the difference between law and gospel.
The question that Joest wants to investigate is whether Luther understood
the permanence of the law for the Ouistian only in the sense that the law always

accuses--usus elenchticus--which means always coming before the gospel--or
whether he also understood it as a norm and guide for life in the sense of the usus

tertius--which means coming after the gospel. When the law is applied to the
regenerate, does it lead ever anew to faith, or is it a word that leads beyond faith
itself?
The other question that Joest is intent on pursuing as a result of his brief
excursion into the antinomian controversy is whether, in view of the concrete
unity of the old and the new in the Ouistian, there is a mediating position
between the law as an agent of punishment and wrath, on the one hand, and the
full freedom of the gospel, on the other. In other words, is there in Luther any
support for a tertius status: a real union of law and gospel, so to speak, that
corresponds to the personal union of the saint and the sinner in the Christian?

NOTES
1Wilfried Joest, Gesetz. und Freiheit: Das Problem des tertius usus legis bei
l.u/Jier imd die neulestame,rtliche Parainese, 4th ed. (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck &
Ruprecht, 1968), 45-55. Joest mentions that he himself depends especiallly on two
monographs: G. Kawerau, Johann Agrirola ron Eisleben, and J. Seehawer, Zur Lehre
V<ltn Brauch des Gesetz.es und z.ur Geschichte des sptlteren Antinomismus. He also
makes reference to R. Seeberg, Lehrbuch IV 2 and 0. Rltschl, Dogmengeschichte n.
2Joest, 53, mentions that the most significant point made by Seehawer in
his critique of the antinomian controversy has to do with the sharp distinction

made between Ouistians as sinners and Ouistians as regenerate. Seehawer
notes that this has the effect of dividing Ouistians into two abstract, unreal
halves whereby the interaction between the old and the new is not properly
understood. lf the third use of the law has to be taught because of the concrete
unity of old and new in Ouistians, then this usus would no longer entail a
judgment that kills and condemns, nor yet would it mark the complete abolition
of all admonition and demand.

92

CJ-IAPfER 3
THE THIRD USE OF THE LAW AND

THE LUTHERAN CONFES.SIONS
Our aim in this chapter is to examine what the Lutheran Confessions teach
about the third use of the law. Since the Formula of Concord is the only document
to specifically address this topic, it will be our main source. However, reference
will also be made to passages in other confessional writings which deal with the
role of the law in the Christian life. Furthermore, since the question of the third
use of the law is bound up with that of good works, we think it would be useful

to first consider whatever is pertinent to our topic in Article IV of the Formula on
good works, before launching into a discussion of the third use of the law based
on Article VI. Because we are chiefly interested in the doctrinal content of the
articles, we will not go into a discussion of their historical background. Besides,
the excursus on the antinomian controversies has already provided some information about the disputes over the law leading up to the Formula of Concord.
Good Works
First of all, we neec\ to define what we mean by good works. Here the
Formula affirms, as do the Confessions generally, that it is God's will and com-

mand that Christians do good works, and •that only those are truly good works
that God himself prescribes and commands in his word, and not those that an
individual may devise according to his own opinion or that are based on human
traditions." Furthermore, the Fomrula teaches that only Ouistians can do truly
93
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good works, because such works presuppose faith and renewal in the Holy Spirit
(SD IV, 7).
Since faith and works are inseparably connected, the Confessions use different terms to describe their relation. Both the Confessions and Scripture use
words like "necessity,• "necessary,• "needful,• "should,• and "must" to indicate
what we are bound to do on the basis of God's will and command. The Fonnula
rejects the idea that Ouistians are free to be indifferent about good works, or that
one can be a Ouistian and have the Holy Spirit even if one continues in sin without repentance. A good tree produces good fruit, a bad tree bad fruit (SD IV, 1415). However, here an important distinction must be made: "When the word
'necessary' is used in this context, it is not to be understood as implying
compulsion but only as referring to the order of God's unchangeable will, whose
debtors we are, as his commandment indicates when it enjoins the creature to
obey the creator' (SD IV, 16).
Works done under compulsion are hypocritical and hence not pleasing to
God. Ouistians, on the other hand, do not act out of fear or compulsion, but
spontaneously out of a free and willing spirit. This is the truth of the assertion
that good works are spontaneous (SD IV, 18). However, because Ouistians are
both saints and sinners, while they gladly and willingly assent to God's will,
insofar as they are righteous, their flesh fights against the spirit and opposes
God's will and hence must be coerced and disciplined by the law. Therefore,
insofar as they are sinners, Ouistians must be told that good works are not
optional but are commanded by God, and that without them they cannot retain
faith and God's mercy and grace (SD IV, 19-20).
To say that good works are necessary, or that good works must follow
faith, can therefore mean two things: either, good works will certainly always
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flow from faith, or, good works should and must be done by the believer. lhe
first alternative views works from the vantage point of the gospel and sees them
as the fruit of faith; the second views them from the standpoint of the law and

sees them as God's demand. 'This law-gospel perspective is in tum related to the
fact that Ouistians are both saints and sinners.l As saints, believers will do good
works without any compulsion, and "with a free and merry spirit" (SD IV, 12). It
is specifically this idea that the Confessions affirm when they speak of good

works as being the fruit offaith. Although they are our deeds, they are really the
achievement of Christ and the Holy Spirit, who dwell in us through faith. Their
purpose is to serve the neighbor and to render honor and glory to God who has
been so gracious to us. On the other hand, in this life Christians always remain
sinners who have to fight against the old nature. As sinners, believers need to be
reminded that God requires good works and that the law urges them. In

summary, justification is effected without works solsJ fide, yet by the same token,
justification cannot be without renewal and good work.s.2
While the Fonnula, on the one hand, teaches that good works are necessary
because they have been commanded by God, on the other, it rejects the proposition that good works are necessary for salvation, because this would be contrary
to the central doctrine of justification which teaches that we are saved by faith
alone without works (SD IV, 21-24). This is entirely in line with Luther's repeated
emphasis in his great Galatians Omrmentary that the law has no place in the
conscience, for to demand anything of the tempted and troubled conscience other
than faith is to deprive it of the consolation of the gospel.
Not only are good works not necessary for salvation, they are also not
necessary to preserve faith and salvation; to say that they are is again contrary to
the doctrine of justification. The Fonnula dtes Article XX, 13 of the Apology as an
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excellent example of how to exhort Olristians to do good works without undermining the doctrine of faith and justification. On the basis of 2 Peter 1: 10, "Be the
more zealous to confirm your call and election,• the Apology teaches that the
reason we should do good works is so that we do not fall away from our calling,
by lapsing again into sin, and thus lose the Holy Spirit and faith. (SD IV, 33).
Doing good works may safeguard and even confirm our salvation, but only faith
preserves it. "Paul ascribes to faith not only our entry into grace, but also our
present state of grace, and our hope of sharing the glory of God (Rom. 5: 2)" (SD
IV, 34).
Finally, the Fonnula rejects the proposition that good works are actually
detrimental to salvation (this was the extreme position advocated by Nicholas
von Amsdorf). The only time that this would be true is if good works were used
as a means of gaining righteousness or the assurance of salvation. But even then
the fault would not be with the works themselves, but with human beings who
want to put their confidence in what they do, rather than in Olrist and his word.
Far from being detrimental to salvation, if the good works commanded by God
are done in faith, they can even be an assurance of salvation (SD IV, 37-40).
The Third Use of the Law
We tum our attention now to Article VI of the Fonnula of Concord and the
third use of the law. Right at the beginning, it describes the three uses of the law:
(1) to maintain external discipline; (2) to bring people to a knowledge of their sin;
and (3) to teach the regenerate to live in the law3 (SD VI, 1). The article carefully
delineates the two opposing positions in the dispute which the Fonnula resolves.
The one party (Amsdorf, Poach, Menius, Otho, NecU\der) taught that the regenerate do not learn the new obedience (the good works they should do) from the
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law, and that furthermore there is no need for such a use of the law, because the
reborn have been set free from the law by Ouist and are guided by the Spirit, so
that they do spontaneously what God requires of them. The other party (Mortin)
taught that, although true believers are indeed motivated by the Spirit and willingly do the will of God without coercion, according to their inner (new) self,
"nevertheless, the Holy Spirit uses the written law on them to instruct them, by
which even true believers learn to serve God, not according to their own notions,
but according to his written law and word, which is a specific rule and norm for
godly life and behavior in accordance with God's eternal and unchangeable will"
(SD VI, 2-3). The Epitome says simply that the question is whether or not the law
is to be urged upon Ouistians who have been born anew (Ep. VI, 1).
The verdict of the Fonnula is that although truly believing Ouistians have
been freed from the curse of the law, they should daily exercise themselves in the
law. For the law is a mirror which rightly reflects the will of God and what is
pleasing to him. Therefore, it must constantly be held up before believers (SD VI,
4). On the one hand, Paul says that the law is not laid down for the righteous but
for the ungodly (1 Tim. 1: 9) yet, on the other hand, the righteous are not without
the law, for it is written on their hearts, "just as the first man was given a law
after being created, which he should live according to.• The difference is that the
law is no longer permitted to vex the righteous with its threats and demands,
because they have been reconciled to God, and now delight in the law according
to their inner self (SD VI, 5).

If Ou-istians were perfectly renewed already in this life through the indwelling Spirit, they would need no law to drive them, but "of themselves and
altogether spontaneously, they would do what they are obligated to do, without
any instruction, admonition, exhortation, or driving by the law." But since they
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. rv nut ~rfectly holy but are CONtantly fighting 1g4inst ain, therefore, the truly
bvli.:ving children of God 'n.-quire ln thia life not only the daily reaching and
-admonition. warning cmd threatening of tlw law, but frequently the punishments
of thtt law u well, to rou. them lt1ufgm1unltrl} to follow the Spirit of God" (SD

Vl, b-9).4
Tho l'onnula iwtr out cleuly the res~ve fw-w:tions of law and gospel in
conrwction with Uw good worka ot believen. The law reveals to Wi the will of
Cod and tella

Wi

how we lhould live, but dow not give Withe power or ability to

do it. Only the Holy Spirit CAI\ do thAt, but the Spirit ta not reooived through the
law, but through thtt pre1ehing of the goepttl. The Spirit hu two offiooa, o~ ~
l60dawd with the law, the ottwr with the goeipel (which ia his proper office). He
both 'kil!JI dlld brinp to lite, he bring11 down to Sheol, And rAiaee up' (1 Sam. 2: 6).
Although the lcaw doo1 wach bellvven tlw wUl ot God, its proper office ls to reprove .5 But the ume Spirit who reprove, them through the low will al80 comfort
them through the SOlipttl (SD VI, 12). Oeuly, theMe two offloo11 belong cloeely toKi•ttwr, iU\d it i» doubtful ii they CAI\ ever be 1epu1ted.
CluutlAN, iNolu II thoy uv born mww by the Spirit, live 1ecordlng to
Uw wUI of God And do 'everything with • froe and nwrry 11pirit.' Booluae they
do not 4Ct under the compulalon of the law but ln tht freedom of the Spirit, these
works, although they conform to the law, uc mictly apealdng not works of the
lAw, but works And fruit» of the Spirit. A.a saints, Although they are not without
Uw l1w, thuy aru not under the law, but rather ln the law. On the other hand,
lnaof u u believers are ltill aiMera plagued by the old Adam, they must not only
be coerced by the law but Also driven to obedience by lta threats (SD VI, 17-19).
lhe f<>mru"2 apew al two positive aspects of the law's work ln the life of
Ouistians. Flrst, we need the law so that we do not fall back on our own holiness
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and piety, 'and, under the guise of God's Spirit, conduct our own self-chosen

Gottesdienst, without his word or command.• The second reason we need the law
is so that we can be continually reminded that, even as Otristians, our life and
works are anything but pure and perfect.6 'The law of God prescribes good
works for believers in such a way that, as in a mirror, it shows and indicates to
them that in this life we are still imperfect and impure.• When Paul admonishes
Christians to do good works, he reminds them of the Ten Commandments (Rom.
13: 9), and he himself learns from the law that his works are still imperfect and
impure (Rom. 7: 18, 19} (SD VI, 20-21).7

However, the law has an important limitation. We have already seen that
it can tell us what to do, but cannot give us the power to do it. Yet that is not all.

It also tells us that our works must be pure and perfect if they are to be pleasing
to God, but it cannot tell us how this is done. Only the gospel can tell us that;
only the gospel can tell us that our spiritual sacrifices are acceptable to God for
Olrist's sake through faith (1 Peter 2: 5; Heb. 11: 4; 13: 15). By themselves our
good works are still imperfect and impure, even though they are the fruit of the
Holy Spirit, because we are still sinners.8 They are acceptable to God only by
faith, or, as the Formula says, only because, according to our inner self, we do
what God wants, not out of compulsion, but willingly and spontaneously from a
heart renewed by the Holy Spirit (SD VI, 23-24). ln the final analysis, our works
are good only because they are forgiven.
Discussion

We begin by making some general observations. Luther and the Formula
are in fundamental agreement about the nature and role of the law in the Ouistian life. Although Luther does not talk about a third use, he nevertheless agrees
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in substance with what the Fonnula teaches about the law. In essence, this is that
Otristians need the law because they are still sinners; yet according to their new
nature, they know and do God's will spontaneously. The role of the law in the
Ch.ru.tian life is both negative and positive. It is negative because it is needed to
keep the old Adam in check, to subdue and discipline the flesh, and to accuse
and terrify the conscience of sin. In this sense, the third use of the law is the application of the first two uses to the Otri.stian. At the same time, both Luther and
the Fonnula know that the\. N also exercises a positive role by teaching believers
what works are pleasing to God; but also here, the law teaches 'Jlristians only
insofar as they are still sinners. Furthermore, both confess that good works are
necessary, but these must always be kept outside the article of justification. 1n
keeping with this, Luther constantly says that the law must be kept out of the
conscience and relegated to the domain of the body.
The Fonnula does not specifically say that the law is only for the old Adam
but says rather that Christums need the law, on account of the old Adam, who inheres in their intellect, will, and all their powers (Ep. YI, 4). In other words, even
though the Confessions know that O\rlstians are both saints and sinners, they
tend to speak holistically, rather than say that Otri.stians qWJ sinners need the law
as opposed to Christians qua saints. On the other hand, when the Fonnula states
that if Christians were perfectly renewed in this life, they would require no law
(SD VI, 6), we are no doubt correct in inferring that the Article VI supports the
proposition that Christians only need the law insofar as (or, because?) they are
sinners. 1bis view is further supported by the statement that the truly believing
and reborn children of God require not only the admonitions and warnings of the
law, but frequently the punishments of the law as well, because of the desires of
tht? flesh (SD VI, 9). Furthermore, the Fonnula never says that the •new man• or
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saint needs the law. In order to read that out of the text, we would have to interpret tenns like 'regenerate" and "born anew" as referring, not to the whole person
as saint and sinner, but only to the Ouistian as saint. That however would be
contrary to the whole tenor of the article on the third use. Therefore, there can be
no doubt that it is the clear teaching of the Fonnula, and indeed the Confessions
generally, that Christians need the law, but only insofar as they are &'till hindered
and thwarted by the flesh from doing the very will of God which they themselves
know, assent to, and rejoice in, according to their new, inner selves (SD VI, 18).9

As we have already said, the Confessions generally teach that the chief
office of the law is to reveal, judge, and condemn sin. Yet, on the other hand,
we are exhorted by the Confessions to live and walk in the law and to exercise
ourselves in it daily (SD VI, 1, 4). How can these two facts be reconciled? How
can we be instructed to take delight in a law that condemns and kills us? The
solution to this problem is the solution to most problems in theology, namely, to
correctly distinguish between law and gospel. Ouistians, insofar as they have a
new heart and a new spirit, delight in the law because they no longer see it as
burdensome. God's will, as it is expressed in the written and preached law, corresponds to their own inmost desires, so that they do not have to wait to be told
what to do but would do it spontaneously. Since, with the eyes of faith, we can
see the law as God's good gift, therefore, it is no contradiction to say that we
should daily exercise ourselves in the law of the Lord, and meditate on it day and
night (Ps. 1: 2).10 The reference in the Fonnula to 1 Tim. 1: 9 suggests a similar
approach to the problem. It teaches that it is precisely Ouistians as saints who
delight in the law in their inmost self (SD VI, 5). Yet those who are born anew by
the Spirit of God and are freed from the law are not really without law, but live
"according to the unchangeable will of God as comprehended in the law,• and
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insofar as they are born anew, they do "everything from a free and merry spiri.t"
(SD VI, 17). It was never Paul's intention to impose on Ouistians the curse of the
law from which they had been redeemed. Therefore, what at first appeared as a
serious dilemma, if not a hopeless contradiction, turns out, on closer inspection,
to be two antithetical statements, each true in its own way, resulting from the
simple application of law and gospel.
We have already seen that the Fonnula speaks mainly of a twofold task of
the law in the Ouistian life. First, the law clearly teaches what good works God
desires believers to do. This is a positive, instructional use of the law. Here the
Holy Spirit uses the law to instruct the regenerate and to show them, from the
Ten Commandments, what is the acceptable will of God (Rom. 12: 2). Whether
the regenerate, insofar as they are saints, actually need to be taught the will of
God from the Decalogue, or whether they know that already, will be discussed

later. One reason that they need to be instructed in works that are pleasing to
God is because Ouistians, insofar as they are still sinners, can easily be seduced
by the flesh into doing self-chosen works, which are neither pleasing to God nor
helpful to the neighbor. The other reason that the regenerate need the law is to
prevent them from imagining that their works--even as the fruit of the Spirit--are
pure and holy in themselves or in any way contribute to salvation. However, it is
precisely here that the second and third uses of the law merge. This is especially
evident in a passage like the following:
Believers, furthermore, require the teaching of the law in connection with
their good works, because otherwise they can easily imagine that their works
and life are perfectly pure and holy. But the law of God prescribes good
works for faith in such a way that, as in a mirror, it shows and indicates to
them that in this life our good works are imperfect and impure, so that we
must say with St. Paul, •1 am not aware of anything against myself, but I am
not thereby acquitted (1 Cor. 4: 4)." Thus, when Paul admonishes those who
have been born anew to do good works, he holds up before them precisely
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the Ten Commandments (Rom. 13: 9), and he himself learns from the law
that his works are still impure (Rom. 7: 18, 19) (SD VI, 21).
Here the didactic function of the law is closely coupled with its accusatory role.
The Fonnula specifically says that the law prescribes good works in such a way
that it also acts as a mirror which shows us our sins and our failure to do the very
works that the law demands. It is the nature of the law that it cannot instruct sinners without at the same time accusing them. The law is God's holy will, which
we are guilty of defying. Since we are sinners, it is impossible for us to hear the
law as pure instruction, without at the same time hearing its accusation. Therefore, any attempt to separate the law's accusatory role from its didactic role is
unwarranted. These two functions of the law, one positive, the other negative,
are closely connected. But they are not on an equal footing, for in Lutheran
theology the .chief function of the law is to accuse and terrify the conscience on
account of sin. The accusatory and didactic functions of the law are almost inseparable in actual experience. Therefore, we should not talk about the didactic
use of the law for believers in such a way that we fail to remember that since
Ouistians are still sinners, we can never completely isolate the didactic function
of the law (third use) from its accusatory role (second use). Although we have

emphasized that the law's primary role is negative, also in the Ouist:ian life, we
reject the notion that the law plays only a negative role in the life of the Oui.stian,
or that it has no objective content, a view particularly common among existentialist theologians.11 Even though the law always accuses, it does not only accuse.

Because believers are still sinners, they need the law to teach them the will and
commandments of God. However, the Fonnula of Concord avoids giving a direct
answer to the question of whether the tertius usus has to be taught or not; it really
does no more than show how it must not be taught. U
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If our argument is correct so far, and Ouistians, insofar as they are already
saints, do not need the instruction and guidance of the law to tell them what to
do, but do it gladly and willingly of their own accord--just as trees do not need to
be told to grow or planets to orbit the sun--then the question remains, How do
God's saints know his will? Although the Fonnula does not specifically address
this is.5ue, it does allude to the fact that we have the law written on our hearts,
and that this guides our conduct just as the law written on Adam's heart guided
him (SD VI, 5). The Epitome appeals to the law written on the heart as proof that
our first parents did not live without law, and understands it as belonging to
what it means to be created in the image of God (Ep. VI, 2). We could also refer
to Paul's words in Rom. 2: 15 to further support the view that all human beings
are born with the law of God written on the heart (implanted law). However,
when sin entered the world, this natural knowledge of God became so obscured
that Paul can argue in Romans 1 that human beings ought to know what is right
and wrong, yet because of sin they do not--and now cannot, because God in his
wrath has handed them over to their own wickedn~. Consequently, while it
may still be possible for people to know that there is a God, they do not know
who God is unless he first reveals himself to them. Ouistians know who God is,
preeminently through the revelation of himself in Jesus Ouist, as attested in the
words of Scripture. But in addition to that, they are heirs of the promise spoken
through Jeremiah, that when God makes a new covenant (testament) with his
people, he will write his law upon their hearts Oer. 31: 33-34; d. the promise of
the new heart and new spirit, Ezek. 36: 26-27). Even more, as believers in Ouist
we have a new nature, created in the image of God (Eph. 3: 24), and yet at the
same time, we are also being gradually transformed into that image (2 Cor. 3: 18).
While unbelievers may have some vague knowledge of God by virtue of creation,
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Christians have God's law inscribed on their hearts by virtue of redemption, as
he himself promised through Jeremiah. However, Ouistians in concreto are still
sinners, and even though they know God's will in their inmost self, sin prevents
them from carrying it out. Therefore, the knowledge of God's will written on the
heart is never enough; Ouistians also need to hear it preached from the written
word. However, when believers hear it, inasmuch as they are God's true saints,
they rejoice and delight in it, because it strikes a chord with them, and tells them
something that they already know.13 Thus the law written cm the heart (implanted law), which was first inscribed with creation, and which subsequently was
either entirely lost or fatally distorted through the fall, is now restored through
baptism (recreation) and the preaching of the gospel, and will continue being
restored until it is perfected with the resurrection of the body. However, it is
through the gospel, not the law, that the Holy Spirit writes his law on our hearts
in fulfillment of his own promise, and renews us in the image of God.1 4 Even so,
both law and gospel will only last as long as this aeon, until the old Adam, "that
intractable and recalcitrant donkey,• has finally been destroyed and we are completely renewed in the resurrection (SD VI, 24). Then, through God's indwelling
Spirit, we will do "his will spontaneously, without coercion, unhindered, perfectly, completely, and with sheer joy, and rejoice in it forever" (SD VI, 25).
It is important at this point in our discussion to examine the distinction
made between God's implanted law and his prc.1>.'.'laimed law, particularly with
reference to Adam. The former refers to the law that Adam was given when God
created him, and the latter to the law that he received forbidding him to eat from
the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil (Gen. 2: 16-17). 1he Formulil makes reference to the law written on the heart (implanted law), although it

does not specifically mention Jer. 31: 33-34. Th~ reason it is mentioned is to show
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that, even though Ouistians qua saints are no longer under the law, they are not
entirely without law, for "just as the first man immediately after his creation received a law according to which he should conduct himself,• so too God has also
implanted his law in our hearts by virtue of our new creation (Ep. VI, 2; SD VI, 5).
What then is the difference between these two laws? Since Scripture is silent
about the nature of the command given to Adam we must be cautious. First of
all, we can see no reason why the law inscribed on Adam's heart should be any
different from the law which God promised to write on the heart of his new
testament people (Jer. 31: 33-34). 11us law inscribed on the heart,· according to
Jer. 31: 34, ensures that all true believers will know God's will by heart--their new
heart, which they receive in baptism (Ezek. 36: 26-27).15 Therefore, it does not
seem unreasonable to posit that the implanted law given to Adam was simply
the pre-fall counterpart to the promise of the law written on the heart in connection with the new covenant. In other words, the eschatological promise of the
law written on the heart is simply a restoration of the implanted law that was lost
through the fall. Furthermore, since the law written on the heart, promised to
God's new covenant people, is an interioriza.tion of the law given by God to
Moses, and since the Mosaic law itself is summed up by the twofold command to
love, we can conclude that the implanted law also was nothing other than the
command to love God and the neighbor. If this is granted, then God did not
need to orally instruct Adam, by means of his proclaimed law, in how to lead a
holy life, because he knew that already, by virtue of the law that God had implanted in him when he first created him. What function then did the proclaimed
law of Genesis 2: 16-17 serve? Here we cannot be certain. Since it is without parallel it is all the more difficult to interpret. By setting limits to Adam's freedom, it
appears that this is God's way of helping him understand his position as creature
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vis-a-vis himself as creator. Since it is basically negative and confined to one pro-

hibition, there is scarcely any basis for understanding it as a moral norm. Nevertheless, regardless of how it is to be interpreted, we have to admit that Adam
was given an objective command.16 Undoubtedly, it is the transgresmon of this
divine command that Paul has in mind in Romans 5 when he develops his
Adam-Ouist contrast. When Adam disobeyed this command, he was not guilty
simply of some moral transgression, but, prompted by the tempter, he tried to
usurp the place of God and become like God himself (Gen. 3: 1-5). 1bis distinction between the implanted law and the proclaimed law is of the utmost importance, because those who defend the traditional understanding of the third use of
the law (specifically, that it applies to Ouistians qua saints) invariably draw a
parallel between the first creation and the new creation, and argue that just as
Adam in his state of innocence needed the proclaimed law, so too the "new man•
in Gui.st needs the instruction of the law.17 However, that line of argumentation

has been shown to be typically Reformed.18 The position that we are defending
is that even though Adam was given an objective instruction by God (proclaimed
law), it was not a guide or norm for life, since he had that already in the implanted law, but it was given for the purpose of defining the boundary between the
creature and the creator. By thP same token, if Ouistians were perfectly sinl~
and holy like Adam in paradise, they too would need no law to guide them. 'The
reason that they need the law is because they are still sinners.
So far we have argued that Ouistians, to the extent that they are truly
born anew, do not need the positive illstruction of the external moral law (proclaimed law) but already know God's will from the law written on their hearts
(implanted law). However, because they are not yet perfectly renewed but are
still sinners, they need the proclaimed law to instruct them in the good works
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that God wants them to do: works that are done to his glory and in the service of
the neighbor. Not only does the law remind them that even their best works are
still sinful and imperfect, it also makes it plain that it is impossible for them to be
Ouistians and not to be doing good works, or to remain in sin.19 The law in the
form of the Decalogue is a norm and rule for life against which we can test all the
decisions that we make in our freedom as Ouistians to see whether they are
done out of love for God and the neighbor. F. Hebart comments: •Toe Fonnula of
Conwrd claims that when we make decisions as believing Ouistian.s, we need a

standard and a guideline. We need God's commands to prevent us from falling
back and becoming slaves of our selfish nature again."20 This does not mean that
as Ouistian.s we are living under the law. Rather, it mean that the law is now
taken into the service of the gospel and used by the Spirit, who sanctifies us
through the means of grace. However, when view the good works that God
wants us to do as a means of increasing our own holiness and gaining favor in
his sight, then we are no longer living under the gospel but under the law, and

the works that we do are no longer the fruit of the Spirits but the works of the
law. Therefore, whether the Ten Commandments are used in the service of the
gospel for sanctification, or in the service of the law as works of the law, will
depend on whether or not they are done in faith. Works done under~ law are
never pleasing to God, no matter how good they may be outwardly, for they ar~
seen anthropocentrically as a demonstration of one's own holiness. Such works
draw attention to themselves and are hypocritical (d. the Pharisee's prayer in
Luke 18: 11-12: "I fast twice a week, I give tithes of all that I get'). On the other
hand, works done under the gospel are good because they are done in faith as thefruit of the Spirit and stand under God's forgiveness. Such works are good, for
the very reason that they are not intentionally done to merit anything from God;
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they are not even regarded as good but merely as one's duty (Luke 17: 10); they
are done out of genuine love for the neighbor, and not with a view to impressing
God (see Matt 25: 37-40, where the righteous ask out of surprise, "Lord, when did
we see you hungry and feed you .. .").
Only the gospel enables us to grow into and to live out our new life in
Ouist, because it was the gospel in the first place that gave us life through the

word and water of baptism. No discussion of sanctification can ever ignore
baptism. The Ouistian life is nothing else than a living out of our baptism, or,
better, the Christus in nobis living out his life in us (Gal. 2: 20). Ultimately, sanctification is Ouist's action in us.21 Before justification, all that the law can do is to
prepare the ground of the heart for the gospel, which alone gives life and fosters
growth. However, after justification, when the gospel takes the law into its own
service, even the Ten Commandments can be used by the Holy Spirit in his work
of ~anctification. However, that does not mean that the preaching of good works
(third use of the law) is a preaching of the gospel. Rather, it presupposes the
gospel, but itself remains a preaching of the law. Strictly speaking, anything that
cannot be correlated with the forgiveness of sins is law. Yet while the preaching
of good works remains law, when it is heard in faith it is seen as God's good gift.
Even though Ouistians are painfully aware that they will never live up to its
demands, yet in repentance they agree with its accusation, conf~ their sin, and
cling to God's mercy and forgiveness. Therefore, Ouistians are no longer condemned by the law, but begin to delight in it, knowing that whatever they cannot
fulfill, on account of the weakness of the flesh, will be fulfilled through faith and
the forgiveness of sins. No longer is the law seen as onerous but as the light yoke
that Ouist promises all who follow him. However, because the flesh (•old man•)
remains unconverted, it still fights against the law and then:'{ore must be con-
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demned by the law so that, through the power of the gospel, the "new man,· born
of water and the Spirit, might finally have his way, which ultimately is the way
of the Spirit (Gal. 5: 25).
We said earlier that it is only through the gospel that God's law is written
on the hearts of his new testament people, and that his image is renewed in us.
This raises the question, Can the preaching of the third use of the law ever pro-

mote sanctification. First, we should point out that, technically, we do not preach
a use of the law but law and gospel, nor can we assume that the third use is ever
going to be heard in isolation from the second use. However, the answer to the
question would be that everything will depend on how such preaching is heard.

If the admonitions of the New Testament are heard in faith and seen as ways in
which faith can expres.s itself in love, then the Holy Spirit can use the preaching
of good works for our sanctification. However, if the admonitions are heard by a
person still living under the law, such works will be seen as ways of meriting
God's favor and approval and will consequently not be the fruit of the Spirit but
merely the works of the law. Only a good tree can produce good fruit, and only
the gospel can make people into good fruit-bearing trees. Although the Spirit can
use the law in sanctification, it ultimately plays second fiddle to the gospel, for
the gospel alone is the power of God, not only in regeneration (salvation) but also
in sanctification. When this is forgotten the result is moralism.22
As long as we understand sanctification as that which God works in us

through the means of grace, it is perfectly correct to speak about progress in
sanctification. In this sense Luther can say that we are only halfway pure and
holy (LC II, 58). However, thi.& does not mean that our sanctification is empirically verifiable or quantifiable. That is the error of pietism, which identifies the

"new man• with the converted person so that one's progress in sanctification can
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be measured against the objective standard of the Decalogue. The problem with

pietism, among other things, is that it arises from a faulty anthropology, which
fails to realize that the Oui.stian remains simul iustus et peccator and that for precisely this reason no area of life can ever escape the reach of the law. Since
sanctification is God's action in us, like all his activity this side of the grave, it too
remains hidden under the old life, and hence is an article offaith. It Le, God's
good work in us through the Spirit, which he began at our baptism and will complete with the resurrection of the body at the day of Jesus Gui.st (see Phil. 1: 6).
Perhaps it is fitting to finish this chapter by referring to the remarks of
Chemnitz who, as we know, was one of the principal authors of the Fonnula of
Omcord, and is therefore likely to be its best interpreter. First of all, as we might

expect, Otemnitz follows the Fonnula in talking about three uses or purposes of
the law. He acknowledges that Luther works with basically a twofold use in his

Galatians u>mmentary, but surprisingly, he claims that Luther constructs a threefold division of the uses of the law based on Galatians 5, where •there is one use
of the law in justification and another for those who have been justified: He
cites Rom. 13: 8 (the obligation to love) and Gal. 5: 14 (the whole law summed up
in the command to love the neighbor) as the scriptural basis for a use of the law
among the regenerate, and alludes to Jer. 31: 33 (the law written on the heart) and
Psalm 119, in which the writer exults in the Torah.23 At first this comes as a surprise because, to the best of our knowledge, we know that Luther did not use the
terminology of the triplex usus legis. However, on closer inspection, the difference
is purely formal. Olemnitz's retnMks should not be construed as meaning that

he has documentary evidence of a literal threefold division of the law in Luther.
Rather, he is ascribing to Luther nothing more than we, together with the
Fonnula, unreservedly teach and confess, namely, that Ouistians also need the
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law because they are still sinners. The word "regenerate" is used here in the same
way as in the Article VI of the Fonnula, and refers not to the true believer as saint
but to the Ouistian as both saint and sinner. Otemnitz makes it clear that the
real issue that lies behind the battle over the law in his day is the q_uestion of
whether the law shows the regenerate how they may learn good works. The First
Antinomian Controversy dealt with the question of whether it is the law or the
gospel that reveals sin. Otemnitz affirms that there is now no longer any debate
over that in Lutheran circles; all agree that it is the law that reveals sin. The d~
bate has shifted rather to the question of whether the law is needed to teach
Otristians good works. 1hls falls right into the area of the third use of the law

and, as we saw in the excursus, formed the background to the Formula's article
on the tertius usus.
Otemnitz further elucidates exactly how he understands the use of the
law for the regenerate, and claims to be teaching according to "the bue and correct 'form of sound words." He lists three uses of the law in the regenerate: (1)
that believers should know "what kinds of works are pleasing to God, so that
they do not devise new forms of Gottesdienst without the Word" and may learn
that God at least wants them to begin obeying the commandments; (2) the law as
a norm is meant to keep Ouistians mindful of the imperfection of their works
because of their abiding sin; {3) due to the constant battle between "the outward
and the inner man,• the regenerate need the law to discipline and coerce the •old
man." It is also needed because "the beginnings of the new obedience are weak
and not supported by our whole spirit and mind" (Rom. 7: 25). The question now
is, What does one do to stimulate these very weak beginnings of the new obed-

ience-preach law or gospel? The answer, of course, is both. The flesh must be
disciplined with the law, on the one hand, and the weak beginnings encouraged
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with the gospel, on the other. •For we experience that the new obedience is not
so voluntary a thing as a good tree which brings forth its new fruit without any
command or exhortation• (Loci, 441).
We see then that, in spite of the fact that Cllemnitz attributes to Luther a
threefold use of the law, including a use for the regenerate, as we have it in the
Fonnula, in actual fact it is nothing more than Luther's twofold use. We can be

confident of this assertion because, as we have seen, Luther certainly applies the
law to Ouistians, and firmly rejects the claim that the regenerate no longer need
the law. Luther's answer (and this becomes especially clear in the Antinomian

Disputations) is that Ouistians are certainly no longer under the curse and condemnation of the law, but they need the law because they are still sinners. By not
only revealin_g to_pe~ple their sin, but also the enormicy of their sin in the light of
Christ's passion and death, the law keeps them dependent on Ouist and gospel.
Luther makes the point very forcefully in his treatise Against the Antinomians that
to remove the law means simultaneously to abolish sin, and to abolish sin means
to remove Ouist, the fulfiller of the law.24 In the final analysis, the antinomian
position is anti-gospel and anti-Cll.rist. In other words, the law must be retained
finally, not for its own sake, but for the sake of Christ and the gospel.25
Conclusions
We have argued in this chapter that although Luther did not adopt the
threefold use of the law introduced by Melanchthon and taken up by the Fonnula,
there is no disparity in doctrine between his theology of the law in his great

Galatians Commentary and the substance of the Fonnula, particularly Article VI.
The Confessions, and the Fonnula of Concord in particular, agree with Luther that
Ouistians, insofar as they are truly God's saints, do not need the law but, guided
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by the Spirit, do spontaneously and without coercion the very works that the law

demands. However, Ouistians, insofar as they are still sinners, need the law in
order to discipline and coerce the flesh since it is always opposed to the Spirit.
Ouistians, insofar as they are at once saints and sinners, do not live under the
law nor without the law but in the law. In other words, they live under grace in
the freedom of the gospel, but need the law as a norm to guide their actions and
Jecisions in order to ensure that they are not self-centered but are done out of
love for God and the neighbor. The law does not motivate them to do good
works, for this comes from the gospel and Spirit; yet the law disciplines them if
they fail to do good works.
Good works are necessary because they are commanded by God; at the
same time, they automatically follow justification as the fruit of faith. Christians
are not free to do just any works they please, but are called to do those specifically commanded by God and taught in the law. As well as teaching them what
works are pleasing to God, the law, acting as a mirror, also keeps believers mindful of the imperfection and unholiness of their works--even if they are the fruit of
the Spirit--and thus ensures that they do not become secure in themselves by
trusting in their own works, but continue to place their trust solely in Christ's
promise of forgiveness.
Since the law always accuses, and Oui.stians are still sinners, the accusin_g
function of the law is always going to be closely coupled with its didactic function. The law that teaches good works from the Decalogue and confirms the law

written on the heart is not some toothless tiger, but it is the same law which, with
one hammer blow, destroys both open sinners and false saints. When we agree
with its judgment that we are guilty sinners, and trust God's promise of forgiveness, the law ceases to be an enemy and becomes a friend, for then we see it as
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God's good gift, which shows faith how it can best serve both God and the neighbor; this in tum corresponds to faith's lnm06t desire and intention. However, if
we remain impenitent and do not acknowledge our sin but attempt to justify
ourselvea. oofore God, then we will never see the law as any thing more than an
enemy and a burden.
While we have our doubts about the concc_pt of the third use of the law as
defiood in chapter one, namely, the specifically positive, didactic use of the law
for the Chrh,1ian· qua saint, we affirm with Luther and the Confessions that Ouistiana still need the law to reveal sin, discipline the flesh, and to teach them the
works commanded by God. More important than the term is the way in which it
is understood. On the one hand, it will be used_pro_perly if it is seen as necessary

for Christians, insofar as they are t1iru1ers, in order to show them the works that
are pleasing to God, and to keep reminding them of the fact that they are sinners,
tKJ

that they put their trust in Ouist and not in their good works. This in tum

means that the third use of the law is very closely connected with the second and
chief use, which reveals to us our sin and again and again drives us to Cluist. On
the other hand, the third use will be misused if it is isolated from the second and
allowed to overshadow it. The result will be moralism and legalism, a charge
which Lutheran orthodoxy has not been able to escape. The confessional position
is rather that Ou-istians, motivated by the Spirit and llvin,; in the freedom of the
gospel, willingly look to the Commandments as a norm, to guide their actions
and decisions, so that all that th~y do ~y be done to the _praise of God and for
the love of the neighbor. Precisely because Ouistians live in the freedom of the
gospel and not under the law, the "third use of the law• is somewhat unfortunate
as a term to describe the role of the law in the Ouistian life because it accents the
law rather than the gospel. Although we have affirmed that the law is necessary
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for the Christian, it is there to serve the gospel. Joest has tried to clarify this with
the term 'practical use of the gospel,' while others have suggested the 'second
use of the gospel' (Laz.areth).26 However, these terms are also ~roblematical.
Since the law is subordinate to the gospel and actual~y serves the gospel in the
life of the Ouistian, perhaps it would be better to speak of the Gospel's use of the
law rather than the practical use of the gospel. 1his also makes it clear that, in
the final analysis, we are not the real 'users' of either the law or the gospel but
are simply the servants of him who uses both for his gracious purposes.
The term 'third use of the law' suggests that in the Ouistian life it is the
law as rule, norm, and guide which ultimately accomplishes our sanctification,
whereas we have argued that this is the task of the gospel, and that when the law
(specifically, the Decalogue) is used by the Holy Spirit for our sanctification, this
happens precisely because the law is now taken into service by the gospel so that
the gospel remains the power of God both in_ justification and sanctification. In
sanctification and the preaching of good works, no less than in justification, the
law serves its ultimate purpose when it is pressed into the service of the gospel.

NOTES
lThis twin perspective of law and gospel is reflected in Article VI of the

A14gsburg Confession on the new obedience where it says: •it is also taught among
us that such faith should {solUdebeat} produce good fruits and good works, and
that we mUbi [musseloporteat/ do all such good works as God has commanded
(CA VI). While this passage is specifically lntended to remind us as Ouistians
that good works are not optional but necessary /sollldebeat; mussloportet], it is also
a pointer to the fact that, insofar as we are born anew, good works will follow
spontaneously. Paul Althaus, Gebot und Gesetz: Zurn 11iema "Gesetz und
Evangelium,• (Gutersloh: C. Bertelsmann Verlag, 1952), 33, n. 1, is correct in
asserting, contra Elert, that when the Lutheran Confessions speak of the necessity
of good works, they refer not only to the nature of faith, but also to God's commands (d. Ap. IV, 189).

2a. Luther's remark in WA 43,255: 38, recorded in SD Ill, 41: "There is a
beautiful agreement between faith and good works; nevertheless, it is faith alone
that grasps the blesslng without works: See BKS 928, n. 1 for other references to
Luther. Edmund Schlink, Theologie der lutherischen Bekermtnisschriften, 3d ed.
(Munich: Ou. Kaiser Verlag, 1948), 156-8, shows that this is consistent with the
teaching of the Confessions generally.
3'y11e C',erman has no words corresponding to the Latin lege docentur which
means that the German simply says that those born anew also live and walk in
the law, whereas the Latin states that they are taught in the law how to live and
walk ln true piety. Without delving into the problems of textual transmission,
this variant alone indicates the reluctance of some to say that the law actually
teaches believers good works,
4Toe Confessions attest that our sanctification and renewal is inchoate and
imperfect because sin still dwells in the flesh (SD Ill, 23). Even regenerate people
cannot keep the law because of the old nature and its evil desires, although the
Spirit in us struggles against the flesh (Ap. IV, 146). The new obedience is something that begins and grows, is manifested •magis magisque• (Ap. IV, 124, 136),
but also more or less. Again, Luther can say that 'holiness has begun and is
growing daily,• that we are •halfway pure and half holy• [halb und halb reine und
heilig] and will remain this way until the flesh is completely destroyed in the
resurrection (LC ll, 57-58). Therefore, when it comes to speaking about regeneration, the Confessions use quantitative language to express its partiality and
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incompleteness. However, this is not meant to imply that God has only done half
a job. lhose whom God justifies he also sanctifies, but when seen from the
pcrspt.~ve of the Ouistian who is both saint and sinner, it is still incomplete ~d
will only be perfected in the resurrection of the body. In this sense, even faith
can be spoken of quantitatively: as a living, joyful, confident thing, it can 'grow
and be strengthened" (Ap. IV, 142,350), 'grow and increase• {Ap. IV, 189), as well
as decrease. Although the Confessions can use quantitative language to describe
the partiality and incompleteness of sanctification, they are united in affirming
(1) that sanctification remains wholly God's work, and (2) that justification is
whole and complete, and that the only righteousness that avails in the sight of
God is that of OuiBt--not our own inchoate rlghteousness--which is imputed to
us by faith {SD III, 32-36). This, as we saw, is preciscly Luther's position in his
great Galatians Commentary. Werner Elert, 1'he Strncture of Lutheranism. Vol. 1:

11ze Theology and Philosophy of Lutheranism Especially in the Sixteenth and Seiienteenth Centuries, trans. Walter A. Hansen (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House,
1962), 151, notes that, although Luther more than anyone else stressed the pure
passivity of faith and justification, at the same time he viewed faith as very concrete, empirical reality.
5tuther says that the hammer of God's law (Jer. 23: 29) daily works true
contrition in the believer and 'with one blow destroys both open sinners and
false saints" (SA III, 3, 2).

6schlink, Theologic, 175, n. 11, notes that while the arrangement of the
chief parts of the Small Catechism highlights the fact that the law is to be a disciplinarian (I) to drive us to Quist (II), the exposition of the Ten Commandments
in the lArge Catechism makes it clear that the Commandll'P.nts in the first chief
part are not only meant to be a disciplinarian, but also a comfort and an occasion
for doxology, as well as a demand for external civil discipline. This is .nothing
more than the realization that the Catechism, in all its parts, is intended for the instruction of the baptized.
7Luther, in his conclusion to the Ten Commandments in the lArge

Catechism, says:
Here, then, we have the Ten Commandments, a summary of divine
teaching on what we are to do to make our whole life pleasing to God. 1bey
are the true fountain from which all good works must spring, the true
channel through which all good works must flow. Apart from these Ten
Commandments no deed, no conduct, can be good or pleasing to God, no
matter how great or precious it may be in the eyes of the world (LC I, 311).
Again, at the end he says that the Commandments are to be extolled 'above all
Stti,ide, commands, and works otherwise taught and practiced,• and he defies
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anybody to come up with anything that can compare with them. God takes them
so seriously that he accompanies them with threats of wrath and punishment as
well as promises of great blessings. "Therefore, we should prize and value them
above all other teachings as the greatest treasure God has given us" (LC I, JJJ).
BEven the best of our works are to be regarded as altogether sinful. When
it comet. to sin and repentance, there is no room for calculatiow and casuistry.
Partial obedience is total disobedience. Thus, as Luther says, Ouistians in daily
repentance realize "that w~ are utterly lost, that from head to foot there is no
good in us .... Repentance ... lumps everything together and says, 'We are
wholly and altogether sinful .... Or.e thing is sure: we cannot pin our hope on
anything that we are, think, say, or do" (SA III, 3, 35-36).
9some examples will illustrate the point. The third reason for the law
cited by the Epitome is that Ouistians, 'after they are reborn, and although the
flesh still inheres in them,• need •on that account a definite rule, according to
which they should pattern and regulate their entire life' (Ep. VI, 1). It is clear
from this passage that the law is given to believers on account of the flesh which
still inheres in them. Again, 'on account of this old Adam, who inheres in
people's intt!llect, will, and all their powers, it is ncceS&ll)' for the law of God
constantly to light their way lest in their merely human devotion they undertake
self-decreed and self-chosen acts of serving God" (Ep. VI, 4). The Solid Declaration
offers a similar testimony. Again, in connection with the third function, we read
that those "who have bl-en converted to the Lord and from whom the veil of
Moses has been taken away, learn (from the law) to live and walk in the law' (SD
VI, 1). The persons being spoken of here are Ouistians, who are both righteous
and sinners.
10in fact, we need to remember that thl law extolled in the Psalms is not
the law in the narrow sense, but rather the Torah, which also includes the gospel.
Therefore, it is not simply the law, but the word of God, with all its admonitiOllB
as well as promises, which becomes the Ouistian's delight and object of meditation. It is because of the ambiguity of the word 'law" that some, like Althaus,
distinguish terminologically between the command, as God's eternal will, and
the negative form of that will in the law that accuses.
11 This point of view is quite common among those who reject a third use
of the law. As an example, we cite Gerhard 0. Forde, The Law-Gospel Debate: An
Interpretation of Its Historical Development (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing
House, 1969), 175-97. This may be the place to make some comments on the
existential interpretation of the law in Luther's theology, which Forde defends.
He builds on the work of Lauri Hai.kola, who argues that the major differ~K.."e

120

between Luther and later Lutheran orthodoxy lies in the Wlderstanding of the
law, particularly the idea developed in orthodoxy that the law is an objective
order, a lex adima, which embodies the moral law. Forde rejects the notion that
the law of God has an objective, abiCWtg co"tent which can be taught and known.
Instead, he emphasizes the fu"ctio" of the law and defines as law anything that
terrifies the conscience and threatens my existence. The knowledge of God's will
is not mediated through a timeless law but is something that l must determine
for myself in each concrete, existential encounter in this life. Therefore, for Forde
the law cannot be identified with any code like the Decalogue. In this way, he
can maintain that the law is not eternal but purely temporary. It is limited to the
old aeon. He stresses the eschatological character of the law rather than seeing it
in terms of a continuous or timeless scheme: eschatological in the sense that the
reign of the law in this aeon comes to an end when the gospel breaks in and gives
me the possibility of a new existence in Christ. It is not difficult to see why this
view allows no room for a third use of the law. The major criticism that we have
with this position is that it denies any positive function to the law at all, and that
it completely evacuates it of objective content and talks only of its fWlction.
12Tois point is made by Ragnar Bring, "Gesetz und Evangelium und der
dritte Gebrauch des Gesetzes in der lutherischen Theologie, • in Zur Theowgie
Luthtrs: Aus der Arbeit der Ll4ther-Agricola Gesellschaft in Finnland, Schrlften der
Luther-Agricola Gesellschaft in Finnland 4 (Helsinki: Akateeminen Kirjakauppa,
1943), 88.

13wemer Elert, Structure, 36, refers to Luther's remarks on the reciprocity
between the two diff"rent forms of revelation, one in the conscience (implanted
law), the other in history (written law). Luther says: "Thus I now keep the
commandments that Moses gave, not because Moses gave them, but because they
have been implanted in me by nature; and here Moses is in agreement with
nature• (VvA 24, 10: 3; How Orristians Should Regard Moses, 1525/1526). Elert
remarks that the •correspondence of the written or proclaimed law to the
implanted law is not accidental. The former would leave us untouched if the
latter did not exist. U it is proclaimed, man's heart replies: 'So it is!' But the
opposite is also true: Satan's opposition blinds the heart to such an extent that the
proclaimed Word must first awaken that voice of the heart• (VvA 16,447: 10;
Sermons on the Second Book of Moses, 1524-1527).
14francis Pieper, Ouistllche Dogmati.k, Vol. 3 (St Louis: Concordia
Publishing House, 1920), 20-21, says that the law assists in the work of sanctification only by continually preparing for the gospel. The g~l itself is the
only source of sanctification. He also agrees that the law is inscribed by the
preaching of the gospel. In a very instructive note, Pieper (p. 18, n. 18) rejects
Baler's exegesis of Gal. 5: 16, in which he attributes the suppression of the flesh to
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the law, and iNtead ascribes it to the Spirit. He cites Carpzov approvingly as a
corrective to Baier: "lne law indt.aed is said 'to be inscribed in the heart,' Jer. 31:
:\J, but it does not inscribe. The inscription takes place solely through the Gospel.
Solely that which regenerates us renews us; now, we are born again solely by the
C,oe;~l; ergo, we are also renewed solely by the Gospel. 1his statement does not
deny that the Law doee, some service in the work of sanctification." Pieper is
right as far cUt he goos, but he has not quite pressed far enough to be able to say
that the law sanctifies when it is taken into the service of the gospel.
15Although Jer. 31: 34 specifically says that no longer will people have to
teach each other who God is ('know the Lord')--Flrst Table--we can no doubt
assume--on the basis of pars pro loto--that the matters embraced by the Second
Table are also included in the content of this written law. This would be consistent with Ouist's teaching that U,e whole law (and even the prophets) can be
:iummed up in the command to love God and the neighbor (Matt. 22: 34-40).
16Luther also acknowledges that, but in his own peculiar way specifically
the command as God's mandate to establish the church and external worHhip located at the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. However, Luther says
nothing about God's proclaimed law being given to Adam as a guide for life, nor
does he conclude from the fact that God gave his proclaimed law to Adam that
the "new man" in Quist alBO ru.~ds the proclaimed law. Luther also addresses
the Heeming contradiction that, on the one hand, God gives his law to Adam in
his iMocence, and yet that, on the other, Paul says that the law was not given for
the just (1 Tlm. 1: 9). Some deduced from this that the law E;iven to Adam was
mtm~ly an exhortation, and that Adam's disobedience was not really sin, because
where there is no law sin is not reckoned as sin (Rom. 5: 13). Luther shows that
the weakness in this syllogiBm lies in the fact that Paul is talking about the law
given by God after sin, which in fact was given, not for the just, but for the unjwrt, as the rest of the First Timothy passage shows. Therefore, Luther concludes
that it is fallacious to try to use that text to argue that God did not really give
Adam a law. Rather, the law that he was given was of an altogether different
type than that after the fall, which acCUBes and condemns. However, as we said
befo.e, Luther does not use Gen. 2: 16-17 to make what might seem to be the
obvious application to th<' life of the believer, but rather holds that the reason
Adam needed this command concerning the tree was in order to establish an
outward form of worship and an outward form of obedience to God. 1be antischtdlmttrisclt thrust of Luther's exegesis is not hard to detect (WA 42, 80: 1-82: 29;
Ltcturts on Genesis). As noted by Julius KOstlin, The Theology of Luther in Its Hist<>riCSJl Development and lmi.:r H,mnony, trans. Olarles E. Hay, vol. 2 (Philadelphia:
Lutheran Publication Society, 1897), 501-2, Luther's comments do not finally answer the most pressing question in the debate about the third use of the law, and
that is whether the Oui.stian, as a new creation, acts from an inner inclination or
til.~li
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in response to the externally imposed "ought" of the taskmaster. Kostlin's own
position seems to call into question the need for the law to instruct the Ol.ristian
qua saint in the knowledge of God's will for life.
171rus position is typified by David P. Scaer, "Formula of Concord Article
VI: The Titlrd Use of the Law,• Concordia Thtalogical Quarterly 42 (April 1978): 145
-55. For Scaer the original positive fWlction of the law is replaced by a negative
prohibition. ln paradise it served as •a description of man's positive relationships
to God, to his fellowmen .. ." (151). He sees the law having two components, a
positive and a negative, a didactic and an imperative. ln the state of innocence
the indicative merged with the imperative. "There was no tension between what
man did and what man could, must, and should do. Now in the state of sin what
man must do and should do is no\ what he can do and does do" (151). The negative prohibition spoken to the first Adam is today applied to the old Adam. In
the third use, according to Scaer, "the tension between law and gospel is finally
resolved,• and the believer "grows constantly in the knowledge of God's positive
requirements for his life" (155). One problems with Scaer's argument, in our
opinion, is that he does not distinguish between the implanted and proclaimed
law. Hence, he sees the proclaimed law (our terminology), which was originally
good but became negative after the fall, return to its originally intended purpose
as a guide to U1e life of the regenerate, by which he means the Otristian as saint.
We however would argue that the reason Ouistians, insofar as they are saints,
frl>ely and spontaneously do what the law requires is because the law is written
on their hearts, and Ouist dwells within them. The proclaimed law, on the other
hand, in the form of parenesis based on the Decalogue, simply reinforces what
they know already. It is not a question of either-or but both-and insofar as Ouistians are both saints and sinners. The other problem that we have with Scaer's
position is that it does not reckon sufficiently with the Anfechtung arising from
the constant attempt on the part of the law (in cahoots with Satan) to rob the conscience of its peace and freedom in Gui.st by reminding it of its sin and God's
righteous anger. Again and again, Luther says that distinguishing between law
and gospel is easy in theory but very hard in practice--and it is hard for this
reason, because the law is continually challenging the liberating words and promises of the gospel, and, already like the serpent in Eden, trying to sow doubt by
always asking: Did God really say?--did he really say that you are forgiven? did
he really say that you are free from the law? free from the consequences of breaking his commandments? It is precisely in the midst of this kind of Anfechtung
that the Ouisfo•n conscience, which now belongs to Ouist alone and cannot be
shared with the law, must learn to send the law packing, and infaith appeal to
God against its accusations in the name of the gospel, which has the final word.
Luther's stress on the struggle in the conscience, which arises directly from the
fact that we are simultaneously saints and sinners, flesh and spirit, reminds us
that while in our inmost self we delight in the law as God's good gift, Satan can
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also use it in times of temptation to afflict our conscience in an attempt to bring
us back into slavery.

1811us has been noted by August Pieper, "The Difference Between the
Reformed and the Lutheran Interpretation of the So-called Third Use of the Law,•
Wiswnsin Lutheran Quarterly 87 (Spring 1990): 108-22. He points out that in the
Reformed view both the first man and the "new man" are under the law. The law
in question is not the implanted law, but the proclaimed law. For Adam it existed as an external norm, which he was obligated to live by. Furthermore, the law
is seen as the means of bringing about Adam's perfection, which in Reformed
thinking, was not given with his creation in the divine image, but is seen as
something that he had to progressively develop into. The prescriptions of the
law in fact provide the motivation for action. Lutherans however view Adam as
having been created perfectly without any real need for development. Hence,
there was no discrepancy between God's will and Adam's will before the Fall, for
he lived in complete harmony with God.
19in WA 50,599: 18-600: 19 (On the Councils and the Church, 1539), Luther
asserts against the antinomians that to make a hiatus between the forgiveness of
sins and the cessation of sins is to grant the premise and deny the conclusion.
Christ earned for us both gratia and donum, so that we may not only be forgiven,
but also empowered to case from sin. In the same treatise Luther also touches on
how the Holy Spirit sanctifies us according to the Ten Commandments:
We need the Decalogue not only to tell us of our lawful obligations, but
we also need it to discern how far the Holy Spirit has advanced us in his
work of sanctification, and by how much we still fall short of the goal,
lest we become secure and imagine that we have now done all that is
required. Thus, we must constantly grow in sanctification and always
become new creatures in Ouist. This means "grow" and "do so more
and more" [2 Peter 3: 18] (WA 50,643: 19-26).
There is a world of difference between Luther's understanding of progress in
sanctification and that common in pietism and Calvinistic circles. Luther does
not use the Decalogue to check his progress in holiness so that he can become
proud of himself or self-righteously compare himself with others. Rather, he
uses the Decalogue primarily as a mirror to keep him humble by reminding him
of how far short he falls from keeping the Commandments properly. Luther
knows that the more we submit ourselves to the Spirit through the word, the
more he will effect in us a daily sanctification and vivification in Ouist, according to the First and Second Tables of the Law.

20friedemann Hebart, One in the Gospel: The Formula of umcord for Our Day
(Adelaide: Lutheran Publishing House, 1979), 70.
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21Harold L. Senkbeil, Sanctification: Christ in Action: Evangelical Challenge
and Lutheran Response (Milwaukee: Northwestern Publishing House, 1989), 184-5,
rightly points out that the Ouistian life is not the Ouistian in action but Gui.st in
action, and that finally Ouist is to be found, not in the human heart, but in the
gospel.
22Tius is stressed by Armin W. Schuetze, "On the Third Use of the Law,
Luther's Position in the Antinomian Debate (FC VIt in No Other Gospel: Essays in
Commemoration of the 400th Anniversary of the Fonnula of Cona11d 1580-1980, ed.
Arnold J. Koelpin (Milwaukee: Northwestern Publishing House, 1980), 227.
23Martin Chemnitz, Lod Theologici, trans. J. A. 0. Preus, vol. 2 (St Louis:
Concordia Publishing House, 1989), 439.
24w A 50,471: 14-21 (Wider die Antinomer, 1539).
25Luther asks, How will we know what Ouist did for us, if we do not
know what the law is, which he fulfilled for us, and what sin is, for which he
made satis(action. He insists that it is only when we hear how much Ouist the
Son of God had to suffer on our behalf that we realize the magnitude of our sin.
This is an example of how the preaching of Ouist's death can be a preaching of
the law, even if the term "law• is never mentioned. "For in the Son of God I behold the wrath of God in action, while the law of God shows it to me with words
and with lesser deeds (WA 50, 473: 20-25). FC SD V, 12 affirms the same thing
when it says, with reference to the passion and death of Oui.st, "as long as all this
proclaims the wrath of God and terrifies human beings, it is not yet the gospel
nor Ouist's own proclamation, but it is Moses and the law pronounced upon tile
unconverted." The antinomians claimed a new method of preaching: they first
preached grace, which they said leads to repentance, and only then did they proclaim the revelation of God's wrath. Luther however insisted that in fact repentance is brought about by the preaching of law and gospel, for although Paul says
that God's kindness is meant to lead us to repentance (Rom. 2: 14), he also says
that the law brings wrath (Rom. 4: 15). On this see, WA 50, 474: ~27.
26William H. ~ •Foundation for Cluistian Ethics: The Question of
the 'Third Use' of the Law,• in Confession and Congregation, ed. David G. Truemper. The Cresset, Occasional Paper: m (Valparaiso: Valparaiso University Press,
1978), 55, uses the term "second" use of the gospel in the sense of •justifying faith
active in sanctifying love.• He rejects the third use of the law in the traditional
sense as Calvinistic, and asserts ralher that if the term must be used, "such a socalled 'third' use does not essentially differ from the first and second uses. It is
merely the pastoral application of the first and second uses of God's law to Ouistians as well as to non-Ouistians." Lazareth docs not seE' the "third• use differing
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in either kind or function, but only in the area of its application--i.e., it applies to
Olristians as well as to non-Ouistians. In denying that there is a special, positive
use of the law exclusively for reborn Ouistians, he follows Bring, while in distinguishing between Gebot and Gesetz, applying the tertius usus to the former and
not to the latter, he is a disciple of Althaus.

CONCLUSIONS
Our aim in this thesis was to examine Luther's understanding of the
role of law in the Ouistian life, based mainly on his Galatians C.Ommentary
of 1531, and then to compare that with the teaching of the Confessions, in particular Article VT of the Fonnula of Concord. This has been done against the
background of the modem debate over the third use of the la":', and in the
light of some of the questions that it raises. When we speak about law in the
sense of the tertius usus, we follow the Fonnula in defining it as the eternal,
unchangeable will of God, which is normative for the Christian life.
Since the third use can be understood in different ways, we defined it,
for the purposes of discussion, as a positive, didactic use, specifically for the
Ouistian qua saint. We have called this the traditional view because it came
to the fore in the period of Lutheran orthodoxy. We saw in our survey that
most modem Luther scholars reject the idea that Luther taught a third use of
the law. It is almost universally agreed that Luther did not use the
terminology of the triplex usus legis, first introduced by Melanchthon, but
consistently spoke of the duplex usus legis. However, the problem of Luther
and the third use of the law cannot be solved merely on the basis of terminology, but only by inquiring into how he understands the theological function
of the law when applied to the preaching of good works.

Our research has led us to the conclusion that, although Luther does
not employ the terminology of the tertius usus, he ~aches the doctrine of the
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third use as confessed by the Fonnula of Concora. However, neither say that
the law is intended specifically for the Christian qua saint; rather both agree
that the law is for the Christian qua sinner. Article VI of the Fonnula agrees
with Luther in teaching that Christians, insofar as they are saints, have no
need to be instructed by the law but know by nature (the new nature born of
water and the Spirit in baptism) what God requires, and do it with a free and
willing spirit. According to Luther, faith does not wait to be told what to do
but does it immediately, because it can do nothing else. Just as God inscribed
the law on Adam's heart when he created him, Christians also know God's
law, in the sense of his unchangeable will, because they have been recreated
in the image of God, and through the preaching of the gospel the law is reinscri bed on their heart. On the other hand, insofar as Ou-istians are still sinners, they need to be taught what good works are pleasing God; not only that,
the flesh must be coerced into doing them, by all manner of threats. But even
more importantly, because they are still sinners, Oui.stians need the accusation of the law (second use) to convict them of sin and to drive them again
and again into the arms of Christ. Therefore, because Christians are simul

iustus et peccator, although they already know God's will through the law
inscribed on the heart, and through the indwelling of Ouist and the Spirit by
faith, they also need the proclaimed law to instruct them in that will. These
two must not be played off against each other. Believers know God's will
through faith, and yet they also need to be reminded of it through the preach_ing of the word.
The term tertius usus legis is somewhat unfortunate and often results
in the Christian life being seen as a life of obedience to the law instead of a life
of faith lived in the freedom of the gospel. For that reason it would be better
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to speak about the use of the law in the service of the gospel rather than the
third use of the law. However, any rejection of the substance of the third use
as define:d in Article VI of the Fonnula of Concord cannot be justified if it is
predicated on the assumption that Christians no longer need the law. This
cannot be supported either by Luther or the Confessions. Christians certainly
are free from the law in their conscience--free primarily from the curse,
accusation, condemnation, and compulsion of the law. However, insofar as
they are still sinners, they remain bound by the law in their bodies, that is, in
the sphere of their relationships, vocation, and service in this world. That
qualification must be clearly made, otherwise simply to assert that Christians
are free is at best ambiguous or at worst antinomian. Christians in concreto
are free from the condemnation of the law and no longer live under the law
(in their conscience), but neither do they live without law (in their bodies);
rather they live in the law; that is, Christ the fulfiller of the law lives in them
by faith (Gal. 2: 20), and this manifests itself in love (Gal. 5: 6).
Christians are never absolutely free but always remain slaves. But we
who have been redeemed from the tyranny of Satan are now the willing
slaves of Christ, for he is our gracious mru;ter who became a slave himself for
our sake, to free us from the curse and condemnation of the law, which falls
on all who disobey it. Now that the onus of salvation is no longer on us but
on Christ, we are free to serve the neighbor in love. However, since we are
not yet perfect but are constantly fighting the old Adam, it is easy for us to be
deceived into thinking that God is pleased by whatever pious works we
choose to do. In reality, however, all self-chosen works inevitably end up
being either an escape from the concrete needs of the neighbor or purely selfserving, and thus idolatrous. This is the reason for Luther's continual insis-
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tence that believers n1ust be taught the good works commanded by God. Of
course, he knows that Otristians, insofar as they are reborn saints, do not
need this instruction, because they do good works spontaneously, just as a
tree produces fruit. Faith without works is not faith. The problem is the
flesh, which wants to hinder believers from doing good works. Hence, the
law finally must be preached to Christians in order to compel the flesh to do
the will of God. At the same time, it needs to be continually held up to
believers as a mirror, so that they remember that they are still sinners, that
even their best works are siJ\ful, and that ultimately they are "good works"
only because they are forgiven. The law then not only teaches Christians
what works God wants them to do, but at the same time accuses them of not
doing them; thus, it continually reminds them that they are sinners and that
their only hope of salvation lies, not in their good works, but in God's mercy
and forgiveness. Therefore, the second and third uses of the law belong together. Insofar as Christians are already iusti, they will delight in the exhortation of the law and see it as a means of praising God and serving the neighbor in love; on the other hand, insofar as Christians are still peccatores, they
will hate the law and falls under its condemnation, because the law reveals
their pride and self-righteousness, and magnifies their sin. So even though
the law guides the Christian to do those works that are pleasing to God, it
never only guides or instructs, but also always accuses, insofar as the saint is
never without the old Adam.
Our research has clearly shown that both Luther and the Confessions
teach that the law plays an important positive role in the Ouistian life by
teaching believers the good works that are pleasing to God. For that reason,
we cannot accept the view, common among existentialist theologians, that
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the only role that the law plays for Christians is the purely negative one o.
accusing and condemning the conscience and driving them again and again
to Quist. On the other hand, it is the clear teaching of both Luther and the
Confessions that it is the chief role of the law to accuse and convict people of
sin. This is an important distinction between the Lutheran and Reformed
understanding of the law, the Reformed stressing that the didactic use of the
law is the chief use. However, these two offices, that of accusing and teaching,
while theoretically distinct, in actual practise remain closely connected. The
law that teaches believers the good works that God wants them to do is the
same law that convicts them of failing to do them. However, even though
the law may still accuse their conscience, it can no longer condemn them, for
as long as they remain in Christ through faith they are covered by his forgiveness.
Whether we continue using the terminology of the triplex usus legis or
go back to Luther's duplex usus is finally only a matter of nomenclature, provided we uphold the doctrine of he law as taught by article VI of the Fonnula

of Concord. However, we have drawn attention to some of the problems that
occur when the third use of the law is overemphasized at the expense of the
second and chief use, or even worse, when the Christian ethic is based on the
law rather than the gospel. A patently false understanding of the role of the
law in sanctification developed during the age of pietism, which inherited an
"un-Lutheran" emphasis on the tertius usus from Lutheran orthodoxy. We
learned from this that when the third use is isolated from the second, and
coupled with an unbiblical ~thropology--specifically, the failure to recognize
that Christians are at one and the same time flesh and spirit, saints and
sinners---the result is a distinctly Calvinistic doctrine of sanctification with its
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attendant dangers of moralism and legalism. lhis kind of error can easily be
fostered by an overemphasizing the informatory, didactic, and hortatory role
of the law while forgetting that the law's chief use is to accuse people of sin
and drive them again and again to Quist, so that they remain totally dependent on him and the Spirit for their sanctification, and not think that their
good works make them more holy in the sight of God. When the "new self"
is empirically identified with the converted self, as in pietism, it easily
happens that one's progress in sanctification is measured against the norm of
the Commandments and becomes an occasion for spiritual pride and fleshly
security, rather than humility, as in the case of Luther, who used the Commandments as a reminder of how little he had progressed in sanctification
and of how far he still had to go.
The perception that the law plays a basically positive role after justification compared with beforehand has led to various attempts to situate the law
in the Christian life more on the side of the gm;pel than of the law. It is on
this basis that some say that the "third" use of the law is so "Wl.law-like" that

it would be better to refer to the law in the vita christiana as the practical use
of the gospel (J~lest), or the second use of thE gospel (Lazareth). The position
that we have taken however is that this may lead to a confusion of law and
gospel. It is not so much the law that changes (contra Althaus, who speaks of
the change from Gebot to Gesetz after the fall and its reversal in Ouist) as
people--from unbaptized unbelievers to baptized believers. The law remains
law; for that reason when the Decalogue, like parenesis, it is addressed to
Christians, is still law, even though it functions differently than the second
use. What has changed is the people it addresses. Parenesis--which is basically the appeal to Ouistians to be what they are-is directed to people who
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have been justified and who now have a new heart and mind. While it is
not the gospel, it is addressed to people who have heard the gospel and live
under the gospel. Since believers now see the law with new eyes, they see it
as God's good and gracious gift and therefore delight in it with all their heart,
for it shows them the way to do precisely what their new self want to do: to
praise God for his gift of salvation, and to serve the neighbor in love. In the
final analysis then, the third use of the law is not simply a use of the law for
its own sake, but a use of the law in the service of the gospel. For this reason,
it is probably better to talk about the gospel's use of the law rather than the
practical use of the gospel. This also makes it clear that, in the end, we are not
the real "users• of either law or gospel, but simply the servants of him who
uso both for his gracious purposes.

A proper application of the third use of the law always presupposes a
careful distinction between law and gospel. Even though Christians greet the
Decalogue with joy, because it corresponds to their own inmost intentions,
yet because they are still sinners struggling against the flesh, the law will still
try to accuse their conscience, rob it of its freedom and comfort in Christ, and
take it back under bondage. At such times, when the conscience is assailed by

Anfechtung, we need to say with Luther that we want nothing to do with
Christ as example (law) but only with Christ as gift (gospel). Luther expresses
this very well in a sermon he preached on January 1, 1532, where he says that,

when law and gospel are battling head to head to control of the conscience, it
_is very difficult to distinguish between law and gospel; we cannot simply say

that the law is for the old Adam and the gospel is for our timid and terrified
conscience. Rather, we must believe the promise of the gospel in spite of the
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demands and accusations of the law, for to allow the law to get the upper
hand in the conscience would amount to a denial of the gospel (WA 38, 8-42).
We have shown that Ouistians need the instruction of the law because
they are still sinners. The challenge however facing the tertius usus is how to
"use· it without falling prey to the twin dangers of moralism and legalism.
These errors will only be avoided (1) provided that the third use is never isolated from the gospel, for the gospel alone provides the basis and motivation
for the new life; and (2) provided that the third use is never used apart from
the second and chief use, for it is only when Ouistians, in the full knowledge
of their sin, despair of their own attempts to keep the law and look to Christ
in faith, that they will more and more take delight in the Commandments,
and prize them as God's gracious gift to guide us in his ways.
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